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It has been a great privilege to be part of the Sociology Department at the ANU, a thriving 
intellectual community that also provides a level of personal support of great comfort during 
the sometimes melancholic and obsessive process of writing a dissertation. 
The Difference Lab (formerly the New Critical Theory group), a collaborative effort formed to 
foster new experimental and generative approaches to thought and practice, has also been a 
significant source of inspiration and collegiality.  The members of this group – Maria Hynes, JD 
Dewsbury, Scott Sharpe, Miranda Bruce, Philippa Barter, Seimeng Lai, Rohan Todd, Oriane 
Simon, and Clare Southerton – have always shown a willingness to countenance what may be 
seen as risky and taboo entanglements, and I am grateful that they have been willing to 
indulge my interest in recent developments in empirical moral psychology, including the 
question of whether masturbating using a store-bought chicken, and then proceeding to cook 
and consume it, would constitute an instance of a ‘non-moral wrong’ suitable for use as an 
experimental stimulus (see Haidt, Koller and Dias, 1993: 617).  
Since 2013 I have enjoyed tutoring and presenting several guest lectures at the ANU and the 
University of Canberra across of variety of courses.  Of particular satisfaction were two 
semesters in a largely STS based course that attracted an incredible variety of students.  During 
one of the class discussions regarding the increasingly popular and sophisticated practices of 
the ‘quantified self’, one student mentioned his use of a digital sleep tracking application.  This 
program, he informed us, tracks movement of the body as a correlative measure of the overall 
restfulness and quality of sleep.  Lying awake one night, this student became restless and had 
an urge to reposition his stiffening limbs.  However, knowing that this would result in a 
noticeable ‘spike’ that would affect the application’s overall assessment of the quality of his 
‘sleep’, he decided against moving, instead remaining awake (and in growing discomfort), but 
retaining the application’s positive assessment of his aptitude in sleeping.  In some sense this 
cruel absurdity captures an underlying motivation of this thesis in considering to what 
authorities and artefacts we willingly give over assessments of our wellbeing, and the 
consequences of when narrow or corrupted scripts embedded in these devices and discourses 
results in optimistically according ourselves to self-defeating labours.  It is these small but 
significant revelatory moments that I have found especially rewarding in teaching.   
Early portions of this research were presented at the University of Queensland and Goldsmiths 
University of London, and I am grateful to those seminar participants who offered constructive 
insight at this formative stage. 
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Very late in the final writing process I was offered the chance to speak at the University of 
Heidelberg on other research I have conducted in tandem with this thesis.  This provided a 
useful opportunity to establish some objective remove from the thesis during the final stages, 
and so I am grateful to Katja Rakow and Esther Berg from the Cluster of Excellence Asia and 
Europe research group at Heidelberg for funding my visit. 
I owe a great debt to my supervisor, Maria Hynes, for both her intellectual insight and 
steadying hand.  Moreover, I am grateful to Maria for allowing me the freedom to pursue 
several lines of inquiry simultaneously, while always serving as an orienting touchstone to help 
ground my often wayward thinking, gently corralling me towards rigour and clarity in my 
writing. 
Finally, I must thank my family for their support over the last few years.  My partner Natasha, 
especially, has been a source of encouragement throughout the entirety of this effort.  Though 
we generally choose to undertake writing a doctoral thesis because we strongly believe in the 
importance of the task at hand, there is no denying that it can prove a somewhat selfish cause 
given the burdens it may place on those closest to us.  With these debts in mind, I hope this 
thesis proves to have been a worthwhile endeavour in tentatively seeking ways we can realise 






















This thesis seeks to trace the escalating shift from mind to brain and resulting changes in 
understandings of care for the self, emergent in part through growing influence of neuroethics 
and related calls for ‘neuro-enhancement’ of the ethical subject.  This study – propelled largely 
through a critical discourse analysis of recent disciplinary output and public engagement – is 
particularly interested in observing the increasing confidence of neuroscience-informed 
perspectives on humanity, with announcements that we are witnessing a so-called ‘Second 
Enlightenment’.  Such calls for a new ontology of ethics, I argue, amounts to overly ‘expansive’ 
claims funnelled through increasingly ‘intensive’ gazes.  Within the rise of neuroscience more 
broadly, empirical neuroethics proclaims its epistemic privilege with respect to tracing our 
moral selfhood, in part through its location of measures of the ethical subject within 
functionally ascribed activity traced at the neurological level.  Once elusive properties of 
conduct and wellbeing are now sought to be registered in the common currency of this 
synaptic ledger, exclusively overseen by specialists in this new field of expertise. 
  
The thesis then explores the subsequent adoption of this new empirical currency by those 
practicing a ‘hard’ transhumanism.  Advocates of this position urge us to embrace methods of 
cognitive and moral ‘enhancement,’ lest we find ourselves unfit for the future in a world of 
ever-escalating risk.  However, I argue that dominant framings of care of the self within 
neuroethics tend to be narrowly construed.  I suggest that by failing to recognise the socio-
historical contingencies of their claims, neuroethicists risk producing rigid, stultifying, and 
perhaps even self-defeating constructs of the ideal citizen.  The personal ethos advanced by 
these new technologies of the self creates new forms of personal responsibility, which, 
consistent with neoliberal ideals of progress, involves a perpetual labour upon one's brain as a 
mode of accumulation strategy.  This threatens to become a cruel labour that ultimately jars 
with our eventual and inevitable neurodegeneration. 
  
In response to this emerging ethos, I attempt to go beyond the constraints of a merely critical 
discourse to enable a more productive, if cautious, engagement with the claims of the new, 
applied neuro-disciplines.  I consider what kind of differently expansive framing of subjectivity 
might be better suited to the present, compared with the ‘hyper-cognitive’ subject of certain 
‘hard’ neuroscientific and neuroethical discourses.  Contributing to the growing interest in the 
social sciences in the broad movement of ‘neurodiversity’, I turn to fictional accounts of 
dementia to see what might be learned from these literary sources.  I argue that these literary 
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explorations of subjectivity open up novel ways of reconceiving our relation to our neurology, 
and thus may play an important role in reimagining the self in a manner adequate to the 
complexity, urgency, and promise of our times.  Though grounded primarily within the field of 
the sociology of science and technology, this thesis also draws extensively on related thought 
in poststructuralist critical and literary theory, while also maintaining an accessibility acutely 
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Chapter One   
The Promise of the Brain 
 
Introduction: Where should we direct our gaze? 
 
In a paper on ‘How to Talk About the Body?’, Bruno Latour (2004: 224-227) recounts that a 
former colleague, the neurophilosopher Paul Churchland, would proudly carry in his wallet a 
picture of his wife, fellow neurophilosopher Patricia Churchland.  Of course, this might be 
typical of any devoted spouse.  However, in lieu of the customary photographic portrait, Paul’s 
token of affection was instead an image derived from a brain scan of Patricia.  Perhaps never 
before has tender sentimentality and ontological debate collided so heavily in something so 
mundane.  Together, the Churchlands comprise a driving intellectual force behind ‘eliminative 
materialism’, an epistemological stance directed towards dismantling the ‘folk psychology’ by 
which we have traditionally navigated questions of our varying volitions and dispositions (P.M. 
Churchland, 1984, P.S. Churchland, 1989).  Such folk understandings, eliminativists argue, 
amount to ‘a false and radically misleading conception of the causes of human behavior’ and 
‘an outright misrepresentation of our internal states and activities’ that, in time, must be 
discarded under the cool gaze of ‘a matured neuroscience’ (P.M. Churchland, 1984: 43).  
Patricia Churchland goes so far as to suggest that ‘the history of science can be seen as a 
gradual process whereby speculative philosophy cedes intellectual space to increasing well-
grounded experimental disciplines’ (Churchland, 2008: 409).    
What, then, should we make of the normative implications of Paul Churchland’s unusual token 
of marital love?  Latour (2004: 224) exclaims with a mixture of aghast and wonder that ‘Paul 
[Churchland] insists adamantly that in a few years we will all be recognizing the inner shapes of 
the brain structure with a more loving gaze than noses, skins and eyes!’.  The rhetorical intent 
implied in the gesture of directing our loving gaze to a brain scan is clear: the material 
composition of the brain is the terrain by which we can map the most meaningful 
representation of the self.  All else is merely post-hoc and decorative.  Patricia Churchland 
(2002: 56) believes that in ‘hacking away’ at the soft and fuzzy edges of our ‘folk’ explanations 
– by gradually translating them down to the neurological level – we may finally arrive at a 
comprehensive understanding of the essential assembly that forms us as humans.  Debate 
along these eliminativist lines is thus ‘foreclosed by the belief that the ontologically most 
fundamental level of explanation is by default the most appropriate one’ (Slaby and 
Choudhury, 2012: 30). In comparison to the take-no-prisoners approach of the Churchlands, 
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other neuro-practitioners are somewhat more conciliatory to other disciplines.  
Neurophysiologist Wolf Singer (in interview with Thomas Metzinger, 2009: 71), for example, 
envisions that ‘the humanities will provide the taxonomy and description of phenomena 
awaiting investigation at the neuronal level’.  However, this still presupposes that one can 
locate and comprehensively bound complex and contingent social phenomena within the 
brain, and moreover accords the humanities only a somewhat limited role.   
Though some might suggest that eliminative materialism has fallen out of favour in recent 
years, I would counter that a closely comparable form of attempted epistemic colonisation 
process is taking place through the relatively new field of neuroethics, and that it is not 
insignificant that one of the first advocates of this new discipline was Patricia Churchland 
(2002).  Specifically, I am concerned here with those proponents of neuroethics who seek to 
import highly contingent understandings of morality and the ethical subject into what might 
be termed the ‘brain terrain’, thereby resubstantialising these elusive properties with a new, 
harder materiality.  This, in part, has been enacted through recent developments in empirical 
moral psychology, with approaches that adopt experimental constructs designed to test our 
normative stances against their functionally-read realisation in the brain ie. do we make ethical 
decisions for the reasons we say we do, or are we beholden to mechanisms that we may be 
able to corral to more desirable ends?  Through these epistemic models, emerging claims from 
neuroethics regarding the biomarkers of the ideal subject may then fold back onto us as 
ethical injunctions, such that technologies and techniques of caring for the self may come to 
include cultivating a very particular kind of neurological disposition to the world. 
What is especially significant about these empirical claims is that they largely exclude the 
possibility that the social sciences and humanities may yet have something more to contribute 
to the emerging neurosciences beyond simple categorical frames.  As Frank Vander Valk (2012: 
1-5) observes, the expansive epistemic reach sought by the cognitive neurosciences suggests 
that the social sciences and humanities are merely treading water until certain cool gazes can 
relieve us of our duties.  We should not anticipate that this epistemic colonisation will be fully 
realised anytime in the near future, if at all, but that nevertheless the widespread belief-in-
itself of this inevitable march of positivist progress may play a formative role in our ongoing 
constitution as subjects (Hacking, 1995).  Yet, in this jamming into the brain of all that it means 
to be human, much may be inadvertently and prematurely squeezed out, including currently 
unforeseen lines of possibility in how we may come to understand ourselves.  We must 
recognise that Paul Churchland’s wallet photo implies a significant ontological claim, wherein 
the brain is deemed the logical stopping point of inquiries into our wellbeing, and the 
storehouse of the self. 
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We should approach with some caution the claim that the neurosciences are in the process of 
illuminating the aetiologies of our ‘essential’ qualities, for its paradigms are themselves 
historically bound, entwined with ideals of the human subject peculiar to the time and place of 
the emerging life sciences.  Through efforts to intensively map the self as a set of material 
properties, some ambitious neuroethicists and related practitioners fail to recognise the socio-
historical contingency of what is eliminated as ‘irrelevant’ from explanatory frameworks, and 
what is then ‘revealed’ within the brain (see, for example, Greene, 2013; Harris, 2010; 
Gazzaniga, 2006; Levy, 2007; Persson and Savulescu, 2012).  It would serve no purpose to 
simply dismiss the claims of such neuroethicists as so problematic as to be beyond 
engagement, for their pronouncements are capturing the public imagination (and research 
funding), and so may prove formative in our ongoing constitution as citizen-subjects.  Hence a 
central aim of this thesis is to interpose a critical perspective upon this burgeoning line of 
inquiry, and to offer alternative ways in which we may approach the tracing of our 
neurological constitutions.   
The neuroethical advocates that I seek to closely interrogate lay claim to a hard, empirically-
driven mapping of the thinking and feeling subject as a means to develop a universal morality, 
one grounded in the epistemological terrain of our brains.  By correlating measures of ‘good 
action’ and ‘right thinking’ to neurological activity such practitioners claim to have uncovered 
biomarkers of morality, proposing that, in the near future, we look to apply these insights as a 
new mechanism of governmentality enacted through subjects increasingly attuned to their 
‘brainhood’ (Vidal, 2009).  From the outset, the universalising nature of such thinkers’ claims 
should ring alarm bells for social scientists who have long criticised the confusion of the 
contingent and the universal.  It is not simply that scientific practices are inevitably value-
bound, determined from the start by particularity and difference (Fox Keller 1985; Harding 
1986; Haraway, 1988), but rather that, in the case of neuroethics, empirical claims about our 
moral personhood regularly fail to acknowledge their contingent nature.  
There are significant practical implications arising from the neurosciences’ epistemic 
colonisation of areas normally open to diverse forms of knowledge. In particular, as Nikolas 
Rose (1990, 1996, 1999, 2007; Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013) has long observed, the knowledge 
claims of the ‘psy’ disciplines – and now increasingly of the ‘neuro’ – inform an ethic of care of 
the self, orienting new forms of subjectivity and governmentality in advanced liberal 
democratic systems.  Under this new neurological regime we may come to see ourselves as 
‘neuronal machines’ and ‘molecular automatons’, modelled and reconfigured through ‘the 
cutting-edge neurocognitive sciences’ (Slaby and Gallagher, 2015: 46).  Through these new 
discourses we are encouraged to labour upon our neurological constitutions as if this were a 
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self-evident good and the logical, authoritative entry point into assessing our wellbeing.  Yet, 
the form of this labour presupposes ‘essential’ qualities of the subject that are already 
conveniently embedded in existing institutional frameworks, and in doing so, makes those 
highly contingent frameworks seem natural and immutable.  As I demonstrate throughout this 
thesis, both certain classical humanist and neoliberal conceptions of the ideal subject are 
underpinning claims about our higher cognitive capacities in ways that fail to recognise their 
socio-historically anomalous quality.  When Thomas Metzinger (2009: 233), for example, 
insists on the importance of tracing the underlying causal mechanisms of good action towards 
developing a ‘consciousness ethics’, he has in mind a particular image of the good actor: a 
unified self, who cultivates their inviolable rational capacities which he or she not only can, but 
should, exercise and moreover seek to enhance.  However, the social sciences have long 
challenged the naturalisation of such images of the ‘good life’, along with the uncompromising 
apportioning of responsibility to the individual that such essentialist claims may entail.  
What we are witnessing, then, is the emergence of new practices of the care of the self, and in 
this thesis I am particularly concerned with how such self-care is folded through the realisation 
of narrowly conceptualised forms of ‘freedom’ (Foucault, 1997).  In the appeal to embrace 
neurological forms of self-enhancement the popular rhetoric of ‘neuroplasticity’ is noteworthy 
here, if only through the manner in which it has captured the public eye by framing the brain 
as a well of potential, open to shaping towards ends chosen by the subject as both consumer 
and producer of self.  As Catherine Malabou (2008: 32-54) has pointed out, metaphors of the 
brain have always represented ideals of governance and the technological diffusion of power, 
and the notion of the brain’s plasticity is no exception.  We might not be surprised to find, 
then, that the so-called higher cognitive capacities that neuroethicists would have us enhance 
are also those deemed of greatest value for productive society in this post-Fordist era, which is 
characteristically ‘dynamic, multi-polar and adaptive to circumstance’ (Jeannerod, 2008, p. xi).  
To abide the contemporary instrumentalising of our neuroplasticity, then, is to commit to a 
perpetual labour of neurological care of the self as a vocation of good citizenship.  Yet these 
parameters within which we are called to enhance ourselves tend to be narrowly delimited to 
an idealised ‘hypercognitive subject’ (Post, 1995; O’Neill, 1997).  Therefore, we may ultimately 
be committing ourselves to a rigid form of plasticity, which risks stultifying the self into frames 
that could later prove difficult to even interrogate, let alone displace.  
Given that the disciplines of neuroscience and neuroethics (a field in part dedicated to finding 
the neurological correlates of normative ethical positions) have been characterised by a high 
degree of ambition in recent years, the social sciences might wish to adopt a critical stance 
towards some of its claims, but should also seek to become ‘entangled’ with the neurosciences 
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in new ways.  Through this cautious but good faith entanglement the great potentials arising 
from these emerging fields of knowledge might be grasped and contextually grounded.  To this 
end, this thesis aims to firstly rein in some of the more ambitious speculations from the 
emerging neurosciences – particularly those which may shape and prescribe ethical injunctions 
regarding the ‘ideal’ neurological subject – and then offer new ways by which we might 
approach the exploration of our neurological subjectivity.  
Much of this thesis is concerned with the emergence of the new sub-discipline of neuroethics, 
which can be broadly divided into two main branches: the ethics of neuroscience, and the 
neuroscience of ethics.1  While the former is in many ways simply a further specialisation 
within already established fields in medical and bioethics, the latter – which purports to trace 
the neural underpinnings of ethics – marks a significant shift in how we may conceive of 
ourselves as ethical subjects, and to what practices we subsequently become normatively 
beholden, and so demands close critical scrutiny.  This will be achieved through close textual 
analysis of those key actors who have negotiated neuroethics into disciplinary legitimacy, and 
of what acts of epistemological flag-planting and ontological claims are now gaining currency. 
A central aim of this thesis, therefore, is to provide a text that is accessible across disciplines, 
offering a work that is critical but also hermeneutical, seeking to build interpretive bridges 
between disciplines by offering a neo-Foucauldian means of thinking against the present 
(Rose, 1996: 18), unpacking cases where the socio-historically contingent has been too readily 
flipped into the timeless universal, and finally, gently angling towards some emerging 
posthumanist conceptions of ethical being as a promising alternative path.  My underlying 
contention throughout this thesis is that some instances of hasty ambition within the 
otherwise generally measured and cautious field of neuroethics can be saliently tied to what 
Niezsche (2004: 14) described as the ‘congenital defect of philosophers’, that is, mistaking the 
highly anomalous subject of today for an eternal truth: 
‘All philosophers suffer from the same defect, in that they start with present-day man 
and think they can arrive at their goal by analyzing him.  Instinctively they let “man” 
hover before them as an aeterna veritas2, something unchanging in all turmoil, a 
secure measure of things.  But everything the philosopher asserts about man is 
basically no more than a statement about man within a very limited time span…  Some 
unwittingly even take the most recent form of man, as it developed under the imprint 
                                                          
1
 The field of neuroethics will be discussed in much further detail below, but for general overviews see 
Brosnan, 2011; Roskies, 2002; Marcus, 2002; Glannon, 2006, 2011; Levy, 2007, 2008; Farah, 2010; 
Conrad and De Vries, 2011; Buniak, Darragh, Giordano, 2014; Darragh, Buniak, Giordano, 2015; Wade, 
2015) 
2
 ‘eternal truth’ 
14 
 
of certain religions or even certain political events, as the fixed form from which one 
must proceed.  They will not understand that man has evolved, that the faculty of 
knowledge has also evolved, while some of them even permit themselves to spin the 
whole world from out of this faculty of knowledge.’ 
Some prominent voices within neuroethics, I will argue, suffer from this defect by too readily 
seeking to affix properties of ethical conduct – which are themselves inextricably wrapped up 
in historical contingencies – within our neurological constitutions.  This defective aspiration to 
‘spin the whole world’ through the intensive gaze into the brain extends further in not only 
hastily conflating the contemporary subject with our forebears (and future descendants), but 
also to hardening idealisations of our species-being.  Such bounding of the ‘ideal’ subject 
occurs within neuroethics through those practitioners who assume that our purportedly 
species-unique capacities in rational thought are ipso facto the key to further realising what 
best affirms us as volitional beings.  This results in the heavily laden assumption that the 
achievement of wellbeing, flourishing, eudaimonia, etc. will come through the ongoing 
enhancement of these species-unique capacities, measured through aforementioned highly 
contingent socio-historical frameworks.  Whatever we mean by ‘ethics’ thus becomes crudely 
shoehorned into this narrow onto- and epistemological space, corrupting it in the process by 
being supplanted with crude placeholders that, I will argue, results in tight spirals of ‘looping’ 
effects (Hacking, 1995) regarding assessments of conduct, thereby negating other possibilities 
for realising new modes of ethical being. 
However, a great deal of expository groundwork must be established before I can dig into the 
detail of this overarching argument.  With this in mind, I wish to spend some time in this 
introductory chapter outlining: the growing epistemic reach of the rapidly expanding 
neurosciences; the parallel emergence of the Western ‘hyphen-ethic’; and finally very recent 
calls for interdisciplinary ‘entanglements’, for each of these recent developments informs the 
curious entwining of intensive gazes and expansive ends that I seek to interrogate throughout 
this thesis.   
 
 
The reach of the neurosciences 
 
In its most basic working definition neuroscience is the study of the nervous system, ranging 
from the molecular level of parsing individual nerve cells up to the study of how the enactment 
of sensory and motor capacities can be traced through the brain.  Suffice to say this is quite a 
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broad scope across multiple ontological and epistemological terrains.  Therefore, as Martyn 
Pickersgill (2013b: 324) drily observes, any attempt to briefly but comprehensively define the 
neurosciences ‘is somewhat akin to attempting to define the social sciences’, and so ‘perhaps 
effaces as much as it reveals’.  The field of view within the neurosciences ranges from the 
‘cellular, molecular, anatomical, physiological, and behavioral’, and so while the discipline as a 
whole relies heavily on the integration of multiple levels of analysis it understandably does not 
lend itself well to wholly encompassing definitions (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013).  Indeed, as 
Steven Rose (2012: 56) wearily notes, the ever-increasing heterogeneity, complexity, and 
specialisation in the division of labour within the neurosciences regularly results in gatherings 
where working practitioners ‘predominantly talk past one another’.  Of particular relevance to 
the following chapter on empirical neuroethics is the way in which increasingly abstract 
qualities of the human condition are being rendered ‘visible’ through brain imaging 
technologies.  But, as Simon Cohn (2004: 70) astutely points out – and contrary to common 
anti-reductionist presumptions – we should perhaps be more concerned not with the 
possibility of damning and dehumanising revelation of our underlying qualities, but rather with 
producing, inducing, and then containing in ‘harder’ forms those diffuse phenomena which 
need to be kept outside the skull, in order to remain open to collective negotiation and 
repurposing: 
‘The real issue, as I see it, is not about the processes of conversion, but the opposite: 
the ways in which cultural dimensions are reproduced and further disguised by such 
technological developments.  Neuroscience increasingly entraps all aspects of human 
experience within a single gaze; all aspects of human life, from emotions to suffering 
to dreaming, are now legitimate areas for valid investigation.  In so doing, the 
technology does not merely transform but newly generates these categories as 
discrete objects for the new scientific.  And, in so doing, life is effectively being recast, 
though it remains transient enough never to be defined or even acknowledged.’ 
Such images exercise a privileged position, representations from which ‘humanness is 
abstracted, yet which nevertheless claims to represent it’ (Cohn, 2004: 70-1).  When this dual 
undertaking of objective abstraction followed by vivid representation purports to radically 
question long-held positions of normative ethics – as the next chapter will demonstrate – then 
in rapid fashion our conceptions of the ethical subject are open to being ‘recast’ (to use Cohn’s 
term).  This may then fold into injunctions upon our conduct targeted at the neurological level, 
for some influential advocates propose that in order to counter escalating global risk we 
should consider embracing a regime of neuroscience-based ‘moral enhancement’ (see Chapter 
Three).  The neuroscientific gaze that has been steadily legitimated through technologies of 
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visualisation thus exercises a dizzying degree of epistemological flexibility, one to which 
scholars of other disciplines would be wise to monitor and – in a collaborative spirit rather 
than hostile takedown – offer their own hard-won cautionary advice. 
Despite its currently privileged position, neuroscience as a somewhat formalised discipline in 
its own right has only been around for about half a century, but in that time has grown rapidly 
and with ‘revolutionary’ zeal (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013: 5).  Of particular interest to this 
thesis are recent efforts in the SCAN sub-fields (social, cognitive, and affective neurosciences), 
which investigate aspects of higher cognition and phenomenology, particularly around 
emotions and affect, morality, decision-making, and memory, amongst other equally salient 
and normatively-laden issues for how we derive meaning and orient ourselves in the world 
(Slaby and Gallagher, 2015).  Such properties and interactions were once within the largely 
exclusive purview of the social sciences and humanities. However, with the increasing 
willingness of the neurosciences to translate properties of the ‘social’ into the epistemological 
terrain of the neuro – in ways that may ‘naturalise’ or ‘essentialise’ them – social scientists 
have an obligation to trace such processes to ensure we recognise the implications of such 
knowledge claims (Cerulo, 2012; Pickersgill, 2013a, 2013b).   
This might appear to place fields like sociology in a bind: are we epistemologically wedged in 
either finding ourselves co-opted and complicit with ‘reductionist’ models of agency and 
selfhood, or do we resist such practices and so risk becoming ostracized and excluded from the 
ongoing ‘making up’ of subjects (Hacking, 1985, 2006)?  Or is there perhaps an alternative 
path, as recently proffered in new forms of interdisciplinary collaboration (Callard and 
Fitzgerald, 2015; Wilson, 2015)?  There are certainly compelling reasons for those in the 
humanities and social sciences to be duly watchful of developments in the neurosciences, for 
claims made regarding the ideal neurological subject may have long-lasting repercussions for 
frameworks of governmentality and injunctions upon our conduct.  Furthermore, as with all 
efforts that push upon the boundaries of knowledge there is an ever present gap between 
what is speculated as conceivable and plausible and what is believed to be true and applied as 
such.  When the gap pertains to our very selves these ‘looping effects of human kinds’ 
(Hacking, 1995) can be especially abundant, fomenting an ‘anticipatory’ ethic of witnessing our 
purportedly naturalised, essential constitutions ‘revealed’ through the objective measures of 
science (Slaby and Gallagher, 2014; Brinkmann, 2005).  We diligently reconfigure ourselves in 
response to these authoritative speculations regarding our human qualities and functions, and 
in doing so produce new assemblages of the self that perhaps would not have emerged had 
those claims not been widely promulgated.  Note that this ‘looping effect’ is not equivalent to 
a self-fulfilling prophecy, but rather pertains to the broader recognition that we are always and 
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already reflexive subjects, and that in the modern era of personal responsibilisation for care of 
the self we remain as reflexive as ever, but often only in certain demarcated avenues given by 
contextual circumstance. 
In this space between speculation, application, and reflection, sociology can play a key role, 
illuminating the effects and practices of when an epistemological claim is caught between its 
positing, its possibility, its production, and its performance.  This role of monitoring potential 
looping effects is especially important given legal scholar and bioethicist Henry Greely’s (2012) 
claim that ‘half of what neuroscience is teaching us about human brain function will be shown, 
in the next 20 years, to be wrong—and we will need each of those 20 years to figure out which 
half’.  Needless to say, twenty years of according ourselves to the ‘wrong half’ of 
neuroscientific claims will not be quickly rectified – particularly where those claims pertain to 
the constitution of the ideal ethical subject – and so a level of epistemological humility is 
required as we follow neuroscience into and out of the lab.  
The success of the neurosciences in capturing public assent and enthusiasm has generated a 
translational bottleneck in which ‘everything that is considered social now must pass through 
the brain’ (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013: 162), and where neuroscientists announce with an air 
of assured impunity that it ‘all comes together in the brain’ (Sperry, 1981: 3).  This in turn may 
shift our relations to these formerly elusive ‘social’ properties once they become ‘affixed’ 
within the neurological.  Along these lines some observers, such as Karl Popper (1985: 97), 
have long predicted the coming dominance of ‘the new promissory materialism’ with a sense 
of resigned ambivalence, noting that ‘the language of the [brain] physiologists is likely to 
penetrate more and more into ordinary language, and to change our picture of the universe, 
including that of common sense’.  For example, and as Chapter Three will demonstrate, a 
particular vein of neuroscience-informed transhumanism suggests that our current ‘common 
sense morality’ is proving insufficient to countenance the complex problems of our globalised 
risk societies, and therefore we may require ‘moral enhancement’ through interventions 
directly targeted at our neurological makeup.   That morality is now spoken of as a property to 
be ‘enhanced’ at the level of the molecular speaks to the prospect that within this new 
discursive sphere it may soon appear illogical or at least inadequate to speak of the citizen-
subject and his/her conduct and wellbeing without reference to their neurological 
constitution.  This flattening of the subject into the brain, suggests Slaby and Choudhury (2012: 
6-7), demonstrates the risky over-confidence and rushed epistemic colonisation undertaken by 
some neuroscientists, for ‘the leading naturalistic assumption forecloses meaningful debate 
and moves right on to programs of technocratic intervention’.  This is where looping effects 
may be especially pernicious, for the increasing impetus placed upon satisfying translational 
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imperatives moves laboratory research and technological developments into the insistent 
‘chasing’ of scientific solutions to social problems, resulting in practical applications emerging 
in ever faster cycles, and leaving us with little space and recourse in which to interrogate to 
what ends such interventions are directed (Rapp, 2011).   
If the Foucauldian ‘conduct of conduct’ is now to be inscribed upon the brain – thus generating 
a new epistemological circularity that ‘not only establishes what counts as an explanation, it 
establishes what there is to explain’ – then this has potentially radical consequences for the 
way mechanisms of governmentality act upon us (Rose, 2007: 192).  Coupled with neoliberal 
endorsements of autonomy, choice, and personal responsibility, along with the incorporation 
of increasingly personalised techniques and technologies of self-management, this turn to the 
neuro generates a new layer of the ‘somatic ethic’ (Rose, 2007: 252-258) we are expected to 
uphold as ‘neurochemical selves’ (Rose, 2003, see also Rose and Novas, 2008).  Of interest for 
this thesis, then, is in tracing how recently emergent neuroscientific sub-fields relate to and 
generate a particular ethos for how we might best assess and manage our capacities and 
agency.  To what degree of self-monitoring, cultivation, and intervention at the level below the 
conscious self might we be called upon to exercise as appropriately ethical citizen-subjects?  
Would such responsibilities of this ‘intensive’ kind – looking to labour upon our sub-personal 
mechanisms – accord us greater ‘freedom’ and space for self-actualisation, or might they 
instead further ratchet up the burdensome upkeep of ourselves as productive subjects in Post-
Fordist societies?  
Part of the growing interest accorded to the neurosciences is driven by the potential envisaged 
in the convergence of NBIC (nano-bio-info-cogno) technologies (Roco and Bainbridge, 2003; 
Parens and Johnston, 2007).  The integration of these different bodies of knowledge poses 
new sociotechnical possibilities and instrumentalisation of our material assemblages in ways 
difficult to foresee, but nevertheless is often framed through the aspiration towards 
‘enhancement’ of desirable human capacities (Kahane, Savulesu and ter Meulen, 2011).  In this 
space of promissory ‘neurofutures’ (Martin, 2015) there is an intense interest of capital, with 
flows of investment given over to the ‘impressive grantsmanship’ (Vander Valk, 2012a: 2) of 
those neuroscientists acutely attuned to satisfying translational imperatives and stoking the 
‘seductive allure’ of their research (Weisberg et al., 2008, see also Joyce, 2008; McCabe and 
Castel, 2008; Caulfield et al., 2010; Whiteley, 2012).  For example, recently launched brain 
modelling projects have piqued widespread interest and enthusiasm, in part serving to 
legitimise the utility of multi $B projects undertaken by the US and the EU (the BRAIN Initiative 
and the Human Brain Project, respectively).  These projects mark the latest developments in a 
string of large scale undertakings that render us ‘visible’ in new forms, with methods and 
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rhetoric that can take on iconographic overtones (see Waldby, 2000; Beaulieu, 2000; Cohn, 
2004; Dumit, 2004; Joyce, 2008).   
The promissory qualities of these ‘big science’ projects is abundant, with President Barack 
Obama claiming that the BRAIN Initiative may improve ‘the lives of not just millions, but 
billions of people on this planet’ (Office of the Press Secretary, 2013).  These projects (the 
BRAIN Initiative in particular) are closely entwined with corporate interests, with technology 
giants such as Microsoft, Google, and IBM looking to build close partnerships due to the great 
commercial potential on offer, while the military-industrial complex can also always be relied 
upon to hold a stake in developments in biotechnology (see Moreno, 2007).  Not all working 
scientists, technicians, and other stakeholders are comfortable with these efforts though (see 
Waldrop, 2013), while others look to hose down any flagrant promissory hype surrounding 
their potential (Rose, 2015: 3).  Such initiatives are joined by other ventures, including the 
(dystopian-sounding) ‘Neuropolis’ research and PR facility in Lausanne, Switzerland, which is 
‘dedicated to neuroscience and the conquest of the brain’. (Ecole Polytechnique Federale De 
Lausanne, 2012).  Through the rhetoric of ‘conquest’ the brain is construed as a terrain to be 
discovered and subsequently colonised, a new frontier in which to plant epistemic flags.    
Recent years have also seen the emergence of what might be described as ‘soft’, consumer-
oriented commercialisation of the neurosciences (Thornton, 2011b).  While more standard 
laboratory research in the life sciences and related industries suffered a downturn following 
the global financial crisis (Amara et.al, 2011), the same period has seen the emergence of a 
suite of ongoing interests claiming to incorporate neuroscience-based insight into their 
products and services.  For instance, business-facing enterprises in ‘neuromarketing’ proclaim 
to enable clients to access the ‘buy button’ inside the consumer’s brain (see ‘Sales Brain’), 
while EEG-based ‘mind-reading’ head sets are marketed with pitches geared around how we 
might conveniently incorporate new technosomatic capacities into the habits of everyday life 
(‘Emotiv’).  Others offer services in lie detection (‘No Lie MRI’), or hawk ‘brain fingerprinting’ as 
a high-tech security measure (‘BrainWave Science’), or tout the potential of oxytocin and other 
hormonal regulators as chemical compounds safely ingestible in the service of enhancing 
feelings of trust, bonding, and intimacy (‘Oxytocin Factor’).  The claims, products, and services 
of these commercial enterprises come with wildly varying degrees of efficacy and plausibility, 
along with generating new areas where regulatory and ethical oversight is required (Caulfield 
and Ogbogu, 2008).  In any case, market analysts predict great capital potential in the new 
‘brain-industrial complex’ (Duncan, 2008; see also Giordano, 2011).   
20 
 
In turn, many lay subjects have come to take an interest in neuroscience as a form of 
entertainment, something ‘exciting’ and ‘consumable’, while other observers are more 
circumspect and cautious, or remain disinterested (Pickersgill, Martin and Cunningham-Burley, 
2015: 883 , see also Johnson and Littlefield, 2011).  Of particular note in this regard is the 
response of one lay interviewee in a study conducted by Pickersgill, Martin and Cunningham-
Burley (2015: 884), who sharply skewered the proclamations of popular neuroscience output 
in characterising it as ‘evangelical’.   This observation usefully captures the way in which the 
fostering of hopeful expectations abounds in the communication of neuroscientific insight and 
its potential applications, with discourses regularly infused and inflated with the hope that we 
can better realise our latent cognitive capacities, and may even finally overcome conditions of 
atypical neurology and neurodegenerative disease (Hedgecoe, 2010; Hedgecoe and Martin 
2003; Brosnan, 2011; Pickersgill, 2013b: 329-32; Pitts-Taylor, 2010; Thornton 2011b; Vander 
Valk, 2012a: 3-5).  In part, this evangelistic sentiment is attributable to the accelerating 
corporatisation of the neurosciences, where the moral hazards that accompany commercial 
interests may result in ‘inflated claims as to the translational potential of research findings’, 
resulting in speculation that not only proffers but actively seeks to produce a particular 
disposition within subjects regarding how we may incorporate the ‘neuro’ into our everyday 
practices (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013: 20).  Commercial interests push to acquire and patent 
intellectual property where profit potentials are most likely, the corollary of which is that ‘if 
researchers know that there is no money to answer certain questions, they may not even 
bother to ask them’ (Lexchin, 2001: 1450).   
This view of the brain as a site of production and consumption frames the emerging 
neurosciences within decidedly contemporary contingencies, whereby we seek practical 
applications for what are considered the most pressing issues today amidst the hyper-
individualism of late capitalist society.  We should thus consider the possibility that entire 
avenues of thinking about the neurological subject may atrophy and wither due to their 
incommensurability with current overarching imperatives.  However, with the neurosciences 
still so young, and our understanding of the brain still so meagre, we should resist narrow 
epistemic co-opting by interests that seek to import what may otherwise be fleeting socio-






Tracing the Western hyphen-ethic  
 
Our modern ‘self’ – in the Western world at least – is commonly represented as though it were 
an immutable property, neatly cleaved from the contextual milieu in which it realises its self-
ness.3  We espouse our personal autonomy, our free will, and the comportment and 
cultivation of bodies and brains that are thought to be our inalienable and inviolable own.  We 
may consider our ontological boundedness and sense of narrative continuity as part of our 
innate, natural constitution, an essential quality, rather than the outcome of the perpetual 
dialectic between socio-technical assemblages and cultural constructions (to grossly over-
simplify the debate of millennia).  So, observes Rose (1998: 1), despite ‘our current confused 
ethical climate’ the one proposition that seems to always remain ‘beyond reproach’ is the 
assertion of our selfhood and its associated capacities, potentials and obligations.  Yet, as 
Clifford Geertz (1984: 126) has famously observed, the idea of the Western self ‘as a bounded, 
unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe’ is ‘a rather peculiar idea 
within the context of the world’s cultures’.  The gradual enfranchisement of the individual 
agent, the formalisation of bureaucratic institutions, the rise of complex self-perpetuating 
economic mechanisms upon which we are interdependently reliant, and various other levers 
of rationalisation all require subjects that can be efficiently governed, measured, and who 
ideally will take such responsibilities upon themselves as acts of both ethical citizenship and 
ongoing affirmations of selfhood.  This creates the subject as a discretely bounded property, at 
least with regard to assessments of their conduct.  The problem, suggests Michel Foucault, is 
when we essentialise this boundedness: 
‘The political and social processes by which the Western European societies were put 
in order are not very apparent, have been forgotten, or have become habitual.  They 
are a part of our most familiar landscape, and we don't perceive them anymore.  But 
most of them once scandalized people.  It is one of my targets to show people that a 
lot of things that are a part of their landscape – that people think are universal – are 
the result of some very precise historical changes.  All my analyses are against the idea 
of universal necessities in human existence.  They show the arbitrariness of institutions 
and show which space of freedom we can still enjoy and how many changes can still 
be made.’  
                                                          
3
 This oft-made observation of our anomalous constitution as modern subjects has been articulated by 
many notable scholars across various disciplines, including Clifford Geertz (1984), Charles Taylor (1989), 




Foucault, 1988: 11 
This does not necessarily mean we should bemoan the ‘arbitrary’ qualities of our ontological 
landscapes, for such frameworks are inescapable in orienting ourselves in the world.  However, 
in the act of ‘forgetting’ their arbitrariness, rendering them unto habit, and then essentialising 
such constructs as timeless and universal qualities of our being, we risk ossifying that which 
needs to remain malleable in order for us to parse new spaces of freedom amidst the rapid 
shifts of late modernity.  Though we commit this universalisation fallacy time and time again 
we have eventually chanced upon ways of overturning the affixing of the self to narrow and 
anomalous contingencies.  The turn to the neurosciences presents another challenge of this 
kind, albeit a challenge made more difficult by the special status accorded to the brain – that 
‘space inside the skull’ (Beaulieu, 2000) to which we gaze as the fulcrum of our being – that is 
then combined with the acceleration of translational imperatives.  Altogether, this creates a 
confluence of factors that heightens the urgent need for critical oversight and new forms of 
productive collaboration. 
In this way I am concerned with what qualities may appear to be both ‘essential’ to our 
species-being and yet also ‘imperative’ to maintain or even enhance, so that only by becoming 
more and better ‘human’ (in the estimation of certain gazes, claiming epistemic privilege) may 
we raise our collective wellbeing and avert potential catastrophes of our own making.  In 
contrast to these calls for neuro-enhancement as a societal imperative, I explore how 
generative lines of subjectivity may be kept open, in part by ensuring that current conceptions 
of our ontology and agency do not become rigidly bound within contemporaneous 
frameworks, which threatens to occur under the rationale that cool, authoritative gazes have 
now, or will soon, reveal our ‘true’ selves.  Such claims foster notions of ‘neuro-realism’ and 
‘neuro-essentialism’ that too often are either exaggerated, or obscure the artificiality of the 
empirical constructs by which such knowledge is produced, or are accepted with overly 
generous credulity when they are translated into popular discourses (Racine and Costa-von 
Aesch, 2001, see also Racine et al. 2009; Ramani, 2009; Racine et al. 2010; Thornton, 2011b; 
Whiteley, 2012; O’Connor and Joffe, 2013; Pickersgill, 2013b).   
We should look to trace these ‘recurrent histories’ (Canguilhem, 1988) and lines of ‘historical 
ontology’ (Foucault, 1984; Hacking, 2002: 1-26) with a watchful eye, noting how knowledge 
claims are variously produced and then folded through assessments of our conduct.  In so 
doing we can craft means of thinking against the present (Rose, 1996: 18), illuminating how 
the frames, gazes, and rhetoric of scientific inquiry contribute to the ongoing project of 
‘making up’ subjects (Hacking, 1985).  Additionally, we should look to interpose a sociological 
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perspective that strives not only to resist the epistemic overreach of other disciplines (as it 
seems we sociologists are so often relegated to doing), but also to contribute to ways in which 
the neurosciences may be productively entangled with neighbouring disciplines similarly 
concerned with the self, subjectivity, and wellbeing.  A creeping process of narrow 
reductionism evident in certain ambitious sub-fields can thus be reoriented and supplemented 
with new rigour and promise by recognising and fostering the multiple ‘cohabitation of 
everyday ontologies’ (Ortega, 2009: 440).  Given current trends it appears we are increasingly 
expected to adopt a constraining self-discipline of instrumentalising our brains and translating 
cognitive capacities into contemporary value-bearing applications, a stance that presupposes 
‘the supervenience of the self as an organizing system that can reflect on and work with the 
idiosyncracies of the brain and the body it inhabits’ (Kirmayer and Gold, 2012: 317).  It would 
appear that we lack requisite epistemological humility in presuming to know how our brain 
may best be cultivated, and so are laden with assumptions that risk inadvertantly paralysing 
lines of possibility not yet even glimpsed (Connolly, 2002; Wilson, 2004; Malabou, 2008).  
Our orientation to our biology, as commonly enjoined upon us today, ‘is not to assert destiny 
or fatalism, but opportunity’ (Rose, 2013: 5).  The brain and – by the now common extension – 
the self, are open to be laboured upon, optimised, and repurposed, so that we may be better 
‘realised’ and made ‘amenable to intervention and projects of control’ (Rose, 2013: 5-6).  
Through this ethical and epistemic framework the brain is viewed as the terrain by which we 
may come to know the ‘key truths’ about ‘human nature and social life’ (Pitts-Taylor 2010: 
635).  This perspective is then folded into contemporary ideals of how we may come to better 
understand and utilise our brains towards desired ends, in particular through notions of 
‘plasticity’ in popular discourses that tout our limitless potentiality and indeed the moral 
obligation to undertake this perpetual labour (Pitts-Taylor, 2010: 636-649).  We are called to 
cultivate our best neurological selves through an apparently democratic and meritocratic ethic 
informed by technosomatic techniques. 
Nurturing of this neurological self also extends to those for whom one cares, with emerging 
discourses saturated with an ethic of ‘protecting’, ‘feeding’, and ‘loving’ the brains of our 
children as a parental obligation in ensuring their wellbeing and maximising life chances 
(O’Connor and Joffe, 2013; Edwards, Gillies and Horsley, 2015; Bessant, 2008; Kelly, 2012; 
Macvarish, Lee, and Lowe 2014; Thornton, 2011a).  Furthermore, much of this popular rhetoric 
drags along with it forms of ‘benevolent sexism’ that can further entrench norms otherwise 
open to contestation by grounding them in scientific facticity (O’Connor and Joffe, 2014a).  An 
ethos of brainhood can therefore prove burdensome and constraining, despite often coming 
wrapped in the rhetoric of empowerment and self-knowledge.  Many lay subjects, while often 
24 
 
indifferent or only superficially engaged with findings from neuroscience (Pickersgill, 
Cunningham-Burley and Martin, 2011), do exhibit a sense of increasing anxiety over the brain 
as a site of potential dysfunction, thus generating an ethic of tending to and cultivating one’s 
brain in the hope of averting the onset of neurodegeneration (O’Connor and Joffe, 2014b: 635-
42; O’Connor, and Joffe, 2015: 15).   
My concern regarding these developments is that we may lose a ‘conatic hope’ (Hage, 2003) 
found in not having the bounds of our capabilities and paths of self-actualisation rigidly affixed 
in our molecular assemblies.  Perhaps – to take a Deleuzian and Spinozan line – only in not 
presuming to wholly comprehend what a body and a brain can do might we retain the capacity 
to be enlivened by the perpetual possibility of stretching our subjectivity into new terrains.  By 
resisting the too-neat cleaving and parsing of the various substantialities that constitute our 
being we open ourselves up to the possibility of new generative entanglements (Connolly, 
2002; Wilson, 2004; Malabou, 2008; Braidotti, 2013; Fitzgerald and Callard, 2015).  However, 
observes Slavoj Žižek (2012), if we insist on plumbing the supposed depths of ourselves in a 
thoroughly mechanistic way we will inevitably stitch together something less than ‘humanity’ 
but also certainly not equivalent to ‘nature’.  Somewhere in this process the initial ends of such 
an ethic melts into the ether, replaced by a corrupting ‘hyphen-ethic’: 
‘In short, what gets lost here, in this hyphen-ethics, is simply ethics as such.  The 
problem is not that universal ethics gets dissolved in particular topics but, on the 
contrary, that particular scientific breakthroughs are directly confronted with the old 
humanist “values” (say, how biogenetics affects our sense of dignity and autonomy)… 
The main consequence of the scientific breakthroughs in biogenetics is the end of 
nature.  Once we know the rules of its construction, natural organisms are 
transformed into objects amenable to manipulation… Crucial here is the 
interdependence of man and nature: by reducing man to just another natural object 
whose properties can be manipulated, what we lose is not (only) humanity but nature 
itself.’  
Žižek (2012: 110-1) 
But if the emerging neuro and biosciences are ‘confronted with old humanist values’ we 
should also briefly acknowledge here that neuroscientific efforts are likewise funnelled 
through new humanist ideals and frameworks of neoliberalism, of life and its 
instrumentalisation as potentials for ‘surplus’ amidst the rationalised creation of ‘biovalue’ 
(Cooper, 2008; Waldby, 2002).   Our neurological capacities thereby become new terrain for 
the exercising of ‘accumulation strategies’ of production and perpetual growth (Harvey, 2000). 
25 
 
This proliferation of hyphen-ethics – occurring in tandem with the ongoing creation and 
extraction of biovalue – has resulted in some hand-wringing amongst classical humanists and 
bioconservative thinkers.  For example, Francis Fukuyama (2002: 10) – cashing in his cachet by 
(lamely) contradicting his well-known earlier thesis – has referred to our current path towards 
trans- or post-humanism as ‘the recommencement of history’, arguing that the progress of the 
emerging life sciences and resultant technologies might fundamentally change our conceptions 
of rights, needs, and interests, and so threatens the hard-won consensus of ‘equality’ that 
underpins liberal democracies.  Jurgen Habermas (2003) has similarly argued that potential 
interventions upon ourselves through new forms of ‘liberal’ eugenics may undermine our 
‘species ethic’ and the shared beliefs that ‘guide our identification as human beings’ (38-9), 
one collective belief of which – according to Habermas – is the freedom from ‘alien 
determination’ (86) in how our bodies are constituted.  According to this view only a subject 
who knows that their functional assembly was not in any way artificially ‘determined’ by 
another will feel sufficiently enfranchised to consider themselves as autonomous subjects.  
Habermas’ argument is grounded upon what he perceives is the excessive drive of 
instrumental rationality operating under the guise of humanist ideals, through which we risk 
becoming steadily disaggregated into a bundle of value-bearing capacities, repurposed into 
falsely autonomous selves complicit in our own dehumanisation.  Political philosopher Michael 
Sandel (2007: 9) also expresses caution about what may be enacted ‘when science moves 
faster than moral understanding’.  Sandel (2007: 26-7) fears that we are now subject to a 
Promethean ‘hyper-agency’, a ‘drive to mastery’ where we may lose ‘an appreciation of the 
gifted character of human powers and achievements’ (see also Kass, 2002).   
However, while I am sympathetic to this general concern I do not find appeals to our ‘species 
ethic’ or the ‘giftedness’ of our human qualities convincing, for too often it seems such 
positions hinge on classical humanist ideals that have largely run their course and no longer 
hold ‘true’ given our increasing understanding of the immensely complex entanglement of 
‘nature’ and ‘nurture’, ‘mind’ and ‘body’, and the ‘social’ and the ‘technical’ (Latour, 1993; 
Connolly, 2002; Braidotti, 2013).  More expansive ways of thinking the neurological subject 
and its relation to the external world are needed.  To this end I will now provide an overview of 
those scholars from the social sciences and humanities who seek to become productively 





Getting cautiously entangled 
 
In this section I will address recent developments regarding the engagement of social scientists 
and humanities scholars with neuroscience.  In particular this thesis follows in the vein of those 
who adopt a critical but not inherently oppositional stance towards the emerging life sciences.  
Given the increasing epistemic reach and public influence of the neurosciences it is clear that 
we in the social sciences and humanities can no longer indulge an attitude of aloof 
opprobrium.  As cultural and cognitive sociologist Karen Cerulo (2010: 115) points out ‘the 
brain is hot … and cognitive neuroscientists have it’.  Step by step, epistemologically imported 
into the brain terrain are understandings of morality, memory, emotion, rationality and 
reason, amongst other weighty properties of being, leaving those of us in the social sciences 
and humanities at the risk of being left behind if we are unwilling to reach across the 
disciplinary divide.  This task is urgent, for as will be shown in the following two chapters an 
influential group of empiricists are moving rapidly towards constructs of the ‘ideal’ subject that 
may prove to be unduly diminishing to our self-conception, and neglects the opportunity for 
productively rethinking the bounds of selfhood, agency, and volition.  If this proves to be the 
case, then not engaging with the neurosciences and related fields now may generate a much 
harder task of restoring these lines of possibility in the future (Pitts-Taylor, 2014: 995-6; 
Lizardo, 2014).     
Moreover, there are ways out of our sometimes antagonistic interdisciplinary struggles and 
towards more dynamic collaborations.  As such this thesis looks to draw upon those scholars 
who I would describe as ‘cautiously entangled’ with the neurosciences.  This group houses 
academics from a number of fields, including: sociology, geography, bioethics and practical 
ethics, various sub-fields of philosophy, along with critical and feminist theory.  Further afield 
we should also consider what insights literary theorists, novelists, artists, and other humanists 
of this ilk might contribute to a productive, generative entanglement.  A recent manifesto-of-
sorts for this approach can be found in Des Fitzgerald and Felicity Callard’s (2015) call for 
‘experimental entanglements’.  Fitzgerald and Callard argue that we in the social sciences are 
too often stuck in dogmatic stances that do not attempt to traverse disciplinary divides, 
despite the fact that once seemingly incommensurable schools of thought are now open to 
forms of fruitful reconciliation and collaboration.  Such an unwillingness to properly engage 
with the new life sciences often ultimately results in either hollow, straw-manning critique or 
shallow, naïve enthusiasm (Fitzgerald and Callard, 2015: 9-13).  Instead, we need not 
presuppose our various approaches simply with reference to what disciplinary badge we 
happen to be wearing in any research encounter.  Too often, in hastily looking to pin the 
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pejorative ‘reductionist’ label, we only further contribute to a stultifying, antagonistic, and 
blinkered approach that fails to recognise ‘much of what is most analytically interesting about 
neuroscience – including its relationship to other domains, and how those relationships might 
be re-imagined’ (Fitzgerald and Callard 2015: 10). 
Of course this is not to say that we should jettison our theoretical rigour.  Indeed Fitzgerald 
and Callard (2015: 11-3) are quite scathing towards the ‘ebullience’ shown by some social 
theorists, who they believe have been overly credulous in uncritically and loosely adopting 
neuroscientific insights in convenient, but ultimately misleading ways.  Such cherry-picking of 
fashionable research and buttressing of pre-existing stances often emerges through cursory 
readings of ‘crossover’ or ‘third culture’ texts, with social theorists skewing analysis by 
incorporating neuroscience at naïve levels in ways that prove a disservice to all parties across 
the disciplinary gamut (Fitzgerald and Callard, 2015: 11).4  Alternatively, Fitzgerald and Callard 
(2015: 13) suggest that we look towards ‘locating a conceptual space’ that does not fall into 
detached, post-hoc critique or naïve, overly deferential ebullience.  To this end, they endorse 
striving towards an ‘epistemic parity’ that would ‘grant the same kind of sustained and critical 
attention to neurology and neurobiology as they do to the interpretative social sciences’ 
(Fitzgerald and Callard, 2015: 13).   
A measure of rapprochement is needed as both the sociocultural and the neurological spheres 
recognise the complex entwining of their once stubbornly provincialised bases.  Prior to recent 
provocative calls for ‘entanglement’, Nikolas Rose (1990: xvi, see also 2013: 13-4) similarly 
lamented ‘the baneful disciplinization of the human sciences’, while recent interdisciplinary 
collaborations have likewise encouraged our willingness to practice a form of ‘disciplinary 
double consciousness’ (Littlefield et al., 2014; see also Fitzgerald et al., 2014).  Admittedly this 
renders such transdisciplinarians susceptible to the possibility that they may find themselves 
                                                          
4
 For an example of this naïve ebullience see Romand Coles’ (2012: 179) lofty hopes inspired by recent 
research into mirror neurons:  
 
‘I venture that recent work on mirror neurons illuminates the character of our capacities for a 
politics of resonant receptivity in ways that help us not only better comprehend the damages of 
our contemporary order, but also suggest alternative ethical-strategic directions for organizing 
a powerful movement toward radical democracy.’  
 
Such applications of our neurology to increasingly complex socio-political phenomena speak to the 
translational promise of the neurosciences, a sense of promise often in need of restraint.  See also Jan 
Slaby, Philipp Haueis and Suparna Choudhury’s (2012: 60-5) similar critique of poststructural critical 
theorists (such as William Connolly), who they suggest are ‘too readily, prematurely, and uncritically’ 
embracing the neurosciences.  Fitzgerald and Callard (2015: 11-3) likewise chastise Catherine Malabou 
and Brian Massumi for work they deem to only constitute a fleeting and convenient engagement with 





‘never at home’ amidst the continuing clash and clamour of various epistemological and 
ontological worldviews (Littlefield et al., 2014: 8).  These willing collaborators invite the 
purgatorial existence of being unfairly pinned as contrarian figures (Littlefield et al., 2014: 8), 
and must resign themselves to operating within an ‘ambiguous intertwinement of knowledge, 
affect and power’ (Fitzgerald et al., 2014: 3), wedged in attempting explorations that feel 
‘intensely ambivalent, transgressive’ (7).  
Nevertheless, with optimism and in good faith we should look to the neurosciences as ‘a flash 
point for transdisciplinary exchange’ (Littlefield and Johnson, 2012: 5).  In doing so we may 
realise ‘a more affirmative relation’ (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013: 2), and negate the 
unproductive and overstated pessimism of those who believe our ‘essential’ ontology as 
human beings is under threat thanks to the new life sciences (see Kass, 2002; Fukuyama, 2002; 
Habermas, 2003; Sandel, 2007).   With this approach we may discover that recent 
transdisciplinary efforts of many neuroscientists are, like many social scientists, humbly 
‘struggling toward a way of thinking in which our corporeality is in constant transaction with its 
milieu’ (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013: 2).  In finding these transdisciplinary allies we may be able 
to unite once rigid and impermeable demarcations of intellectual inquiry into new 
microassemblages of experimentation.  Such experimental constructs are predicated on not 
presuming to know they will ‘reveal’, and therefore are receptive to generating forms of 
‘epistemological and ontological excess’ through which conceptions of the neurological subject 
may be radically reconfigured in ways we cannot yet envisage (Fitzgerald and Callard, 2015: 3).  
This promises not just to undo some of the theoretical constraints we have placed upon 
ourselves in looking to elucidate our neurology, but may also contribute to rethinking the 
subject in ways that accord greater recognition to neurological difference.   
 
 
Expansive entanglements  
 
A newly expansive approach to rethinking the neurological subject will require means by which 
to ground our inquiries in mutually navigable terrain.  To this end some novel forms of 
theoretical commensurability may be required.  In this spirit some scholars look with optimism 
to become productively entangled with the neurosciences through feminist, poststructuralist, 
and posthumanist approaches.  These engagements are often grounded in the equal parts 
humbling and liberating admission that 
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‘Crudely put, in all these disciplines, it is found that ‘‘we’’ humans are not the 
autonomous, transcendental, preferably male subjects that we were once made out to 
be. Instead, we must learn to see ourselves as hybrid blends of flesh, mind, materials, 
machines, information, values, institutions, relations, and processes.’  
Van Den Eede, 2015: 152 
In contrast to those who aspire to better realise our ‘most human’ quality of our rationality 
(see Chapters Two and Three), these anti-humanist theorists – ‘anti-humanist’ at least with 
regard to espousing our ‘hybrid’ ontology – discern an opportunity for radical reconsideration 
of our being, in part through explorations of our neurology as it is ‘imbricated’ with our bodies 
and the external world (Wilson, 2015: 18).  This turn towards expansive and imbricated 
neurology hinges on recognising that the brain – as some supposed substantiation of ‘nature’ – 
is not ‘prefigured by final causes’, nor a property of ‘latent perfection seeking homeostasis’ 
(Rabinow, 1996: 108).  Rather, argues Paul Rabinow, only once we understand the 
‘polyphenomenality’ of life, might we be able ‘to facilitate, encourage, [and] accelerate its 
unfurling’ as vital entities endowed with ‘thematic variation’.5    
One way in which Rabinow’s ‘polyphenomenality’ is being ‘unfurled’ is through attempts to 
reconcile lines of inquiry once separated on the now possibly specious grounds of their 
incommensurability.  Recent broadly monistic, psychoanalytic, and new materialist critiques, 
such as Adrian Johnston’s and Catherine Malabou’s Self and Emotional Life (2013: ix), attempt 
to wrangle together the affective neurosciences with psychoanalysis and continental 
philosophy, girded by the claim that ‘no genuine materialist philosophy legitimately can 
neglect the natural sciences generally and that no authentically materialist theory of 
subjectivity defensibly can sideline the life sciences specifically’.  Johnston and Malabou (2013: 
x-xi) argue that the old ‘alibi’ of avoiding engagement with the life sciences for fear of 
becoming complicit in dehumanising reductionism is no longer tenable, and simply amounts to 
‘hollow excuses of a tired old antinaturalism’.  With this new transdisciplinary spirit, much of 
Self and Emotional Life is dedicated to untethering notions of agency and affect from the 
neatly bounded individual agent, and instead granting such qualities their own trajectories and 
volitions (see also Brennan, 2004).  By unsticking cognition from iconic conceptions of the 
classical humanist subject new possibilities emerge for exploring the folds between nature and 
culture, and extending the cognitive subject beyond the mechanisms inside the cranium. 
                                                          
5
 Here I must credit Catherine Waldby’s (2000) tracing of contemporary iconographic approaches to 




Elizabeth Wilson’s Psychosomatic (2004) also provides guidance in how we might allow 
neurology to break the confines of the skull.  More specifically, this text rehabilitates Freud’s 
early work in neuroanatomy prior to his psychoanalytic breakthroughs, so as ‘to extend the 
somatic beginnings of psychoanalysis back further than hysteria – further chronologically, 
further phylogenetically’ (Wilson, 2004: 1).  Through this reconciliation of Freud’s early and 
late work Wilson (2004: 5) cuts across current conceptually stagnant divides between our 
nervous system and our ‘ideational contortion[s]’ by not presuming molecular mechanisms 
that underlie cognition to be deterministic, fixed processes.  Rather, suggests Wilson (2004: 
21), if we consider the ‘molecular’ and the ‘ideational’ as mutually constitutive and ‘obliging’ 
towards each other, then an array of possibilities opens for differing notions of embodiment 
and extensions of cognition.  This thesis will demonstrate that too often it appears that a small 
coterie of influential advocates of the ‘neuro’ – in their translational ambition – are overly 
reductionist with regard to these ‘ideational contortions’, working with narrowly derived and 
socio-historically contingent notions of the subject that they seek to affix in the immutable 
materiality of the brain.  Consequently we ‘reduce’ that which is already narrow, anomalous, 
and contingent, and thereafter epistemologically cordon it off from critique.  However, 
through Wilson’s (2004: 13-16) reconceptualising of cognition we may see ‘the potential in the 
neurosciences for reinvention and transformation’, in part by recognising that ‘forces of 
influence and determination are more mutually entangled than the critics of neurological 
determinism have hitherto acknowledged’. 
Similarly Rosi Braidotti (2013: 61) aspires to assembling a new postanthropocentric subject by 
edging us towards a broadly Spinozan monism, and away from the hard cleaving and bounding 
of cognition that forces all that we deem to constitute selfhood inside the skull.  Through this 
anti-humanist stance we may come to see that what was once previously thought to be 
biologically immutable and inert as now ‘vital’ matter, imbued with volitional sway in networks 
of lively mediation.  This rich vein of thought finds allies across the disciplinary divide in 
neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio, whose work on the role of affective volitions and 
somatic markers greatly aided the turn to affect within the social sciences and humanities 
during the 1990s and 2000s (Damasio, 1994, 1999, 2003; Wilson, 2004: 83, 91, 111; Johnston 
and Malabou, 2013: 6; Braidotti, 2013: 56-7).  Recognition of this complexly mediated and 
affectively-guided subject, says Braidotti (2013: 52), could serve to produce a subject ‘worthy 
of our present’ by eschewing the now restrictive binds of classical humanism, while also 
rejecting the narrowly rationalised drives of late capitalist neoliberalism. 
Underlying the general impetus of this thesis then, is the cautious edging towards newly 
emergent ways of conceiving the neurological terrain, where ‘materiality is always something 
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more than “mere” matter: an excess, force, vitality, relationality, or difference that renders 
matter active, self-creative, productive, unpredictable’ (Coole and Frost, 2010: 9).  This task 
must be undertaken with care, for overly speculative and/or superficial engagement of the 
social sciences with the neurosciences risks committing the same kind of naïve ebullience or 
strawman critiques that Fitzgerald and Callard (2015) have firmly warned against.  That said, 
there are some influential pockets of intellectual inquiry – particularly in the emerging sub-
discipline of neuroethics – that I will argue lack the requisite humility and restraint, and 
threaten to foment ways of considering the neurological subject that may prove harmful.  It is 
these scholars who I will look to thoroughly critique in the following two chapters. 
But critique without the offer of an alternative path is ultimately a hollow endeavour, and lacks 
the intellectual generosity required to foster experimental entanglements.  Thus weaving 
throughout this thesis is the attempt to move in steady increments away from widely 
prevalent ideals of the ‘hypercognitive’ subject (O’Neill, 1997; Post, 2000), and to offer one 
that is more affectively driven and less rigidly bound to notions of the unified self, with 
multiply mediated and substantialised forms of cognition extended through the body and 
external environment.  Teresa Brennan’s (2004) The Transmission of Affect offers a useful 
entry point into such a ‘generous’ new framing of cognition in demonstrating how some 
properties of the self typically considered intangible, elusive, and ineffable can take on a highly 
visceral quality, a motion and causal agency, but only if we can resist pre-emptively excluding 
them when assembling the modern subject endowed with ‘high’ cognition.  Regrettably, 
argues Brennan (2004: 18-19), we have typically operated on the basis that ‘to be a worthy 
object of study, the individual has to be severed from affective connections with the 
surrounding environment and others in it’.  Such hypothetico-deductive constructions where, 
for example, our ‘ethical’ qualities are framed within our ‘higher’ rational capacities and 
entirely housed within the brain, speak to ‘primarily modern and Western approaches … that 
assume that the individual is an energetically self-contained or bound entity, whose affects are 
his or hers alone’ (Brennan, 2004: 24).   
This insistence on the individualised and ‘bounded’ subject brings with it normative 
expectations to conscientiously manage one’s affective state so as to avert its undesired 
intrusion upon higher cognition.  Those who are neglectful in managing their affects in ways 
aligning with overarching expectations will be ascribed a ‘borderline’ status, seen to be 
‘susceptible as well as liable to “leakage”’ (Brennan, 2004: 26), or to being ‘taken over’ by 
affect-laden dispositions (15).  Yet these ascriptions fail to recognise that such an ethic of 
affective self-care is a ‘culturally specific idea’ that ‘presupposes a self-contained individual’ 
(Brennan, 2004: 25).  The emerging cognitive sciences, suggests Brennan (2004: 63), are so 
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enamoured with importing prevailing societal dictates into the neurological terrain that they 
risk becoming ‘caught up in the very process it should be analysing’.  The result is the elevation 
and emulation of the subject capable of conscientiously quelling their affects, and thus ‘self-
containment is not only a delusion but also an achievement’ (Brennan, 2004: 63).  Undoing 
these hard ascriptions and narrow containments of cognition may allow for new possibilities of 
subjectivity less dependent on the questionable premise that we are the Cartesian authors of 
our volitions. 
Through this lies the (tentative and cautious) possibility for rethinking the political sphere, 
perhaps by way of a new micropolitics informed not by the presumption of singly unified 
citizen subjects, but rather cognition as interpersonal and extra-subjective; a politics where 
coalitions are formed not between single agents but through transmissions of affect.  Such 
aspirations are admittedly speculative and exploratory, but nevertheless helpful 
entanglements of thought as we contemplate how best to realise our hybrid ontologies.  
William Connolly’s Neuropolitics (2002: 2) was amongst the first to present such a thesis, 
encouraging conciliation and amiable entanglement with the neurosciences by reminding 
social and cultural theorists that 
‘… in their laudable attempt to ward off one type of reductionism too many cultural 
theorists fall into another: they lapse into a reductionism that ignores how biology is 
mixed into thinking and culture and how other aspects of nature are folded into both. 
Every theory of culture bears an implicit relation to biology and biological theory. The 
more cultural theorists try to avoid this gritty terrain, the more they either implicitly 
recapitulate one of two classical conceptions of nature that have long contended for 
primacy in Euro-American life or levitate toward a disembodied model of thinking, 
culture, and ethics that is difficult to sustain.’ 
Connolly is not overly credulous towards the neurosciences though, and stresses that there 
will likely always remain a gap between the observation of the physiological brain-in-action 
and the phenomenological experience of the subject.  The task, then, is ‘not how to eliminate 
the discrepancy, but how to respond to it’ (Connolly, 2002: 6).  This ‘zone of indiscernibility’ 
presents opportunities  
‘… to augment intellectualist models of thinking and culture with a perspective that 
appreciates the dense interweaving of genetic endowment, image, movement, sound, 
rhythm, smell, touch, technique, trauma, exercise, thinking, and sensibility. Thinking is 




Connolly, 2002: 12 
In this reconfiguration ‘cognition’ is not bound within the skull, but rather is dispersed through 
obliging networks, shifting in substantiality as it extends from one terrain to another.  
However, not all social theorists are on board with Connolly’s attempts to use the 
neurosciences to pose new potentials for micropolitics, and admittedly Connolly’s 
Neuropolitics does have a frustratingly nebulous quality that often comes with radical 
transdisciplinary works, particularly those that lack a firm grounding across all the bodies of 
knowledge they seek to render commensurable (see Slaby, Haueis and Choudhury 2012: 60-1; 
Johnston, 2012: 157-8; Fitzgerald and Callard, 2015, for similar critiques).  Nevertheless, we 
should recognise the potential that lies in not posing the relation between phenomenology 
and materiality as the task of reducing the unwieldy former to the comforting tangibility of the 
latter, but rather of their co-constitutive quality, which in turn has implications for how we 
conceive of the self. 
Not only might this require a new language by which we approach neurology and the self, but 
it also may require sacrificing some sacrosanct ideals by which we have constructed the rights 
and responsibilities of the modern subject.  For example, in discussing Benjamin Libet’s (1985) 
much-debated study of ‘readiness potentials’ – and the subsequent supposed implications for 
‘free will’ – philosopher Brian Massumi suggests that, rather than seeing the ‘gap’ of will within 
a single, localised being, we might instead reconsider the very notion of willing.  Here, will may 
be seen as a potentiality that swells through and between subjects, rather than bound as some 
Cartesian substance contained within a single agent.  In this way Libet’s purported temporal 
‘gap’ between when ‘I’ – as conscious agent – effect an action after my body signals a 
matching potentiality is not ‘empty’ but rather  
‘… overfull, in excess of the actually-performed action and of its ascribed meaning.  
Will and consciousness are subtractive.  They are limitative, derived functions that 
reduce a complexity too rich to be functionally expressed.’  
Massumi, 2002: 29   
If, then, we posit that ‘free will’, autonomy, personal responsibility, and all those other tent 
poles of modern liberal democratic societies are of value and still worth defending, this does 
not mean that we should seek to import them into the material by insisting on intensively 
finding their neurological correlates.  To do so would be to counter-productively diminish and 
foreclose both these socio-political ideals and what it is we believe a brain can do.  Each will be 
lessened in their potentiality if they are ontologically flattened and resubstantiated into the 
other through our currently crude methods.  As Foucault (1988: 15) suggested, perhaps ‘there 
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are more secrets, more possible freedoms, and more inventions in our future than we can 
imagine in humanism’, and therefore we should resist the temptation to intensively work and 
affix our current contingencies of the subject and its wellbeing into the brain terrain.   
 
 
Entanglement through neuronarratives 
 
Lastly, in this overview of those seeking productive ‘entanglement’ with the neurosciences, I 
will briefly address efforts in literary fiction that explore the turn to the neuro.  This will be of 
particular relevance to Chapter Four’s discussion of attempts to mimetically capture the 
subjective experience of dementia through fiction, but also speaks more broadly to the recent 
emergence of transdisciplinary efforts that seek new ways of conceiving the neurological 
subject through the arts and humanities.6  Literary works that sensitively explore the interiority 
of neurodegeneration, I will argue, have the potential to shift our orientation to dementia – 
seemingly the ailment most characteristic of our modern times – in ways that can accord 
sufferers greater understanding and recognition, and thus aid in the development of ways by 
which we can reaffirm selfhood in a person undergoing cognitive decline. 
This form of ‘entanglement’ requires rehabilitating narrative models of therapeutics in a way 
that cuts across both biomedical and identity contexts.  There is a rich but somewhat 
neglected history to draw on here.  In correspondence with Oliver Sacks, the neurologist A.R. 
Luria lamented the current dominance of ‘classical’ science, where quantitative data derived 
from rigid experimental constructs and the disaggregation of the subject into precise metrics 
of observation (or other comparably fixed and immutable measures) came to be preferred 
over more holistic narratives (Sacks, 1985: x-xi).  Sacks similarly endorsed this potential return 
to developing richer narratives of neurological difference over the ‘objective’ cleaving of 
condition from person, considering the latter approach grossly insufficient in capturing the 
enormously complex entwining of neurology with subjectivity.  Indeed Sacks is perhaps the 
best known proponent of ‘romantic science’ as a means of both therapeutic care and advocacy 
to others, and in recent years advocates of ‘neurodiversity’ have taken up this return to the 
narrative model of neurological difference (see, for example, Draaisma 2009a; Shostak and 
Waggoner, 2011; Birge, 2012).  Relatedly, and on a more quotidian level, a good deal of recent 
empirical work has explored the way lay subjects incorporate neuroscientific logics into their 
                                                          
6
 See, for example, the curious output emanating from the ‘Hubbub’ research group, a transdisciplinary 
experimental collaboration led by Felicity Callard and funded by the Wellcome Trust. 
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ongoing narrative of self, with accessible neurological frameworks at times providing ‘an 
important explanatory and legitimating function for our participants to make further sense of 
their personal perspectives’ (Pickersgill, Martin, Cunningham-Burley, 2015: 885, see also 
Pickersgill 2013a, 2013b; Pickersgill, Cunningham-Burley, Martin, 2011; O’Connor and Joffe, 
2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015).  This neuro-logic is neither totalising nor insignificant, and instead 
emerges as a resource of contextual orientation to be drawn upon by the subject, one 
narrative hook amongst several others upon which to hang conceptions of self and agency. 
Parallel to this growing ‘mundane significance’ of the neurosciences in everyday settings 
(Pickersgill, Cunningham-Burley and Martin, 2011) has been ongoing debate within academia 
over the apparent divide between the ‘Two Cultures’ of the natural sciences and the 
humanities (Snow, 2001).  Admittedly the invoking of Snow’s thesis has become an almost 
clichéd and trite presence in discussions of conflict between disciplines.  Yet, as Lustig and 
Peacock (2013: 3) note, Snow himself (2001: 74-5) – in later revisiting his famous thesis – 
touched upon the coming collision of our self-conceptions with scientific endeavour, 
suggesting that the gaze into the ‘higher nervous system’ would ‘affect the way in which men 
think of themselves more profoundly than any scientific advance since Darwin’s’.  Snow’s 
observation was remarkably prescient, and perhaps could only have been gleaned from 
someone who adeptly straddled the two cultures divide, as he did, in his prolific work as a 
physicist, novelist, and administrator.   
It is through this question of how the molecular gaze has shifted our self-conceptions and 
subsequent habits and practices that novelists have found an intriguing way into neuroscience, 
exploring issues of interiority and subjectivity as they are now shaped by neuro discourses.  
Since the 1990s in particular there has been an emergence of a sub-genre within the literary 
canon – variously described as ‘neurofiction’ (Birge 2012), the ‘neuronovel’ (Roth, 2009; 
Gaedtke, 2012) or ‘neuronarrative’ (Johnson, 2008) – that looks to wrangle with the 
neurosciences and their accompanying worldviews and ethical injunctions regarding our 
conduct and wellbeing.  Though a loose category such works are generally characterised by 
featuring protagonists living with some form of neurological difference, or through characters 
whose vocation is within the neurosciences and related fields.  In either case a crucial element 
is the exploration of the interiority of these protagonists who are either neurologically atypical 
or otherwise particularly attuned to see the world through a neuro lens.  Many neuronovels 
also play up the two cultures divide, juxtaposing the dispositions of ‘hard’ neuro-practitioners 
against the ‘soft’ appeals of humanists (see, for recent examples, David Lodge’s Thinks (2001), 
Ian McEwan’s Saturday (2005) and Enduring Love (1997), Richard Powers’ The Echo Maker 
(2006) and Galatea 2.2 (1995), and Will Self’s Umbrella (2012)). 
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Some novelists and literary theorists have looked to the neurosciences and related life sciences 
with optimism, finding inspiration in exploring the interiority of characters who find 
themselves caught up in hyper-reflexive considerations of their own neurological makeup (see, 
for example A.S. Byatt, 2006, and Ian McEwan, 2003).  Others similarly view the neuronovel as 
providing helpfully demonstrative explorations of ‘Theory of Mind’ and orders of intentionality 
between subjects, and so frame such works as providing a fertile, consoling, and instructive 
space in which we can ‘try on’ the consciousness of someone who may be cognitively ‘other’ 
(Zunshine, 2006).  Fictional works, arguably more than other any communicative form, can 
generate representations of neurological difference imbued with ‘depth and thickness’ 
(Waugh, 2013: 24).  In this way authors of fiction have sought to use the creative form as a 
means of promoting neurodiversity, in part by presenting rich interior worlds typically hidden 
from view (see Berger, 2014).  Indeed, as Birge (2012: 92-3) observes, although non-fiction 
works can describe in great and exacting detail the external manifestation of cognitive 
difference ‘fiction is able to go one step further by representing the subjective viewpoint of 
people who might have a difficult time describing their own perspective narratively’.  
Therefore fictional works can serve as a form of gentle instruction and advocacy for those 
living with some form of cognitive disorder or difference. 
However, while some authors and literary theorists see great potential in fiction as a means of 
fostering neurodiversity, others are more reticent, expressing concern that neurological 
difference is – in some cases – used merely as a prop for adopting an experimental form, or 
otherwise deployed in ways that appear to be exploiting a condition so as to address issues of 
far less importance.7  Along similar lines some authors and literary theorists look upon the 
increasing enthusiasm and authority granted to the neurosciences with wary concern, espying 
a forthcoming onslaught of eliminative materialist claims that may erase the experimental 
generativity of fiction and diminish wider understandings of subjectivity (Roth, 2009).  Feted 
novelist Tom Wolfe (1996) was among the first to express this fear of the supposed irresistible 
reductionist march of the neurosciences, taking it upon himself to (hysterically) inform all of us 
that ‘your soul has just died’.  This was based upon Wolfe’s (1996) assertion that neuroscience 
‘is on the threshold of a unified theory that will have an impact as powerful as that of 
Darwinism a hundred years ago’.  Suffice to say the ‘unified theory’ claim was completely 
overblown, and marks another example of the unhelpful and crude cross-disciplinary 
antagonisms that can derail new avenues of thought. 
                                                          
7
 Such critiques are often found, for example, in addressing representations of characters with autism in 
popular literature and film (see Draaisma, 2009b; Burks-Abbott, 2008; Murray, 2008).  
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Still, a not entirely unreasonable apprehension remains amongst some literary thinkers, who 
fear they might lose their epistemic privilege regarding explorations of subjectivity, and in turn 
be less able to resist certain rigid constructions of the self.  Jonathan Franzen (2012: 279) – 
whose novel The Corrections (2001) explored several aspects of our emerging sense of 
‘brainhood’ (Vidal, 2009) – directly expresses this view in suggesting that the ‘very identity’ of 
the novelist ‘is threatened by such abject materialism’ of the neurosciences.  This threat is 
captured in The Corrections through characters that commonly think of themselves with 
reference to their neurological functioning, particularly through one character who divides his 
sense of wellbeing into the micro-management of precisely delineated ‘Neurofactors’, 
measures which he obsessively monitors and finely adjusts in the cruelly ironic hope of 
warding off the onset of depression (Franzen, 2011:  139-140).  This character practices a form 
of ‘objective self-fashioning’ (Dumit, 2004) that takes his sense of neurochemical selfhood to 
obsessive levels, counter-productively resulting in a pitiful form of self-estrangement and 
‘misplaced concreteness’ of wellbeing (Waugh, 2013: 22, citing Alfred North Whitehead, 1925: 
62).   A cruise ship doctor in The Corrections captures this apparent sweep of the 
aforementioned ‘abject materialism’ and the colonisation of the humanities with his matter-
of-fact therapeutic claims: 
‘Fear of humiliation and the craving for humiliation are closely linked: psychologists 
know it, Russian novelists know it.  And this turns out to be not only ‘true’ but really 
true.  True at the molecular level.’  
Franzen, 2001: 318 
Thus, Franzen fears that – in the estimation of certain cool, eliminativist gazes – real truth is 
now inscribed upon the molecular brain, waiting to be revealed by these ‘pastors of the soma’ 
(Rose, 2007: 29).  Overall this spectrum of ‘Neuro Lit Crit’ (Chace et al. 2010) broadly mirrors 
ongoing debates within neurosciences and surrounding fields, but does so in ways that may 
shed further light on what may be gained or lost in our turn to the neurosciences and its 
accompanying normative injunctions. 
 
 
Maintaining a critical stance 
 
While I wholeheartedly endorse the call for experimental and speculative entanglements as 
outlined above, there nevertheless remain some contexts where direct critique is required.  
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This pertains especially to the resurgent eliminative materialist stances mentioned in the 
opening of this thesis and, relatedly, to those who exhibit what might be described as a 
translational haste in seeking to alleviate evermore complex societal problems by digging 
deeper into our neuronal circuitry.  Some current proponents of these potential applications, I 
will argue, have very narrowly defined parameters of the ideal citizen-subject, combined with 
inflated hope in the neurosciences to effect this ideal, which altogether serve to forward a 
research and policy agenda with such impunity that some staunch resistance may be 
necessary. 
In many ways the recent emergence of ‘Critical Neuroscience’ as a sub-field of inquiry is in 
response to the growing confidence of some neuro-evangelicals in holding forth on elusive 
qualities of being, and proposing forms of neurological self-instrumentalisation as the best 
means by which we might optimally realise our ‘humanity’.  Critical neuroscience is a relatively 
new field dedicated to tracing knowledge production practices in the neurosciences, their 
communication to wider audiences, and the outcomes of these exchanges with regard to our 
self-conception (see Choudhury et al., 2009; Slaby and Choudhury, 2012; Slaby, 2010; 
Kirmayer, 2012; Rose, 2012; Schleim 2014; Slaby and Gallagher, 2015).  Advocates in this area 
express caution towards the hurried incorporation of neuroscientific understandings into 
understandings of selfhood, seemingly driven by a translational imperative of a collective 
‘readiness and even “hunger” for self-objectification that is not easy to explain’ (Slaby, 2010: 
398).  This translational reconfiguring of ourselves occurs, in part, through claims to ‘hard’ 
veracity that are difficult to interrogate given the particular epistemic gaze of the 
neurosciences, along with various technical barriers to engagement pursuant (Slaby, 2010).  
New forms of epistemological consilience and commensurability are required to carefully 
manage how we incorporate the technosomatic into our lives, and thus critical neuroscience 
aims to be the measured and thoughtful linchpin between laboratory scientists, social 
scientists, private enterprise interests, policy makers, and the lay person, carefully monitoring 
the translations undergone as logics of the neuro work their way into and out of the lab. 
Critical neuroscience is also opposed to the too-easy absolution of neuro-practitioners from 
the ‘analysis of contextual factors, historical trajectories, conceptual difficulties, and potential 
consequences’ of their work (Slaby, 2010).  Rather, a critical neuroscience perspective poses 
that if neuroscientists wish to make knowledge claims in areas once within the purview of the 
social sciences and humanities they should be duly acquainted – within reason – of precisely 
what they may be seeking to endorse, refute, or supplant.  Critical neuroscience, however, is 
not simply a watchdog of the neurosciences, but also looks to pose new theoretical and 
methodological frames through which we might consider cognition, and likewise urges other 
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social scientists to loosen any pejorative preconceptions they may hold towards the ‘hard’ life 
sciences (see, for example, Slaby and Gallagher, 2015).   
These critical perspectives look to hold neuroscience to account for the dissemination of 
research findings, chastising those careless in their research design or their engagement with 
wider society, and in turn encouraging careful contextualising of output and fostering new 
forms of collaboration (see, for examples, Abi-Rached, 2008; Fine, 2008; Nahmias, 2011).  
More specifically to the concerns of this thesis, Kathinka Evers (2005, 2007) emphasises the 
need for the emerging discipline of neuroethics to establish a firmer philosophical grounding, 
with the view that some current conceptualisations are lacking in sufficient nuance relative to 
their vaulted ambitions.  Other theorists have similarly sought to ward against the slipping past 
of claims of ‘normative facticity’ that inscribe in harder forms that which is socio-historically 
contingent (Hartmann, 2011; Buller, 2006; Glannon, 2009; Chesire, 2006).  That neuroethics 
appears ‘trendy’ and ‘hip’ should not distract us from claims that overreach (Conrad and De 
Vries, 2011: 301), nor from attempts to inscribe questionable norms through a process of 
confirmation bias that ‘absolutizes itself’, and so may become unimpeachable for those 
outside of this techno-epistemic elite (Hartmann, 2011: 71).   
As alluded to earlier, the hope for critical neuroscience is not merely to correct ‘brain 
overclaim’, but also ‘to push experimental work in alternative directions’ (Choudhury and 
Slaby, 2011: xiii; Fitzgerald and Callard, 2015).  Furthermore, such efforts look to tease out the 
current prevalence of ways in which ‘our lifeworlds, language, and habits are already being 
subtly transformed by findings from neuroscience’ (Choudhury and Slaby, 2011: 2-3).  These 
critical perspectives are therefore keenly attuned to the risks of categorically affixing the ideal 
subject through neuroscience, with Cliodhna O’Connor and Helene Joffe (2013: 255) stressing 
that the ascription of ‘truth’ of any scientific concept may prove ‘largely irrelevant to its 
substantive effect on people’s thinking about themselves, others and society’.  What gets 
‘taken up’ in the public discourse surrounding neuroscience brings with it certain normative 
implications (O’Connor, Rees and Joffe, 2012: 220), and thus we need to cultivate ways of 
interrogating the present in order to illuminate the contingencies of that which may initially 
appear mundanely universal. 
Critical efforts also look to illuminate the underlying normative stances by which 
neuroscientists may undertake their research.  Pickersgill (2012), for example, notes the weary 
ambivalence felt by neuroscientists in satisfying both personal and institutional ethical 
standards, while also expressing resistance to those intrusions which may stall or halt 
knowledge production (Brosnan and Cribb, 2014; De Vries, 2007b).  This reticence, 
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ambivalence, and occasional indifference is significant, with sociologists of bioethics and 
medicine in particular seeking to draw attention to current disciplinary assemblages and 
delineations of responsibility.  Such critiques are especially focused on those claims which 
suggest convenient usurping or self-absolution from the ethical implications of their chosen 
frameworks, methodologies, and subsequent knowledge claims.  Additionally, Pickersgill 
(2012) notes that many laboratory scientists conduct their research with the belief that the 
ethical implications of their processes and findings need not be considered concurrently or 
thought to be constitutive of the knowledge work in itself.  Along these lines, then, ethical 
considerations are neatly cleaved from the knowledge production of those who purport to 
uncover the ‘essential’ properties of our very ethical being.  Rationalisation processes and the 
hyper-specialised division of labour thereby ease ethics out of the lab and into the purview of 
certain qualified assessors, but – through empirical neuroethics, as I will demonstrate in the 
following chapter – ‘ethics’ is then smuggled back in diminished forms by some neuro-
enthusiasts who endeavour to reveal the underlying construction of our ethical makeup.   
Yet we must not neglect to remind ourselves that the work of scientists is always and 
inevitably laden with normative and didactic dimensions, particularly for those in the psy and 
neuro fields where Ian Hacking’s (1995) ‘looping effects of human kinds’ are especially likely.8  
As Foucault pithily notes: 
‘I don’t think psychology can ever dissociate itself from a certain normative program… 
Every psychology is a pedagogy, all decipherment is a therapeutics: you cannot know 
without transforming’  
Foucault, 1998: 255 
Therefore every pronouncement that resounds from within the neurosciences inevitably has 
an underlying pedagogical impetus regarding how we might best conduct ourselves.  In 
response, a great deal of critical neuroscience discourse looks to tamp down any overblown 
appeals and ‘breathless wonder’ accorded to the ‘revolutionary’ potential of the neuro, along 
with overstated and normatively-laden appeals that ‘invest people with an understanding of 
their own brains and emotions as manageable material to be transformed’ (Murison, 2012: 
30).  This compelling rhetoric of the brain as a site for re-invention ‘overdetermines our modes 
of self-understanding’ (Gotman, 2012: 85), resulting in a perpetual labour that disaggregates 
the self into mechanistic assemblies to be rendered maximally efficient, but is ultimately less 
than the sum of its parts. 
                                                          
8
 These effects of our reflexive constructions are addressed in more detail in Chapter Three. 
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This over-determination of the brain is inevitably framed within contemporaneous 
parameters, with Hartmann (2011: 81) suggesting that by way of the current translational 
bottleneck ‘what we might want to call social, economic, or political circumstances of action in 
everyday life (including their specific pressures and constraints) is played by the brain in 
neuroscientific discourse.’  The possibility that thereby emerges is that we are affixing in the 
immutable ‘natural’ what simply amounts to highly contingent institutional frameworks, and 
the accompanying ethical injunctions that perpetuate these social systems.  When 
subsequently bound up in the ‘neoliberal order of individualized responsibility’ this results in a 
strange espousal of a personal ethic that entails working on strictly delimited cognitive 
capacities required to maintain these same institutional mechanisms of neoliberalism 
(Hartmann, 2011: 81, see also Schleim, 2014).  This may generate a self-estrangement that, 
once enacted, may be resistant to countering discourses and so becomes dramatically 
reconstitutive of the ways in which we perceive ourselves as agents of varying autonomy and 
volition (Kirmayer, 2011: 367). 
The ‘seductive allure’ (Weisberg et al. 2008, see also Joyce, 2008) of the neurosciences may 
play a key role here, for the promise of a ‘hard’, rigourous discipline that can give consoling 
solidity to our various idiosyncrasies holds great appeal for those who find themselves adrift 
due to their neuroatypical makeup.  Cohn (2011), for instance, demonstrates that the 
promissory and seemingly mimetic qualities of neuroscientific representations – particularly 
through brain imaging – are already shaping the dispositions of those suffering from mental 
illness, who may seek more tangible markers of ‘authenticity’ for their respective diagnoses.  
Such images appear to provide vivid depictions of one’s difference for those uninitiated in the 
equal parts artful, technical, and messy construction of many forms of brain imaging, drawn 
upon to trace the equally heterogeneous assemblage of categories of mental illness (Cohn, 
2011: 184, see also Joyce 2006, 2008 on the construction of MRIs).  Such efforts give these 
elusive phenomena a tangible quality that for many psychiatric patients accords a new sense 
of personal ‘legitimacy’, in part achieved through the surreally ironic hope that brain imaging 
will ‘“prove it’s not all in my head”’ (Cohn, 2011: 187).  
This feeds back into the ontology, substantiality, and discursive terrain we accord to 
difference, with increasingly complex conditions and categorical framings imported into the 
molecular brain, to which we then gaze in the hope and promise of wresting control over our 
rebellious psyches (Thornton, 2011b: 29-63; Illes et al., 2008).  The drive of the neuro to go 
‘upstream’ in reducing such conditions to their physiological mechanisms creates an ‘invisible 
curve’ of research output, for  
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‘… neuroscience itself is reproducing many of the existing values and assumptions that 
underpin traditional psychiatry … Incongruously, then, the faith in an object beneath 
and prior to the symptoms is the very thing that appears to ensure the biology of 
mental disease will inherit much of the old social nature of mental illness.’  
Cohn, 2011: 186-7   
Thus a categorical circularity and ontological bait-and-switch may occur where ‘the symptom 
has collapsed into the referent’ (Dumit, 2011: 222).  Where this occurs once previously 
negotiated and heavily contextualised categories may become shorn of their nuance and 
affixed in the material in ways that could prove counter-productive and difficult to later 
deconstruct.  Critically tracing these processes requires disciplinary flexibility, and so critical 
neuroscience seeks to work both ‘downward in a conceptual analysis of the underpinnings of 
our models and metaphors of the brain, and upward toward a political economic analysis of 
the uses of neuroscientific knowledge’, along with ‘attention to the middle realm of 
interactions in networks or assemblages’ (Kirmayer, 2011: 370). 
Undoing overly promissory discourses and their underlying epistemological claims and 
assumptions will take some concerted effort.  George Whitehouse (2012: 199), a 
neuroscientist also trained in bioethics, notes with weary scepticism the ‘triumphalism’ of 
much current neuroscientific rhetoric, where ‘the hype about malleability of the brain 
manifested in the concept of neuroplasticity oozed into social and mental spaces in a way that 
seemed first stretched and then rigid’.  It seems that once open and expansive orientations to 
our plasticity have already been appropriated by narrow overarching discourses (Malabou, 
2008; Papadopoulos, 2011).  Vidal (2009: 10) similarly detects an air of ‘ahistorical 
triumphalism’ in the neurosciences seeking to resolve the debates of millennia in ways 
ignorant to their deep context and contingency, and so risks making claims that are both 
overreaching and narrowly derived.  These concerns of ‘stretching’ our neurological selves only 
to reinforce rigid and historically anomalous self-conceptions are pithy observations from 
Whitehouse and Vidal for, as I will show, so much of the clamour to ‘enhance’ our neurological 
makeup is construed in ways that seem desperately unimaginative and banal, yet also 
threatens to prove burdensome.   
If, under the new promissory regime of ‘plasticity’, the brain is increasingly thought to be 
infinitely malleable, and furthermore that all experience must pass through the ledger of the 
molecular, then – in a gradual accretive turn towards ‘brainhood’ (Vidal, 2009) – this organ 
becomes the site upon which our efforts towards living well must be oriented.  This ethos may 
become an ‘underlying central dogma’ to which we will expected to accord ourselves 
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(Whitehouse, 2012: 205).  But, as Catherine Malabou (2008) observes, we have no idea what it 
means to truly be plastic, for currently we insist on working plasticity to our own ends in ways 
that negate its potential of working on us ie. to prescribe exactly how one should be ‘plastic’ 
only serves to reinforce already laid paths.  Thus, like Whitehouse (2012: 205), we may ponder 
whether neuroplasticity is merely an obfuscation of a more efficacious ‘psychoplasticity’.  That 
is, we reconfigure our neurology through techniques of self care in accordance with how we 
are informed our brains are ideally constituted in the current socio-political milieu.  
Such an ethos, combined with the aforementioned consumption of ‘soft’ neuroscience, has 
resulted in the proliferation of popular and faddish outputs that ‘frame brain imaging and 
neuroscience as an accessible body of knowledge that has direct, concrete applications for 
almost every area of daily life’ (Thornton, 2011b: 1).  In tandem with highly individualised 
imperatives to perpetual self-improvement, such discourses of manageable plasticity 
encourage ‘willful efforts to improve the brain’ in the expectation of ‘superior intelligence, 
greater emotional stability, and improved performance in the home, at the gym, and in the 
workplace’ (Thornton, 2011b: 2).  The result is ‘endless projects of self-optimization in which 
individuals are responsible for continuously working on their own brains to produce 
themselves as better parents, workers, and citizens’ (Thornton, 2011b: 2).  In this way the 
quotidian is now housed within the neuroplastic, and ‘endowed with regulatory significance’ 
(Thornton, 2011b: 7).  Keenly felt but elusive properties become disaggregated into 
neurological processes deemed functioning or deficient, with discretely bounded and 
consumer-friendly interventions to match. 
Through their growing epistemic privilege and cultural cachet anthropologist Emily Martin 
(2000: 574) sees the ‘neuroreductive cognitive sciences as the most dangerous kind of vortex – 
one close by and one whose power has the potential to suck in disciplines like anthropology, 
severely weakening them in the process’.  Martin (2000: 581) espies a kind of ‘mania’ taking 
hold of the idealised subject, one in which we are valued for our willingness to push our brains 
to their absolute limits, albeit only in narrowly derived, pre-determined ways.  Under the 
broadly neoliberalist dismantling of the state – with the parallel expansion of personal 
responsibility towards maximising one’s performance in competitive arenas – greater 
expectations are laid upon the individual as the engine for societal propulsion and 
regeneration.  As a result ‘the individual must become the site for investment of resources … 
made up of a flexible collection of assets; a person is proprietor of his or her self as a portfolio’ 
(Martin, 2000: 582).   
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Suffice to say that viewing our neurology as an asset-based portfolio to be actuarially managed 
and leveraged blurs any remaining distinctions we might still have held between self-
administered ‘treatment’ and ‘enhancement’.  Into the future, as we develop ways to labour 
with greater precision upon our molecular constitutions, we will likely witness further blurring 
between ‘treatment’ and ‘enhancement’, along with the once similar cleaving between the 
care of one’s ‘natural’ state of being against various socio-technical extensions of the self.  
However, we need not stridently resist such entanglements through a fear of losing what is 
thought essential to our ‘humanity’, for such nostalgia towards old humanist ideals serves little 
purpose as we shift into new forms of ontological hybridity.  Rather, we should look to 
preserve the generative potential of these current and forthcoming entanglements.  This 
requires resisting the concretising of the subject, for if the contingencies of today are crudely 
imported into the brain terrain then we may find ourselves compelled by irresistible 
essentialist imperatives that actually serve to diminish the expansive possibilities of selfhood.  
 
 
Outline of the thesis 
 
The goal of this thesis is to delineate the production of new and shifting subjectivities as they 
are framed through the emerging neurosciences and related fields, particularly as they relate 
to ideals of ethical conduct.  In this way I hope to provide an ‘epistemology of assemblage’ 
(Rose, 1990: xv) in how we may come to be constituted as subjects, of how we are 
reconfigured as knowledge claims are folded into injunctions upon our everyday conduct.  In 
turn, this thesis also aims to contribute to the assembling of a more expansive neurological 
subject, one less acutely bound within idealisations of the ‘hypercognitive’, and instead better 
recognised as ‘embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, affective’ (Protevi, 2010).   
Whether the grand ambitions of the ‘hard’ neuro-enthusiasts to be discussed in this thesis 
succeed or otherwise, their success in capturing scholarly attention and the public imagination 
entails that they will nevertheless have an effect in how we are negotiated into being.  We 
may, in time, come to govern ourselves via a precise instrumentalisation of our neurology, 
adjusting molecular levers towards satisfying narrowly prescribed ideals.  These current and 
proposed technologies and techniques of the self mould evermore abstract and elusive 
aspects of our biosociality, but do so in evermore minutely materialist ways; a curious contrast 
of intensive means directed to expansive ends.  It is worth acknowledging that Nikolas Rose 
45 
 
(1990: 11) diagnosed this hyper-reflexive state of the modern subject long prior to our current 
interest in the cognitive neurosciences: 
‘Through self-inspection, self-problematization, self-monitoring, and confession, we 
evaluate ourselves according to the criteria provided for us by others.  Through self-
reformation, therapy, techniques of body alteration, and the calculated reshaping of 
speech and emotion, we adjust ourselves by means of the techniques propounded by 
the experts of the soul.  The government of the soul depends upon our recognition of 
ourselves as ideally and potentially certain sorts of person, the unease generated by a 
normative judgment of what we are and could become, and the incitement offered to 
overcome this discrepancy by following the advice of experts in the management of 
the self.’ 
Selfhood is thus constituted by what paths are already inscribed by ‘experts of the soul’ 
through the imprints and scripts left and given by technologies of care, and dominant 
paradigms of seeing and knowing, which in turn generate normative standards and the means 
to measure their adherence.  If today this reach of governmentality is heading into the 
neurological, then we as social scientists must develop the means to trace this importation of 
concepts of subjectivity into the new terrain, and moreover seek to become productively 
entangled in this process.  
However, this thesis does not claim we are on the precipice of some form of damning 
ontological implosion.  Contrary to the aforementioned hand-wringing of some popular 
commentators in this vein your ‘soul’ did not just ‘die’ (Wolfe, 1996), and the turn to self-
instrumentalisation and incorporation of new habits of self-care through the new life sciences 
will not necessarily result in us ‘paying coin in our humanity’ (Kass, 2002: 101).  Such 
prophecies are all too common and indeed are one aspect of the excessively utopian and 
dystopian discourses I seek to critique.  Rather, I endeavour to provide a more measured 
tracing of how certain subfields of neuroscience and ethics may come to inform everyday life, 
particularly in how we think of ourselves as ethical beings within the wider overarching 
imperatives of late modernity.  This task will be undertaken in three parts.   
Moral Spectroscopes and Synaptic Ledgers traces the emergence of neuroethics, a new 
discipline claiming epistemological territory by blackboxing properties that were once firmly 
within the purview of the social sciences and humanities into the hard empirical gaze of 
cognitive neuroscience.  This combination of cool empiricism with the potential for application 
to pressing collective issues entails that neuroethics may, suggest proponents, bring about ‘a 
second Enlightenment’ (Farah, 2010: 8) through the development of a ‘universal morality’.  
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Such ambition should give us pause, and indeed some influential outputs of neuroethical 
discourse will be shown to be insensitive to socio-historical nuances of subjectivity, resulting in 
narrowly construed conceptions that look to affix the ideal ethical being in ways that fail to 
recognise their productive contingencies.    
Not Fit for Purpose? engages with those advocates who propose that we look to precisely 
recalibrate the ethical subject through the application of neuroscientific insight.  These ‘hard’ 
transhumanists suggest that it may prove a virtuous endeavour to seek to improve ourselves 
through direct interventions upon our neurological makeup, and indeed that in light of the 
increasing global risks that we collectively face it may prove imperative that we demonstrate a 
willingness to practice this technosomatic self-fashioning.  In response, some bioconservative 
and classical humanist thinkers have sought to defend ‘traditional’ ideals of the subject.  
However, I suggest such stances are as equally rigid, constraining, and ultimately unattainable 
as those they criticise from the transhumanist camp.  Instead, I draw on critical theory and 
‘anti-humanist’ perspectives that demonstrate the possibilities that may emerge if we are 
willing to embrace our ‘hybrid’ ontologies, while also practicing an epistemological humility 
that does not seek – through ‘translational imperatives’ and the promise of ‘enhancement’ – 
to immediately shift scientific insights into practical applications that may foreclose other 
avenues of thought and experiment.  Using this theoretical framework I also provide a critique 
of the growing popularity and ethical injunctions embedded in the ‘brain training’ industry. 
Dementia in a Hypercognitive World shifts from the critique of those who aim to affix 
measures of the ideal ethical subject as one who is ‘hypercognitive’, to instead explore 
questions of subjectivity, narrative, and wellbeing in those who suffer from dementia; a 
typically characteristic condition of the highly developed world.  Using experimental but 
sensitively rendered works of fiction as inspiration, this chapter demonstrates how dementia is 
an entangled phenomena, irreducible to biological phenomena or social constructions, and 
plagued by problems of inexpressibility, and thus requires nuanced practices of care and 
emotional labour in order to continually affirm those who are undergoing rapid shits in their 
ontology.  More broadly, through such considerations of neurodiversity we may come to 
recognise the importance of relational and affective elements in retaining an ongoing sense of 
self and volition, and so may be better placed to reconsider how our varying neurological 
constitutions may best be realised. 
Finally, the concluding chapter returns to the curious contrast of the intensive and the 
expansive found throughout this thesis, and outlines some trajectories by which we might 




Moral Spectroscopes and Synaptic Ledgers: On the Epistemic 
Claims and Disciplinary Formation of Neuroethics  
 
Introduction – Blackboxing the moral subject 
 
In Charles Dickens’ (1865) Our Mutual Friend the possibility is raised that morally-infused 
energy generated by our interactions give off arrays of light that are then read by intergalactic 
beings using sophisticated technologies.  From this data such beings can view the full spectrum 
of our morality and see us in vivid displays of our ‘true’ selves.  That such a device may 
transform the complexities and nuances of our day-to-day morality into blazes of light flowing 
between beings is (perhaps) a romantic, tantalising, and enlivening idea, one pithily described 
by Oliver Sacks (2001: 120) as a kind of ‘moral spectroscopy’.  
There emerges hazardous epistemological terrain, however, in developing a moral 
spectroscope that purports to capture the spectrum of such elusive phenomena as ‘morality’, 
but in practice only presents a slice claiming itself as the whole.  This chapter will address a 
potential form of ‘hard’ moral spectroscopy from the burgeoning field of neuroethics, which 
insists on seeing and bounding morality within the ‘wetware between our ears’ (Safire, 2002b).  
This branch of empirically-inclined neuroethics hones tools and experimental constructs that 
gaze into our material compositions, and then pairs them with our current understandings of 
localised neurological functions, thus endeavouring to map morality in however it may be 
inscribed upon the brain.  In this way the organ itself becomes the bounded container of moral 
being, neatly cleaved from the muddying context in which right thinking and good action are 
emergent and practiced.     
For social scientists, this configuration of the ‘right’ and the ‘good’ at the neurological level 
might raise concern. Therefore, along with Karen Cerulo’s (2010) aforementioned lament of 
sociology’s tepid response to the growing influence of the neurosciences, we can now add the 
potential epistemic capture – a Latourian ‘blackboxing’ (1999: 304) – of inquiry into morality.  
Through such blackboxing, ‘hard’ methods of empirical neuroethics purport to produce 
morality-in-action with an immediacy, vividness, and seemingly specialised and technical 
precision which the social sciences and humanities can neither equal nor easily critique. The 
claimed exactitude of experimental constructs that use repeatable and infinitely iterative 
stimuli (such as moral dilemmas), to thereby test the neuronal basis of variable morality, lends 
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a guise of legitimacy and objective clarity to empirical neuroethics, altogether generating a 
research program which demands thorough interrogation from social scientists. 
The introductory chapter highlighted the importance of practicing a cautious entanglement, 
seeking productive exchange where possible, but also reining in ambitious neuro-practitioners 
who overreach in their epistemic claims regarding the ‘cerebral subject’ (Ortega, 2009).  Often 
these claims invoke an understanding of the brain as the final resting place upon which all 
other phenomena may be converted into a common currency, as suggested here by highly 
regarded neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux (2002: 5): 
‘The puzzle of how nature and nurture shape who we are is simplified by the 
realization that synapses are the key to the operations of both. Whether your 
paycheck is deposited to your bank account automatically or you hand it over to the 
teller in person, it goes to the same place. Nature and nurture function similarly: they 
are simply two different ways of making deposits in the brain’s synaptic ledgers.’9 
But what is lost if we choose to focus solely on this endpoint of the final ledger and eschew the 
varying processes by which a ‘deposit’ is made?  Indeed, if we take LeDoux’s chosen analogy of 
depositing a paycheck, we can observe that while, yes, the funds will arrive in your account in 
either scenario the ethical inflection of the process can differ dramatically, and thus change 
our relation to that same paycheck.  The human bank teller, for instance, can be felt to pass 
judgment on your wealth, while the non-human actor who receives your electronically 
programmed deposit cares not.  However, in turn the human teller can provide warmth and 
consolation, while the non-human machine processes your requirements without feeling.  An 
array of ethical dynamism and reflexivity therefore surrounds even the most mundane 
artefacts and exchanges, with the processes and networks by which certain desired outcomes 
are effected also feeding into the ongoing shaping of various forms of ethical subjects (Latour, 
1992; Pickersgill, Cunningham-Burley, and Martin, 2011).  If even the most mundane of 
interactions, frames, and gazes can shape our ethical dispositions and constitutions, then what 
of claims that resubstantialise varying ontologies across ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ into the 
common currency of the neuronal?  Thus, while the synaptic ledger may be a tempting 
construct, we should acknowledge that the vast spectrum of means by which ‘deposits’ are 
made can in turn create wildly varying ethical relations that only serve to further undermine 
the ledger’s ongoing reliability.  We should therefore not presume the synaptic ledger to be 
                                                          
9
 Similar claims can be found throughout neuroscientific literature, though this has lessened in recent 
years in favour of more embodied and relational models of cognition, see Glannon (2009) for a critical 
overview.  My contention within this chapter, however, is that a certain influential vein of positivist 
neuroethics seeks to bring back the hard fixity of the synaptic ledger in assessing our ethical being. 
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wholly encompassing of the phenomena which make up the world available to the experiential 
subject, for too much threatens to be lost in this seeming surety.  
The propounding of a moral spectroscope and the synaptic ledger provide complementary 
ways of capturing the particular approach of neuroethics, an emerging discipline predicated 
upon the authority of the ‘neuromolecular gaze’ to translate properties of subjectivity and 
wellbeing into its epistemic orbit (Abi-Rached and Rose, 2010).  Such spectroscopes and 
ledgers accord once elusive properties of the subject an ‘anatomical reality’ and in this way 
become open to new forms of instrumentalisation and injunctions regarding care of the self 
(Abi-Rached and Rose, 2013: 47), proposals which will be further addressed in the following 
chapter. For now, it is worth noting that there has only been a small amount of prior 
scholarship outlining the promissory rhetoric, epistemic flag-planting, and expert-wrangling 
deemed requisite in order for neuroethics to firmly establish itself as a discipline that demands 
both due deference and scrupulous oversight (see Brosnan, 2011; De Vries, 2005, 2007a; 
Conrad and De Vries, 2011).  While helpful in establishing a base for sociological critique this 
chapter seeks to go further in offering a sustained and relatively lengthy investigation of 
neuroethics’ emergence over the last fifteen years.  In particular, I wish to draw attention to 
the work of those within the field whose claims regarding the possibility of realising moral 
spectroscopes and synaptic ledgers of wellbeing threatens to produce a narrowly conceived 
metamorality, one grounded in highly anomalous historical contingencies of ‘wellbeing’ both 
justified through and shoehorned into the seemingly immutable brain terrain.  It is this 
assumption of parity – that current conceptions of good living, right thinking and just action 
can be translated down into the molecular gaze of neurological function – which this chapter 
predominantly seeks to interrogate from a sociological perspective.   
 This chapter will demonstrate how such ambitions of moral spectroscopy – though not shared 
by all practitioners – were present from the very beginnings of neuroethics’ formalisation as a 
field of inquiry, constituting an adapted form of eliminative materialism that demands close 
scrutiny.  More recently, the assessment of the ethical subject through moral spectroscopy can 
be witnessed in the experimental models of neuroethicist and moral psychologist Joshua 
Greene, whose work has potentially discipline-shaking implications, yet despite this and being 
demonstrably influential (cited well over ten thousand times in academic publications) his 
work and related studies have thus far escaped sociological scrutiny.  The claims of Greene and 
others towards more precisely ‘reading’ the moral being are also gaining traction in popular 
outlets, hitting that titillating nexus between the assurances of scientific precision with the 
promise of greater wellbeing for all, and so risks weighty ‘looping effects’ (Hacking, 1995) 
regarding our self-conception as agents.  These effects may hasten what I will ultimately argue 
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are questionable epistemic claims regarding wellbeing that ultimately reduce and rigidly affix 
once productively elusive understandings of moral autonomy.  Instead, what is produced 
through crude spectroscopes and narrow synaptic ledgers may well be both the ossification 
and reification of already extant but highly anomalous conceptions of the ‘ideal’ ethical 
subject.  The following chapter will subsequently trace how such hypothetico-deductively 
drawn outcomes are being applied to narrow contemporary contingencies in search of 
‘enhancement’, neglecting other possibilities of how our neurological capacities may best be 
realised.  
To this end of providing a thorough discourse analysis of the disciplinary emergence of 
neuroethics, and then interrogating recent empirical claims, this chapter will first provide a 
brief overview of the emergence of neuroethics, particularly in tracing claims that suggest 
neuroethics may lay the foundations of ‘a second Enlightenment’ (Farah, 2010: 8) and a form 
of ‘universal ethics’ (Gazzaniga, 2006: 178).  The ontological groundwork required in justifying 
the synaptic ledger – of rendering neurology commensurate with morality – will then be 
explored through the advocacy of those working within the philosophy of mind, such as Neil 
Levy and Thomas Metzinger.  Following this the moral spectroscopy of Joshua Greene will be 
explored as especially demonstrative of the ambition of empirical neuroethics in attempting to 
dismantle long-held and widely accepted positions in normative ethical thought.  Through 
these empirical endeavours I will show how neuroethics conflates multiple branches of ethical 
inquiry, with potentially significant consequences across the disciplinary gamut.  Lastly, and in 
anticipation of the following chapter, some insights will be given as to the ‘ideal’ subject 
envisioned by some neuro-advocates – to be potentially realised through direct interventions 
upon the brain – that threatens to actuarially affix understandings of subjectivity and risk that 
we are still well short of truly comprehending.      
 
 
The ambition of empirical neuroethics 
 
Neuroethics, in its broadest definition, has two main branches. Firstly, it is the study of how we 
should conduct research within the neurosciences with regard to ethical, legal, and social 
implications, thus placing itself firmly within bio- and medical ethics more generally. Secondly, 
neuroethics concerns itself with the problem of how neuroscience-based research might 
productively inform, support, or question the validity of current understandings and 
applications of morality and ethics (Roskies, 2002; Marcus, 2002; Glannon, 2006, 2011; Levy, 
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2007, 2008; Farah, 2010; Conrad and De Vries, 2011; Buniak, Darragh, Giordano, 2014; 
Darragh, Buniak, Giordano, 2015).  It is this latter aim which is of particular novelty and 
ambition.  
For this reason the following analysis is especially concerned with how neuroethics is 
interrogating longstanding principles of normative ethics and – on the basis of its positivist 
empirical approach – proposing ways in which we might consider modifying our ethical 
practices and propensities by way of neurological intervention.  From its inception, this line of 
neuroethics has been characterised by the promise of resolving long-debated normative 
stances, most notably the bind between broadly Kantian deontology and Bentham 
utilitarianism (Gassen, 2008).  In addition, neuroethics has also positioned itself as a regulatory 
overseer of efforts towards alleviating the growing burden of psychiatric disorders and 
degenerative neurological disease, whilst also policing the general conduct of the 
neurosciences and warding against over-promissory rhetoric (Glannon, 2006).  Whether the 
field can appropriately tend to these dual aims without inviting accusations of regulatory 
capture is a source of ongoing tension and debate (Brosnan, 2011; Marcus, 2002). 
The term ‘neuroethics’ dates to 1973 when Anneliese Pontius (1973) raised the possibility that 
walking devices used to aid newborn children may ironically result in long term consequences 
in developing the required neurological capacities for that same motor function.  Though this is 
certainly an interesting and pertinent line of inquiry, neuroethics as it is understood today 
usually does not directly concern itself with these issues of developmental neurology and the 
incorporation of artefacts with bio-mechanics of movement (Buniak, Darragh, Giordano, 2014; 
Conrad and De Vries, 2011).  Rather, Erin Conrad and Raymond De Vries (2011: 312) suggest 
that – in playing down the earlier Pontius coinage and instead highlighting ties to bioethics 
more generally – neuroethicists are ‘are appropriating the “origin myth” of bioethics… 
beneﬁtting from established work in bioethics while claiming a new area of inquiry’.  This 
approach has so far proven to be a clever discipline-building strategy. 
A broad consensus suggests that neuroethics first entered the wider public consciousness and 
established a claim as a discipline in its own right around fifteen years ago, with credit given to 
popular linguist and neuroscience advocate William Safire’s organisation and subsequent 
public discussion of the 2002 ‘Neuroethics: Mapping the Field’ conference, which proved a 
catalyst for pushing the field into the academic limelight (Farah, 2010: xiii; Buniak, Darragh and 
Giordano, 2014).  In attempting to carve out legitimacy and establish their ambitious aims 
public figures like Safire (2002a: 3-5) aligned their new endeavour with revolutionary thought, 
specifically invoking the fruitful outcomes of the ‘intellectual revolt’ following the 
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Enlightenment.  Safire’s lively rhetoric further cautioned against Promethean hubris while 
nevertheless urging the promise of remaking ourselves into our most desirable form and 
image.     
This rallying cry opened the crucially formative 2002 ‘Mapping the Field’ conference, a high 
powered affair featuring many of the intellectual heavyweights of the psy, neuro, and cogno 
disciplines, including: Antonio Damasio, Patricia Churchland, Michael Gazzaniga, Steven 
Hyman, Erik Parens, Arthur Caplan, Paul Root Wolpe, and Judy Illes, amongst others.  The 
purported aim was to establish a broad consensus of what neuroethics consists of as a 
discipline, its relation to neighbouring fields, and its potential role in public communication 
and policy development.  Conference attendees also debated what issues were most pressing 
with regard to future research possibilities.  Curiously, throughout the conference the very 
descriptor of ‘neuroethics’ itself was held to be contentious, with attendees instead proposing 
‘euneurics’10 (Blakemore, 2002: 130), ‘neurohumanities’ (Mahowald, 2002: 317-8), or the less 
catchy but certainly comprehensive ‘social consequences of neuroscience’, as suggested by 
Henry Greely (2002: 309-10).11  Indeed Greely (2006: 606) would several years later continue 
to express frustration with the field’s name, concerned that the focus on ‘ethics’ unhelpfully 
distracts from equally pertinent legal and social issues.  Greely, however, is resigned to the fact 
that the ‘catchy’ term ‘has been impossible to dislodge’.  In any case, ‘neuroethics’ has largely 
won out, although some practitioners prefer to label themselves as ‘neurophilosophers’ or 
variations thereof, often depending on their initial entry point into the field.   
One recurrent theme of this first conference was to steer conceptions of our species away 
from overly romanticised notions of human exceptionalism to cooler, empirically informed 
tracing of our moral constitutions.  Antonio Damasio (2002: 15), while broadly supportive of 
the neuroethical cause, recognised that this may prove a difficult pill to swallow: 
‘As if it were not enough to have Copernicus tell us we are not the center of the 
universe, Darwin tells us we have humble origins, and Freud tells us that we are not 
masters of our own house, now we are being told that even in the realm of ethics 
there is forerunner behavior.’   
Certainly, one of the earliest aims of neuroethics as a sub-discipline was to find and describe 
these neuronal ‘forerunners’ of ethics – those causal mechanisms operating below conscious 
                                                          
10
 Suffice to say this term did not catch on despite Colin Blakemore’s (2002: 130) belief that aversions to 
eugenics had now been overcome.   
11
 In addition the philosopher of mind Thomas Metzinger (2009) would later propose a neuroethics-like 
field that embraced a project of ‘consciousness ethics’ (233) and ‘rational neuroanthropology’ (218).  
This is further discussed later in the chapter. 
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perception, which together form brief coalitions of volitions to action – and to determine how 
these material bases might inform our understanding of ourselves as ethical beings.  Thus in 
the same way that Copernicus and Darwin created radically different ledgers through which to 
understand our contingent existence, so might neuroethics reconfigure understandings of the 
ethical being.  Conference attendees understood that this could prove a disquieting realisation, 
for edging further back in the causal chain of agency may appear to ‘shrink the domain we 
think of as uniquely personal decision making’ (Kennedy, 2002: 202).  
For some of these aspiring ‘engineers of the human soul’ (Rose, 1992), however, the possibility 
of better upholding our current ethical subscriptions demands that we follow with a 
pioneering spirit wherever the neurological gaze may lead us, even if such a task may initially 
seem self-damning.  Invoking William James (in ways James probably did not anticipate), 
philosopher and historian of science Jonathan Moreno endorsed neuroethics as an avenue of 
productive self-repurposing, a way to ‘make our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy’ 
(Moreno, 2002).  Similarly, Patricia Churchland (2002: 43) expressed the view that neuroethics 
would enable a ‘degree of freedom’ previously not possible, and that rather than diminish 
would enhance our ‘sense of self’.  Churchland (2002: 25) also highlighted the potential of 
neuroethics as an objective ledger by which assessments of personal responsibility can be 
made, enabling determinations at the neuronal level of those ‘in control’ and those in whom 
neurochemical imbalances may mitigate responsibility.  Assessments of mens rea could 
plausibly, in Churchland’s estimation, be referred to the neuroethical gaze.  Prominent 
bioethicist Arthur Caplan (2002: 98) went even further in endorsing neuroethics and expanding 
the breadth of its potential utility, suggesting that the field will enable us to safely ‘move 
toward optimization of our brains’ and will aid us in thinking ‘about how we might modify and 
design ourselves’.  Such aspirations are becoming more prevalent, as the following discussion 
and Chapter Three will demonstrate. 
One conference speaker, philosopher of science Kenneth Schaffner (2002: 29), also posited 
that – thanks to the rigour of neuroethics – researchers could now commit to a kind of 
‘creeping reductionism’ that would enable ‘roughly deterministic explanations for some types 
of behaviour’.  In similar fashion Churchland (2002: 55-6) also endorsed reductionism as ‘a 
guiding methodological principle’, one that at its base is distinctly neurological: 
‘I don’t think that in neuroscience we’re going to be able to explain something like 
temperament or storage of a memory in terms of something more basic than 
neurons… It looks to me like a very reasonable empirical hypothesis that that’s the way 
the world works … I don’t place much significance on the so-called patchiness of the 
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sciences … We’ll just keep hacking away at it on the assumption, reasonable enough 
given the history of science, that eventually we’ll get the answer or to a good 
approximation.’ 
Again we see here the epistemic claim of the synaptic ledger, with the neuro establishing itself 
as the definitive point of inquiry in wholly capturing such complex properties.  For Churchland, 
no substantiality above or below the neuron in the translational chain will have explanatory 
power over qualia like ‘temperament’ or ‘memory’ without losing its illuminating and 
instructive purchase.  Beyond the question of how valid such a reductionist account is, the very 
notion of ‘hacking away’ at something like ‘temperament’ at the neurological level gives 
disconcerting insight into the precarious nature of tracing the elusive properties that 
constitute us as human beings.  The risk here is that neuroscience’s ‘good approximations’ will 
too hastily foreclose the possibilities of more expansive future investigations into these 
complex phenomena, that is, we affix a corrupted common currency that only captures a 
slither of the phenomena it purports to encompass.  It seems significant that the confidence of 
those first conference attendees in 2002 was of such lofty ambition that an unidentified 
interlocutor felt compelled to chastise one panel for ‘talking rather casually about altering 
human nature’, and to remind them that ‘we need some dimension of humility here’ (Marcus, 
2002: 170).   
The published proceedings of this crucial 2002 conference indicate only one social scientist 
invited to address the attendees.  This sole representative was Barbara Koenig (2002: 61), a 
highly regarded medical anthropologist, who raised concerns over ‘the seductive promise of 
prediction’ towards ‘assessments about people and their motivations, desires, and 
characteristics’.  Koenig (2002: 61-2) urged that these ambitions be tempered with the 
understanding that ‘whether or not those predictions prove to be scientifically accurate may 
be less important than our belief in their power’.  Yet this warning of the potential for self-
fulfilling prophecies, classificatory looping, and presumptive circumscribing has largely not 
been recognised by some influential neuroethicists, who, I argue, display a lack of reflexivity in 
importing and affixing certain assumptions that risks neglecting other opportunities in how we 
may approach exploring ethical subjectivity. 






A second Enlightenment? 
 
It should be noted that the epistemological origins of neuroethics certainly go back much 
further than the initial 2002 ‘Mapping the Field’ conference.  For decades, those in the psy 
disciplines, along with philosophers and social scientists, have debated issues of the brain-
mind-body entanglement and ethical being with reference to the neurosciences, with Ashcroft 
(2006: 211) citing the work of Kurt Goldstein, A.R. Luria, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty as 
especially notable predecessors capable of traversing this expansive terrain.  Though their 
various influences persist in the neurosciences in some measure it would appear that some of 
the more ontologically entangled and nuanced views of thinkers like Merleau-Ponty have been 
exchanged for broadly eliminative materialist positions, at least in the influential pockets of 
neuroethics I am concerned with here.  This form of hard empiricist neuroethics owes a debt 
to both the rise of neuroscience and associated technologies, which gave cognitive scientists 
greater confidence in discerning at the neurological level steadily more complex and once 
abstract qualities of cognition.  Additionally, neuroethics also emerged in part by way of the 
growth of empirically-driven moral psychology, a sub-discipline of increasing public interest 
(see, for example, Haidt, 2001).   
The rise of neuroethics forms part of ‘an avalanche of works in recent years’ exploring the 
possibilities of a universal measure of wellbeing by, in part, tracing and rendering into parsable 
data ‘morality’ as it is realised within the brain (Rasmusson, 2009).  Perhaps, then, empirically-
inclined neuroethics is best distinguished by the focus placed upon the tools of reproducing 
psyche, agency, and volition in new substantial forms (Levy, 2009: 69).  In particular, the field’s 
current preferred form of moral spectroscope – fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) 
– purports to render vivid and material the ethical mind at work, by correlating increasingly 
complex stimuli with localised activity in the brain in close to real time.12  One outcome of this 
co-production of tool, technique, and facticity within neuroethics has been that morality is 
increasingly considered in functional terms, progressively mapped into the material as 
ethically-demanding stimuli pass through and leave measurable traces within the brain.  Some 
have raised concern over this binding of morality to emerging technologies within a single 
field, suggesting that it risks forms of hasty specialisation, hyperbole, and inflated expectations 
(Parens and Johnston, 2007).  Nevertheless there is little doubt that since the initial 2002 
conference the field of neuroethics has grown rapidly.   
                                                          
12
 For one of the first and most influential applications of fMRI in this manner see Greene et al., 2001.  
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Following special issues dedicated to neuroethics from Brain & Cognition, Cerebrum, and the 
American Journal of Bioethics, there are now three recently established journals dedicated 
exclusively to the field: Neuroethics, the American Journal of Bioethics – Neuroscience, and the 
Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics.  In additions, dedicated research centres are opening, 
societies are being formed, first principles are being codified into textbooks, undergraduate 
and graduate level courses are now taught in universities, and public forums are capturing the 
rapt attention of the layperson (Buniak, Darragh, and Giordano, 2014).  More broadly Priva 
and Austerweil (2015: 7-8) observe that in the journal Cognition the number of studies 
dedicated to measuring expansive and complex social properties of morality, judgment, norms, 
harms, and the like increased eightfold from 2000 to 2015.  This increase occurred as the 
proportion of theoretical studies fell dramatically in exchange for experimental frames, a shift 
that aligns with the growing uptake of fMRI and other measures of functional activity 
developing finer temporal and spatial resolution.  This academic interest of tracing the social 
being at the molecular level, says Joshua Greene (2015: 39), is ‘more than a growth spurt, the 
field has busted Hulk-like out of its jeans and sneakers’.   
Caragh Brosnan (2011: 290-3) suggests that neuroethics has asserted its disciplinary status on 
two main fronts.  The first of these is by appeal to the absolute centrality of the brain for an 
understanding of who we are as humans.  Though many ethical issues arising from 
neuroscience research are similar in kind to those already considered within bioethics, what 
differentiates neuroethics is the degree to which the material properties examined by the 
neurosciences are equated with what it means to be a human being.  According to prominent 
cognitive neuroscientist Martha Farah (2010: xiii) ‘Neuroscience, more than any other branch 
of the life sciences, intersects with the fascinating realms of human identity, autonomy, and 
agency’.  Neuroethicists are working towards the transmutation of normative ethical inquiry 
into a material science over which these new ‘pastors of the soma’ (Rose, 2007: 29) would 
exercise an epistemic privilege, as expressed here by Farah (2010: 1):  
‘In principle, and increasingly in practice, we can understand the human mind as part 
of the material world.  This has profound implications for how we regard and treat 
ourselves and each other.  It gives us powerful new ways to predict and control human 
behaviour and a jarringly material view of ourselves.  Neuroethics is the field that 
grapples with these developments.’ 
The second front on which neuroethics has staked its claims as a discipline concerns the vast 
scope of its purported expertise. As noted earlier neuroethics claims that two distinct branches 
of inquiry are within its purview:  monitoring the ethical conduct of scientific research practice 
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in a manner similar to bioethics more generally, while also investigating the causal precursors 
of morality as they are inscribed upon the brain.  The suggestion, then, is that neuroethics can 
both supervise its own conduct as an empirical endeavour and play a potentially revolutionary 
role in understanding human morality, by shifting its aetiology to the brain.  The revolutionary 
language invoked can at times verge on the grandiose, with Farah (2010: 8) further suggesting 
that 
‘… neuroscience may be responsible for a kind of second enlightenment in the twenty-
first century, naturalizing our understanding of humanity and transforming the way we 
think about ourselves.’  
Thus neuroethics promises both a ‘hard’ science and a radical usurping of the humanities, 
through which it may ultimately ‘free’ human subjects from the tyranny of evolutionary 
hangovers and their not-yet-maximised neurological capacities.  Again, this appears to 
generate a compromised position regarding whether a discipline can be both a promulgator of 
discoveries in the causal underpinnings of ethics while also a regulator of the ethical practices 
involved in the very research techniques that they utilise.  The possible outcome is a form of 
regulatory capture that risks ‘chasing its own tail’ (Brosnan, 2011: 292, see also De Vries, 
2007b).  This is a convenient circumscribing of authority, for while neuroethics as a field of 
expertise clearly wants to move the levers of policy it is resistant to being moved in turn 
(Kennedy, 2002: 205, Gazzaniga, 2006: xvii).  Furthermore, as Pickersgill (2013a) notes, the 
increasing epistemic reach of neuroscience and its sub-fields requires greater technical 
specialisation and access to costly technologies – compared to the relative interdisciplinarity 
and open practice of bioethics more broadly – but this technical specialisation makes it all the 
more pertinent to open these emerging fields to complementary studies of science and 
technology.  A too hasty circumscribing of a field also risks exacerbating expert-lay divides in 
research areas (eg. applied ethics) where participatory approaches are usually considered 
imperative to best serve wider society. 
Reasoning and decision making, emotion and affect, empathy, rationality, the qualia and 
malleability of memory, and the very notion of wellbeing itself are all within the claimed 
purview of neuroethics (Brosnan, 2011; Marcus, 2002; Levy, 2007; Farah, 2010).  This reflects a 
broader trend where the neuro is taking over from the psychological and the genetic in being 
‘frequently portrayed as key to properly appreciating the subtle complexities of humanity’ 
(Pickersgill and Van Keulen, 2011a: xiii).  Yet the ways in which this gaze is epistemologically 
fixed, and then proceeds to affix an ideal ethical subject are, I argue, open to contestation.  
Hence the importance of turning a critical eye to neuroethics, for current discourses within the 
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field ‘fail to see the larger context that gave rise to the specialty of bioethics’ and too 
frequently lack objective remove from the phenomena they wish to investigate, along with an 
understanding of the sociological context of disciplinary formation (De Vries, 2007b: 67).   
However, this places a potential sociology of neuroethics in the unenviable position of 
attempting to work across multiple fields in order to fairly and saliently critique their practices 
(De Vries, 2005: 26).  This task is made even more difficult thanks to neuroethics’ insistence on 
self-regulation.  At times this insularism is oddly justified with appeals to liberal democratic 
principles.   For example, one advocate of this ilk, prominent public scientist and former 
President of Stanford, Donald Kennedy (2002: 205), declared himself ‘in favor of leaving the 
ethical decisions to the researchers themselves … partly out of a conviction that research really 
is a form of speech’.  This is a strange and convenient form of ‘scientific isolationism’ (Douglas, 
2014) that seeks to house sensitive research under the protection of freedom of expression 
and libertarian principles.  
Nonetheless, neuroethics has largely succeeded in claiming an expansive mandate by 
incorporating two distinct lines of inquiry under one discipline (see Roskies, 2002, and Levy, 
2008 for explicit rationales of this dual reach).  As already noted, the less contentious line – the 
ethics of neuroscience – deals with issues largely similar to that of bioethics and ethics of 
medical practice more generally, simply put, this line considers the debates around how those 
working in the neuro fields should go about their day-to-day work.  This sub-branch also 
extends into the sphere of critical neuroscience, critiquing misrepresentations of 
neuroscientific insight in public discourse, including excoriating popular texts that introduce 
‘neurosexism’, unfounded rationalisations of status quo, and obscuring scientism (see, for 
example, Fine, 2008).  Lastly, within this area can also be found commentaries on 
representations of neuroscientific research in popular media, chastising crude applications, 
exaggeratedly utopian and dystopian views, and gross simplifications of complex ethical issues 
(see Krahn, Fenton and Meynell, 2010; Lavazza and De Caro, 2010). 
Evidently this is already quite a breadth of interests to which neuroethics lays claim.  However, 
the other aforementioned line of inquiry, the neuroscience of ethics, further aims to measure 
and reconfigure the ethical subject by way of empirical investigation into the working brain.  
The hope is to demonstrate ‘that a science of normativity can exist’, one to which the 
neurosciences may play a key role in ‘the development of an authentic science of morals’ 
(Changeux in Changeux and Ricoeur 2000: 178).  This is all predicated upon the synaptic ledger 
premise that ‘human experience shows every sign of being determined by, and realized in, 
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states of the human brain’ (Harris, 2010: 8).  Advocates claim that this particular branch, 
exclusive to neuroethics, is 
‘… importantly different from other branches of applied ethics … [neuroethics] 
occupies a pivotal position, casting light upon human agency, freedom and choice, and 
upon rationality.  It will help us to reflect on what we are, and offer us guidance as we 
attempt to shape a future in which we can flourish… today the issues it embraces are 
rightly seen as central to our political, moral and social aspirations.’  
Levy, 2007: 2 
For philosopher and neuroethicist Neil Levy (2008: 2) neuroethics may go ‘to the very heart of 
what it means to be a human being’ and thus has no analogue in bioethics.  Indeed, 
neuroethics may go further than any other endeavor to ‘reveal the structure of our minds and, 
therefore, of our souls’ (Levy, 2008: 2).  Note here how ‘mind’ is implicitly already blackboxed 
into ‘brain’, which then presumes to stand in for whatever we mean by ‘soul’.  That ‘mind is 
what brain does’ (Rose, 2013 : 3) is accepted as axiomatic under the new regime of dutifully 
cultivating our ‘brainhood’ (Vidal, 2009). 
Despite these ambitious claims for importing selfhood into the brain terrain, sociologists and 
related scholars have for the most part ignored the emergence of neuroethics, perhaps to 
avoid becoming wedged between long-running debates regarding the practical utility of 
reductionism against the subtle and technical nuances of academic moral philosophy and 
normative ethics.  Yet the belief amongst some neuroethicists who suggest that their work 
may ‘force us to confront the possibility of a major shift in our self-conception’ (Levy, 2008: 2) 
necessitates our critical sociological eye, not least because the conflation of the neuro and the 
normative may engender new constitutions of subjects that could prove highly problematic 
from the perspective of the social sciences, which, for their part, risk becoming marginalised 
and excluded from these important ongoing debates.   
As it currently stands sociologists are largely observing from the outside, conducting a 
sociology of neuroethics, rather than a sociology in neuroethics (Brosnan, 2011, De Vries, 
2004).  On the whole, what little sociological scholarship into neuroethics that currently exists 
has been limited to post-hoc analysis, general overviews of the field, and ethnographic studies 
with neuroscientists who may confront neuroethical issues in their day-to-day work (Brosnan, 
2011; De Vries, 2005; Conrad and De Vries, 2011; Pickersgill, 2011; Brosnan, Cribb and 
Wainwright, 2013; Brosnan and Cribb, 2014; Buniak, Darragh and Giordano, 2014; Darragh, 
Buniak, and Giordano, 2015).  Furthermore, sociological insights have rarely featured in 
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neuroethical dispatches, with contributions to the field across the disciplinary range largely 
limited to neurology/neuroscience, philosophy of mind, moral psychology, and 
medical/bio/public/legal ethics.  Some observers go so far as to claim that the contribution 
sociology can make in this area will remain forever limited by its particular orientation to 
phenomena (Sheehan and Dunn, 2013).  As a result, sociological contributions around 
neuroethics are more likely to be found within ‘critical neuroscience’ or ‘neurocultural’ outlets 
already dedicated to transdisciplinary engagement (Choudhury and Slaby, 2011; Ortega and 
Vidal, 2011; Pickersgill and Van Keulen, 2011b; Littlefield and Johnson, 2012).   
Given the relative confidence and impunity with which neuroethics is forging ahead this 
exclusion of sociological insight is worrisome, for while practitioners of the neuro look to 
diligently map the ‘space inside the skull’ (Beaulieu, 2000) note that this space may merely be 
the proxy for the importing of contingent worldviews regarding the ideal ethical subject, now 
inscribed in the immutable form of the ‘natural’ and ‘essential’, and hence a further 
colonisation of the ways and means in which we are ‘obliged to be free’ (Rose, 1999: 87).  
From a slightly more positive stance, however, Pickersgill (2013b: 323) suggests that the 
seemingly irresistible epistemic creep of the neurosciences may open up space for productive 
interdisciplinary exchanges.  Such tentative aspirations are echoed by others, and indeed some 
recent collaborative entanglements previously mentioned hold great promise to undo the 
‘baneful disciplinization of the sciences’ (Rose, 1999: xvi).  In likewise endorsing such 
aspirations I aim in Chapter Four to make a small contribution to this endeavour of directing 
inquiry towards more expansive views of neurological difference.   
Still, this optimism of potential collaboration and exploration must be weighed against the 
headlong rush currently displayed by some prominent neuroethicists, whose efforts may be 
rigidly determining the ideal ethical subject.  Some claims in this vein demonstrate an 
unnerving ambition, unabashed in blithely dismissing other disciplines, as evident in this call 
from neurophilosopher Sam Harris: 
‘Questions about values – about meaning, morality, and life’s larger purpose – are 
really questions about the wellbeing of conscious creatures.  Values, therefore, 
translate into facts that can be scientifically understood: regarding positive and 
negative social emotions, retributive impulses, the effects of specific laws and social 
institutions on human relationships, the neurophysiology of happiness and suffering, 
etc.  The most important of these facts are bound to transcend culture - just as facts 
about physical and mental health do.  Cancer in the highlands of New Guinea is still 
cancer; cholera is still cholera; schizophrenia is still schizophrenia; and so, too, I will 
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argue, compassion is still compassion, and well-being is still well-being.  And if there 
are important cultural differences in how people flourish – if, for instance, there are 
incompatible but equivalent ways to raise happy, intelligent, and creative children – 
these differences are also facts that must depend upon the organization of the human 
brain.  In principle, therefore, we can account for the ways in which culture defines us 
within the context of neuroscience and psychology. The more we understand 
ourselves at the level of the brain, the more we will see that there are right and wrong 
answers to questions of human values.’ 
Harris, 2010, pp.1-213 
This is one of the most frank and wide-ranging claims for the development of a moral 
spectroscope and synaptic ledger for a new science of human flourishing.  Such a science 
adopts a premise of an ontological equivalency between meaning, morality, purpose, and 
wellbeing given that – with the right spectroscope to see and the right ledger to measure – all 
these properties are reducible to their material realisation in the brain.  This also, Harris 
believes, renders such ‘facts’ of wellbeing beyond the supposedly distorting variable of culture.  
Thus, with Harris’ spectroscopes of ‘values’ and a synaptic ledger by which to compare them, 
‘we will see that there are right and wrong answers to questions of human values’.  This new 
science will involve placing normative ethical systems under the experimental gaze, testing 
their construct validity (ie. whether we ‘really’ invoke normative stances for the reasons we 
say we do) through the rigour of empirical measures derived from recent developments in 
cognitive neuroscience.  Harris is one amongst a growing chorus of empiricists challenging the 
purview of the social sciences and humanities by straddling the ‘hard’ neurosciences and the 
‘soft’ disciplines of moral psychology and applied ethics, holding grand aspirations of 
maximising ‘wellbeing’ and ‘dismantling metaphysics’ (Meloni, 2011: 105-6).  It would appear, 
                                                          
13 It should be acknowledged that this eliminativist stance has many precursors.  In particular Stephan 
Schleim (2014: 1) points to influential neuropsychologist Roger Sperry (perhaps best known for his work 
on split-brain function, for which he received a Nobel prize), who expressed a strong position in favour 
of a future normative ethics based upon empirical neuroscience.  Sperry’s (1981: 3-4) stance was that 
through this ascendance of neuroscience certain worldviews would soon be rendered untenable:  
‘Particularly relevant are recent changes in concepts relating to the mind of man, the nature of 
the conscious self, freedom of choice, causal determinacy, and to the fundamental relation of 
mind to matter and to brain mechanism.  Some of man's most enduring concerns are involved, 
i.e. whether consciousness is mortal or immortal, cosmic or brain-bound, or reincarnate, and 
the like. It is in terms of the humanistic implications along these and related lines that 
neuroscience has always had its special interest and greatest meaning. Ideologies, philosophies, 
religious doctrines, world-models, value systems, and the like will stand or fall depending on 




however, that such ‘hard’ models tend to be minimally reflective about some of their 
grounding presuppositions.  
To conclude this section it is worth observing that while neuroethics has been wary and 
resistant towards possible external interference it has also been acutely attuned to engaging 
the public.  Highly cited figures in this area – Michael Gazzaniga, Sam Harris, Joshua Greene, 
Julian Savulescu, and Neil Levy, amongst others – frequently attend public events and make 
media appearances with an eye to accessibility and cultivation of ‘third culture’, wherein 
scientists may be seen to authoritatively and responsibly comment on aspects of our collective 
wellbeing (Brockman, 1995).  Such a capturing of hearts and minds has been championed from 
the very beginnings of neuroethics, with William Safire (2002b) strongly emphasising that their 
new field must ‘get this far-reaching, soul-searching debate out of the ivory tower, onto the 
floor, onto the tube and into print until it penetrates every sentient being's consciousness’.  
Safire himself served as chairman of the Dana Foundation, a private philanthropic enterprise 
dedicated to furthering research in the translational and application-inclined neurosciences, 
along with communicating such insights to the public.14  The Foundation certainly takes their 
aim of meaningful public engagement seriously, with the recent publication of You’ve Got 
Some Explaining to Do: Advice for Neuroscientists Writing for Lay Readers (Nevins, 2014) made 
freely available on the Dana website along with regular newsletters, multimedia resources, 
conference materials, Q&A’s with neuroscientists, press releases and other output designed 
for lay audiences.  Further to this, one of the foundations first significant projects – aside from 
the aforementioned 2002 ‘Mapping the Field’ conference – was the publication of Michael 
Gazzaniga’s The Ethical Brain (2006), a highly influential text in establishing the legitimacy of 
neuroethics as a discipline, and making the case for developing a universal morality through 





                                                          
14
 One cannot help but acknowledge the fraught legacy of neurologist Charles L. Dana, for whom the 
organisation takes its name.  For example, Dana was vehemently opposed to women’s suffrage 
movements, with part of his objection based upon his professional opinion that the female brain was 
not suited to political affairs.  Conrad and De Vries (2011: 309) note the obvious cautionary tale here in 
that otherwise questionable socio-political stances may masquerade behind the gaze of hard science, 
and thus we should keep this firmly in mind as neuroethics grows in influence.  The Dana Foundation 
continues to be a very generous source of funding for neuroethics and regularly publishes material 
promoting the field.  
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On the case for a universal morality through the neurological gaze 
 
Gazzaniga’s The Ethical Brain is one of the most forthright appeals for the legitimacy of 
neuroethics, and is representative of some of the discipline’s more troublesome aspects. Given 
its wide readership it is worth noting that although Gazzaniga’s empirical work as a 
neuroscientist is of the highest order, his foray into neuroethics is far less scholarly and 
laudable, making claims that many social scientists would find naïve and deeply problematic.  
The Ethical Brain is frequently cavalier in its assertions, largely ignorant of history, and 
repeatedly deploys weak analogies and logic in attempting to assuage concerns.  Though The 
Ethical Brain was admittedly written with a general readership in mind this does not absolve it 
from gross ethical missteps and logical failings, for while we may be tempted to blithely 
dismiss such generalist works such a stance would fail to recognise the important role of the 
public in: confirming disciplinary legitimacy; shifting conceptions of permissible inquiry; and 
ultimately sanctioning research endeavours.  Public perception is crucial in our ongoing 
reconstitution as subjects, especially in this case regarding neuroscience’s unique position as a 
‘hard’ science revealing the fine scaffolding of our humanity (Racine, Bar-Ilan and Illes, 2005; 
McCabe and Castel, 2008; Weisberg et al., 2008; Ramani, 2009).   
In similar fashion to others previously discussed, Gazzaniga’s vision for neuroethics is grand, 
firmly placing himself amongst those aspiring to a ‘brainbased philosophy of life’ (Rasmusson, 
2009).  Gazzaniga is confident that this project may be realised, and fiercely opposes any 
outside interference or insinuations that the field will be unable to regulate itself.  A longer 
quote is necessary to demonstrate Gazzaniga’s (2006: xvii) particular mode of argumentation: 
‘One of the things I would like most to do is eliminate the ‘slippery slope’ argument 
from neuroethical discussions…  By arguing extremes, to which the slippery slope will 
take us, ethicists play on the public’s fears and suggest that if we give scientists an 
inch, they’ll take a mile.  The truth is, most of these arguments are the stuff of science 
fiction.  Take the “humanzee” example – the fear that scientists would cross a human 
with a chimpanzee using modern genetic manipulations.  You present the humanzee 
as a possibility, and suddenly everyone’s afraid of letting scientists grow human stem 
cells in mice – research that might lead to cures for Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s, and other 
diseases.’ 
Yet the ‘humanzee’ is an odd and dated strawman to invoke, and it is difficult to find any well-
regarded commentator – from the academic sphere or otherwise – proposing that 
neuroscientific developments should work towards anything remotely comparable to this 
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example.  Gazzaniga’s railing conjectures of regulatory interference and characterisations of 
public concern bent on creating roadblocks to the development of potential cures for 
neurodegenerative diseases and other disorders of the brain is similarly without substantive 
evidence.   
Still, Gazzaniga (2006: xvii) goes on: 
‘What is it about the biological and neurological sciences that is so frightening? Fear of 
change?  It was only 300 years ago that bathrooms were introduced.  Change can be 
good. Fear of the unknown?  We can imagine Martians, but that doesn’t provoke 
ethicists to argue that we shouldn’t try to land on Mars.  Fear that new technology will 
be used for evil?  We know what nuclear bombs can do, but we continue to build 
them.  The fact is, the positive things that are occurring in laboratories far outweigh 
the tiny number of possible strange uses.  Even if a lab were given over to a latter-day 
Boys from Brazil cloning project, it wouldn’t have an impact, because we are a moral 
society that will not allow such extremes.15 While they have occurred throughout 
history, we have gotten rid of them—whether they be extreme dictators, extreme 
fashions, or extreme drugs.  It does not make moral, political, or social sense to allow 
the fear of the extreme to hinder the good.’  
For a modern discipline such as sociology, which has done much to elucidate the fraught 
relationship between an ‘extreme’ event such as the Holocaust and the overarching 
characteristics of modernity (Gerson and Wolf, 2007; Bauman, 1989), Gazzaniga’s reassurances 
that such ‘extreme’ events are things of the past are not especially convincing, nor is the 
assurance that empirical neuroscience, in itself and unfettered, can be a reliable protectorate 
of the ‘good’.  The implication that the neurosciences, and particularly neuroethics, may serve 
as such authorities is grossly unsubstantiated, and we might indeed be concerned by the 
historically naïve arguments that are voiced in the name of this particular scientific enterprise 
and may come to inform public policy (Edwards, Gillies and Horsley, 2015).  This mismatch 
between such intensive gazes and expansive ends is especially the case when, in his defence of 
genetic engineering, Gazzinga (2006: 53) opposes ‘the basic, gut concern’ many might feel by 
pointing to a strange rationale of our essential ‘humanity’:  
                                                          
15
 Philosopher Ingmar Persson and bioethicist Julian Savulescu (2012), though equally supportive of this 
endeavour of ‘hard’ transhumanism, actually put forward an inverted justification, suggesting that we 
live in societies of rapidly escalating risk brought about by our own actions, and hence need to 
neurologically intervene upon ourselves as ethical subjects, in order to avoid causing our own demise.  
This will be discussed further in Chapter Three. 
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‘The basic, gut concern with genetic enhancements is that with the advent of genetic 
engineering we’ve become involved in some kind of massive dehumanizing effort.  But 
what is it to “dehumanize”?  We are talking about a practice that exists only because 
of the very nature of being human: to discover, to think, to figure out new ways to do 
things.  How, then, can using this very human skill, using the brain, the thing that 
makes us human, be accused of “dehumanizing”?  Isn’t it the ultimate human skill?’ 
It may be troubling to remind ourselves, but in response to Gazzaniga’s framing of ‘progress’ 
and ‘humanity’ it would be negligent not to recall that it was indeed a highly rationalised 
society that oversaw the Holocaust.  The Adolf Eichmann so adroitly captured by Hannah 
Arendt (1963) was an efficient bureaucrat who, in the name of a society that prized its 
intellectual culture and scientific achievements, displayed an ability to frame his ‘ultimate 
human skill’ solely towards how best to satisfy rationalised dictates of a heinous regime, which 
is to say, he so instrumentalised himself in a way where he was rendered incapable of making 
sound ethical judgments.  As Arendt famously observed, Eichmann (who, for his part, 
considered himself a follower of the Kantian imperative) thus justified the most profoundly 
dehumanising acts by an appeal to authority and the accompanying belief that he was 
contributing to a societally beneficial project.  We should therefore be exceedingly wary of any 
suggestions that our ingenuity in itself is the best way to realise our ‘humanity’. 
That said, I am equally cautious towards the dystopic form of argument in which all roads lead 
to the Holocaust, and I certainly do not mean to identify the discipline of neuroethics as the 
epistemological frame of any future fascist cause.  However, the claim that the practice of 
ethical thought and our peculiarly modern, Western form of rationality are identical is one that 
the social sciences have long criticised from a number of angles (Kuhn, 1962; Foucault, 1970; 
Feyerabend, 1975; Haraway, 1988; Latour, 1993; Hacking, 2002).  It is worth remembering, 
too, that Gazzinga’s book has been highly cited, serving as one of the bedrock texts in 
establishing the legitimacy and potential of neuroethics within the public imagination.  
Gazzaniga is a feted neuroscientist who was considered of sufficient character and intellectual 
rigour to be appointed to the President’s Council of Bioethics during the Presidency of George 
W. Bush.  Suffice to say, then, that Gazzaniga has served as an influential figure in how we may 
come to be constituted as ethical subjects.  As neuroethics steadily increases its influence 
within academia and in the greater public sphere, exponents like Gazzaniga (2006: 178) are 
seeking to reconfigure notions of the self and its wellbeing, including through an aspiration of 
developing a ‘universal ethics’ driven by empirical cognitive neuroscience: 
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‘I am convinced that we must commit ourselves to the view that a universal ethics is 
possible, and that we ought to seek to understand it and define it.  It is a staggering 
idea, and one that on casual thought seems preposterous.  Yet there is no way out.  
We now understand how tendentious our beliefs about the world and the nature of 
human experience truly are, and how dependent we have become on tales from the 
past.  At some level we all know this.  At the same time, our species wants to believe in 
something, some natural order, and it is the job of modern science to help figure out 
how that order should be characterized.’  
This ‘no way out’ rhetoric is found in many of the more forthright appeals for neuroethics, 
stoking an imperative to repurpose ourselves so as to contend with the risk societies we find 
ourselves precariously wedged within (see Chapter Three).  But would we wish the likes of 
Gazzaniga to be leading such a charge? 
Thankfully, not all advocates of a universal ethics through neuroscience are as blusterous and 
unreflective as Gazzaniga.  In particular several philosophers and ethicists have developed 
cogent, coherent, and measured arguments for subscribing to neuroethics.  Such insights 
combine sound technical knowledge of laboratory science and an understanding of current 
limitations of research (so as to avoid contentions that delve into unhelpfully utopian or 
dystopian speculations).  Combined with this is an acknowledgment of socio-political 
sensitivities, together with a thorough grounding in the nuance and complexity of the ethical 
issues raised, informed (to an extent) by a sense of humility that shows an awareness of our 
collective capacities for self-destructive hubris that is made possible when our ambitions are 
unchecked.  This cautiously negotiated intellectual space is where neuroethics presents itself 
as a discipline that demands meaningful engagement and somewhat opens itself up to 
transdisciplinary engagement.      
The philosopher Neil Levy, in his foundational Neuroethics (2007) text – though still, I will 
argue, too hasty in seeking to colonise lines of academic inquiry into the self and its wellbeing 
– makes lucid arguments for the disciplinary legitimacy of neuroethics, while also displaying 
due reticence and deference regarding what the field can reasonably hope to achieve in the 
near future.  While the following discussion will still take exceptions to some of Levy’s ideas it 
is worth noting that his work is less immediately concerned with the grand overarching project 
of bettering homo sapiens through ‘universal ethics’, and is instead directed towards 
reconfiguring firm preconceptions we collectively hold of the ethical subject, thus clearing the 
way for the field’s ongoing development.   
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Refreshingly, Levy does not attempt to shoehorn all of the social world into the brain, and 
instead proposes the adoption of an externalist ethics, one that recognises the distributed 
quality of action and judgment, and where the boundary between agents and context ‘is taken 
to be much less significant than is traditionally thought’ (Levy, 2007: xi).  Like many proponents 
in the field Levy emphasises that neuroethics – while requiring the expert gaze of those 
suitably equipped in the mind sciences – will not upend conventional conceptions of selfhood 
so much as contribute to incremental improvements in the human condition.  Nonetheless, 
Levy (2007: x) does venture to claim that such a project would ultimately enable us to exercise 
‘unprecedented degree of control over ourselves’, an aspiration that he suggests is not 
especially radical, given that we have always been ‘self-creating and self-modifying animals’ 
(xiii).   
However, this essentialist appeal to our ‘self-creating and self-modifying’ capacities raises a 
number of problems.  Firstly, if we are encouraged to adopt materialist understandings of our 
constitution as ethical subjects and our propensity to good action, does this entail that 
whatever we mean by ‘ethics’ will now be modularly bound in those spaces and substances 
that we determine to be its causal mechanisms?  What knock-on and looping effects of 
reflexive subjectivity might this generate, when self-modification is postulated as both 
constitutive of the human essence and the raison d’etre of neuroethical knowledge and 
application?  Secondly, as Malabou (2008) has observed, we cannot fail to note the 
coincidence between this supposedly universal quality of self-modification and the very 
particular image of the ideal subject associated with Post-Fordist capitalism.  Moreover, as 
Rose and Novas (2008) have noted, while the demands of ‘biological citizenship’ are ostensibly 
non-coercive this does not make them any less compelling for contemporary subjects, for 
whom work upon the self is both an exercise of capacity and a self-actualising task.  Thirdly, 
faith in the possibility of precisely targeted neurological intervention seems to involve a 
commitment to a particular form of mental hygiene, one based upon the subversion of default 
volitions in favour of cultivated thought and action consciously induced and enacted at levels 
below conscious thought.  Considered altogether, could we ever expect to produce a reliable 
synaptic ledger in this incredibly dynamic context?  
To his credit, Levy does recognise the limits of hypercognitive conceptions of the self, 
emphasising that the vast majority of volitional impetus occurs at a subpersonal level, while an 
over-emphasis on ‘control’ is ‘a distant descendent of the Cartesian view …[that] would shrink 
the self down to a practically extensionless, and probably helpless, point’ (Levy, 2007: 23-4).  
Levy’s alternate grounding image of the human subject is a temporary, ever-shifting 
assemblage of volitions, whereby unity is achieved through the successful labour of aligning 
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lines of disposition into meaningful action, a view informed by the extended mind thesis of 
Andy Clark and David Chalmers16 and also the embodied, affect-driven cognition of Antonio 
Damasio (Levy, 2007: 27-33, see also Levy 2007).  Though this marriage of perspectives may at 
first glance appear incongruous it presents a model of the ethical being that may actually 
prove quite palatable to many, for it posits: agents capable of forming (or more precisely 
‘receiving’) volitions in certain contexts; agents who are in large part the products of their 
cultures; agents aided or constrained by human and non-human actors that serve as 
extensions of our collective cognition; and embodied agents, with volitions felt upon the body, 
which in turn bears the imprint of accumulated experience.  This is an incredibly complex 
entanglement, but Levy also reassuringly rejects the presumption that we might ever have a 
coherent, all-encompassing model for this externalist model of ethics.  
Yet, when Levy shifts from theoretical framing to real-world application, some objections to his 
claims may be raised.  Here is one of Levy’s (2007: 61) central claims, taking inspiration from 
the extended mind thesis of Clark and Chalmers: 
‘… if some part of the external world functions in a manner that, were it internal to the 
skull, we should have no hesitation in calling cognitive, we should regard that external 
resource as part of the mind. Analogously, I suggest an ethical parity principle (EPP). 
The EPP comes in two versions, a strong and a weak version, corresponding to the 
hypotheses of extended and embedded cognition respectively:  
EPP (strong): Since the mind extends into the external environment, 
alterations of external props used for thinking are (ceteris paribus) ethically on 
a par with alterations of the brain. 
 EPP (weak): Alterations of external props are (ceteris paribus) ethically on a 
par with alterations of the brain, to the precise extent to which our reasons for 
finding alterations of the brain problematic are transferable to alterations of 
the environment in which it is embedded.’   
So, argues Levy, if we accept that the extension of my cognitive self into an object (a diary 
being the commonly used example), one I deem entirely parallel to my intentional being, 
thereby constitutes the mind extending and inscribing itself on the external world, then any 
alterations upon this object are effectively equivalent to alterations upon the brain.  Ethically, 
                                                          
16
 The extended mind thesis, in its briefest definition from Clark and Chalmers (1998: 8) themselves, 
suggests a form of parity principle of cognition, whereby ‘If, as we confront some task, a part of the 
world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in 
recognizing it as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the 
cognitive process.’   
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therefore, there is no difference in simply skipping the mediator of the external prop and 
intervening directly upon the brain, whatever that may entail in practice.17  Clearly, as Levy 
himself notes, everything hinges here upon what we consider to be analogous.  For instance, in 
Levy’s (2007: 113) estimation, ‘some of the traditional means of changing minds mechanize 
the self to just as great an extent as the new neurotherapies do’, including the use of 
psychotherapy or physical exercise as a means of alleviating depression.  Therefore, argues 
Levy, ‘why should suspicion fall upon one means of changing minds and not the other?’.  
Through this rationale Levy (2007: 64) thus suggests that aversions to his EPP tend to be born 
of a naïve prejudice ‘that would confine mind to skull’.  
While I am in agreement with Levy regarding untethering the practice of ‘mind’ from the brain-
as-organ, we must still recognise that the means by which we arrive at the synaptic ledger of 
‘parity’ may prove significant.  We must not forget that where a supposed ethical quality is 
housed, how such containment is rationalised, what new substantiality we then accord to the 
quality in question, and how we instrumentalise ourselves in according our habits and conduct 
to these new bounded properties is of ongoing significance, for this will likely change the 
makeup of the ethical quality or the desirable state in itself.  These ‘looping effects’ that come 
with attempting to affix properties of the always reflexive human subject cannot be 
discounted (Hacking, 1995).  For our current purposes, what is important to observe is that this 
reconfiguring reflects a broader conflation of ethical thought into a newly demarcated space, 
one that transforms the nature of what we have typically understood ‘ethics’ to denote. 
It is this transformation of ethics-in-itself that another notable philosopher of mind, Thomas 
Metzinger (2009: 233), raises in his optimistic proposal of ‘consciousness ethics’.  Metzinger 
observes that underpinning much of the current fascination with neuroscience is the rhetoric 
of potential; that we are now in a position to break the chains of our minds as tools once 
assembled solely to satisfy evolutionary imperatives, and so reorient and repurpose ourselves 
to achieve new ways of being in the world.  For now, however, we are mostly ‘stuck’ in the 
‘Ego Tunnel’ where: 
‘Our conscious model of reality is a low-dimensional projection of the inconceivably 
richer physical reality surrounding and sustaining us.  Our sensory organs are limited: 
They evolved for reasons of survival, not for depicting the enormous wealth and 
                                                          
17 Or, as it stands in the ‘weak’ version of Levity’s parity principle, such alterations should not be 
considered ethically different to others merely because they are induced, emergent, and enacted inside 
the cranium.  In this way distinctions between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ are not recognised or are 




richness of reality in all its unfathomable depth.  Therefore, the ongoing process of 
conscious experience is not so much an image of reality as a tunnel through reality.’  
Metzinger, 2009: 6 
We might well draw parallels with the actors in Plato’s cave who, in crafting narratives out of 
shadows, miss the infinitely more wondrous phenomena that play just beyond the bounds of 
current capacities of perception.  But the implication is also that we are now – if only obliquely 
and crudely – contemplating the possibility of espying the ‘enormous wealth and richness of 
reality’ through interventions directly upon our brains.  Metzinger (2009: 238) also recognises 
that inequalities threaten to abound in enacting practices of consciousness ethics, and thus we 
must remain vigilant in protecting ‘a principle of phenomenal liberty’.  In this way, Metzinger 
(2009:238) suggests, we might realise a form of socially responsible ‘rational 
neuroanthropology’:  
‘Developing a consciousness culture has nothing to do with establishing a religion or a 
particular political agenda.  On the contrary, a true consciousness culture will always 
be subversive, by encouraging individuals to take responsibility for their own lives… 
The crucial question is how to make use of the progress in the empirical mind sciences 
in order to increase the autonomy of the individual and protect it from the increasing 
possibilities of manipulation.  Can we ride the tiger?  If we demystify consciousness, do 
we automatically lose our sense of human solidarity at the same time?  If rational 
neuroanthropology shows us the positive aspects of what it means to be a human 
being, we can systematically cultivate those aspects of ourselves.’   
My concern here is that an aspiration towards a ‘neuroanthropology’ points to an attempt to 
objectively parse the neurological subject, yet this project appears already normatively laden 
and framed within contemporary understandings of liberty, autonomy, and personal 
responsibility.  Of course, defending such principles is admirable as a means of warding off the 
possibility of any authoritarian knowledge claims.  Yet my suspicion is that although Metzinger 
and others aforementioned may gamely attempt to find an Archimedean point by which to 
understand ourselves we may instead simply reinscribe broadly humanist ideals in new, harder 
forms.  This reinscribing of humanism limits us in chancing upon new ways to conceive of 
cognition and selfhood, of findings paths less insistent on abiding socio-historically contingent 
framings of the modern subject.  The following chapter will explore this shaping of the ideal 
citizen-subject by way of the neurosciences in greater detail, but for now we should first 





Empirical neuroethics in practice: Trolley problems and dismantling deontology 
 
So how, in practice, might a neuroethicist develop a moral spectroscope and synaptic ledger by 
which to conduct empirical research and so: circumscribe and justify a claimed epistemic 
privilege, produce verifiable findings, and use such findings to propose practical applications?  
Consider the following hypothetical: 
‘You are standing on a platform next to a train track.  Approaching is a speeding train 
hurtling out of control.  Five people, for unknown reasons, are tied to the track and will 
be killed by the oncoming train unless action is taken.  Before the five people there is a 
sidetrack on which one person is tied.  On the platform there is a lever which if pulled 
will divert the train onto this sidetrack, thus killing one instead of five.  Is the right 
action to pull the lever?’ 
This is a common iteration of the well-known ‘Trolley Problems’, a set of thought experiments 
in normative ethics and moral philosophy, first developed in contemporary form by Phillipa 
Foot (1967) and further adapted by Judith Jarvis Thomson (1976 and 1985), amongst many 
others.  Consisting of a series of hypothetical dilemmas, each iteration differed slightly with 
regard to the possible outcomes of the incident and the respondent’s available courses of 
action.  Typical academic debate on these dilemmas usually centres around the various means 
of weighing outcomes, whether there is a moral obligation to act (or intentionally not act), and 
the extent to which this obligation may reach. 
Almost all lay respondents support the pulling of the lever in the above iteration of the 
dilemma (Hauser et al. 2007).  Similarly (although there appears to be slightly more reticence) 
most academic philosophers support the ‘switch’ option (Bourget and Chalmers, 2013: 16).18  
Interpretations of the trolley problem from moral philosophers and ethicists range from the 
basic act utilitarian perspective that one is morally obligated to effect whatever action may 
maximise the ‘good’, to an unflinching deontological view whereby participation of any kind 
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 For the lever dilemma 68% of philosophers surveyed in this study support the ‘switch’ option while 8% 
opted for the ‘don’t switch’ option (with 24% declining to answer).  Note also that this survey of 
practicing philosophers and ethicists expressed a curiously proportionate spread of normative ethical 
stances, with 26% broadly subscribing to deontology, 24% to consequentialism, and 18% to virtue ethics 
(Bourget and Chalmers, 2013: 15).   
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renders one complicit in a moral wrong.19  Alternatively, one can invert these normative 
positions and subsequent action, for example by positing a form of consequentialist argument 
that one should refrain from taking any action in order to render certain moral wrongs 
ineffectual in their desired outcome.20  Or, a deontological perspective might argue that your 
very presence in this unfortunate circumstance entails a compelling injunction towards a 
beneficial outcome, and that based on the available evidence you are ethically obliged to 
exercise your fortuitous agency in this matter.  Many more positions can be found in this 
complex, nuanced literature (Otsuka, 2008).   
While, as noted above, the majority of lay subjects support pulling the lever in the above 
iteration, less consensus is found when the circumstances are adjusted slightly.  A common 
alternative to the above iteration presents a scenario where the five people remain tied to the 
track, but now there is no longer a sidetrack.  Instead, above the track and before the five 
unfortunates, is a footbridge upon which you and a large man are witnessing proceedings.  In 
this scenario, the respondent can opt to push the large man off the footbridge onto the track, 
stopping the train at the expense of the man’s life, but sparing the five others.  In this second 
iteration the possible outcomes are still the same as the side track dilemma (at least in a crude 
net sense, sacrificing one to save five).  However, there is a much greater degree of resistance 
and dissonance felt amongst lay respondents, and so when respondents are pressed on why 
they make a distinction between the two scenarios many struggle to articulate their aversion 
to taking action in the footbridge iteration, often regardless of how adamant they are in their 
decision (Hauser et al. 2007).21  However, one widely held explanation for this aversion posits 
that the footbridge dilemma has a greater degree of emotional salience than the lever 
dilemma; the former requires what is essentially an act of violence upon another, whilst the 
latter is somewhat depersonalised by the mediating presence of the lever (Greene et al. 2001).   
Taking this further, one explanatory view is that the crucial difference between the two 
iterations refers us back to the Kantian categorical imperative, particularly in considering self 
and others as ends over means (Thomson, 1986: 94-116).  The question that emerges, then, is 
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 Very briefly, utilitarian and consequentialist stances pertain to maximising overall outcomes, while 
deontological positions emphasise deference to rules, duties, and obligations.   
20
 A real world application of this would be a refusal to negotiate with hostage-takers as a means to 
negate or minimise the possibility of such future occurrences. 
21
  This ‘moral dumbfounding’ is a common occurrence in decision making that tests ingrained 
assumptions (Haidt, 2001), though I would also suggest that ‘dumbfounding’ somewhat misrepresents 
what may be better described as a differently valanced moral response, one not necessarily conducive 
to cogent and articulate explanations of a particular decision made.  The presumption that we must 
precisely articulate our ethical stances in any given situation in order to assert their legitimacy appears 
to be another of those unreflexively Western assumptions, elevating a rationality that compels framings 
of the subject and its wellbeing down pre-set paths. 
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whether something like Kant’s categorical imperative is already inbuilt, existing a priori as a 
kind of universal ‘moral grammar’ (Mikhail, 2007).  Empirically-inclined neuroethicists, 
however, posit that we need to go beyond abstract theorising to explain our responses to such 
dilemmas at a more substantive level, for there may be means by which we can improve upon 
our cognitive capacities when contemplating such fiendish problems.  These empiricists 
suggest that we can derive and correlate likely motivations against chosen actions by 
observing brain activity whilst subjects are presented with moral dilemmas.  In this way, faulty 
motivational mechanisms that lead to adverse outcomes can be mapped and used to develop 
techniques by which to reconfigure the ethical subject. 
It is in this context that the use of fMRI through the highly influential work of Harvard 
neurophilosopher Joshua Greene and colleagues has emerged.  Greene’s studies of subjects 
responding to moral dilemmas while being observed through fMRI have attracted great 
interest and debate around the validity and potential of this new synthesis of moral philosophy 
and neurology (see, for example, Haidt, 2007).  More specifically, Greene’s ongoing research is 
concerned with observing localised activity of functionally bounded areas of the brain – 
according to current understandings of functional localisation – in response to moral 
dilemmas, such as trolley problems, and correlating the relative activation of reflexive 
‘emotional’ v. deliberative ‘rational’ responses with outcomes chosen.  Greene (2014) has 
posited that there is a form of dual process cognition involved in decision making, one that he 
likens to ‘automatic’ and ‘manual’ settings.  Understanding this dual process, argues Greene 
(2014: 35), will enable us to reconfigure our brains towards the ideal realisation of 
consequentialist ethical norms: 
‘We should distrust our automatic settings and rely more on manual mode when 
attempting to resolve practical moral disagreements. So far, so palatable. But where 
does this lead? I believe it favors consequentialist approaches to moral problem-
solving, ones aimed solely at promoting good consequences, rather than deontological 
approaches aimed at figuring out who has which rights and duties, where these are 
regarded as constraints on the promotion of good consequences…  As private 
individuals, we should nearly always respect the conventional moral rules, but in 
establishing those rules (as voters and policy-makers) we should aim simply for the 
best long-term consequences.’  
Greene’s assertion that findings from neuroethics may inform the development of public 
policy will be explored further below, but for the moment I will briefly trace the empirical 
underpinnings of such a potential future application.  Through the stimulus of neatly 
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circumscribed moral dilemmas, Greene and his colleagues derive relative measures of how 
different functional mechanisms within the brain are activated.  These localised functional 
areas include the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vm-PFC) and the amgydala, which play a 
significant role in fomenting emotional/autonomic responses (eg. disgust at the thought of 
pushing someone off a bridge), along with other functional areas such as the dorsolateral 
prefrontal context (dl-PFC), which is correlated with measured, deliberate, rational thought 
(Greene et.al, 2001; Greene and Haidt, 2002; Greene, 2005, 2007).  Most of the time these two 
functional processes accord with each other, but fraught dilemmas may cause a form of intra-
psychical conflict that results in a felt dissonance, strain, and arguably poorer overall decision-
making outcomes.  The failure to make decisions that result in best overall outcomes, says 
Greene (2008: 36), ‘cast[s] doubt on deontology as a school of normative moral thought’ and 
signifies a blind spot of our neurological capacities to rightly determine the ‘good’.  This, of 
course, is an enormous claim with potentially paradigm shifting consequences across multiple 
disciplines.   
To summarise, Greene’s neuroethical form of consequentialism seeks our assent on the basis 
of the following logical progression.  Firstly, we must accept that five people dying is of greater 
consequence than one and that, given no other information, right action in this scenario 
entails the death (incidentally or otherwise) of one person instead of five.  Secondly, we must 
concede that it is now – or will soon be – possible to observe that your decision to not effect 
this five-for-one outcome could be empirically proven to have been ‘thwarted’ by cognitive 
processes geared towards emotional salience that overrode your capacities for measured 
rational thought.  Thirdly, therefore, if the above has been observed within a sufficiently 
rigourous experimental construct we must conclude that your brain is in some sense deficient 
with respect to wider societal expectations (but in ways that may be open to ‘correction’).  
Thus we have a supposed rationale towards reconfiguring the faulty subject toward socially 
desirable ends, achieved in a way akin to the functionalist correlation of brain lesions with 
differing cognitive capacities in much early neurological research.  But would such a 
reconfiguring effectively disaggregate the ethical subject into a bundle of neurological 
functions determined by contingent circumstance, and what looping effects may be generated 
in becoming subject to such parsing of our ethical stances?  One result could be an ironic 
subversion of subscribing to a normative ethic system in the first place, for the ‘ends’ are lost 
in the tracing and refining of a form of hyper-reflexivity that blazes straight past the subject 
itself.  To be informed that your vm-PFC ‘overrode’ your ds-PFC may prove unsettling grounds 
on which to reorient our ethical subjectivity, with looping effects difficult to predict.    
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This neuroethical reconfiguring of the subject speaks to a particularly audacious ‘circulating 
reference’ (Latour, 1999: 24-79), where a transformational step-chain is enacted in order to 
render some property – in this case nothing less than ‘deontological normative ethics’ – 
commensurable with the statistical aggregations of sophisticated software programs that 
(through their own complex transformational chain) can trace blood oxygenation levels by way 
of magnetic resonance.  Of course a great many more processes occur in this chain in order to 
remove ‘noise’ from the final output (see Joyce, 2006, 2008), but eventually the 
transformation is complete, with the resubstantialising of ‘deontology-in-action’ to causal 
mechanisms in the brain now labelled either operational or deficient.  Yet while we may 
admire the ambition and technical sophistication of these efforts, too little appears to be said 
of the ‘irreality’ and tight circularity of these referential constructs (Rose and Abi-Rached, 
2013: 78; Cohn, 2011), not to mention their usually WEIRD22 samples of research participants 
and questionable experimental designs (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan, 2010).  This irreality, 
circularity, and narrow sampling is worrisome given the weighty properties under 
investigation.  Does the artificiality and crude cleaving from context of the experimental 
construct of a dilemma of life-or-death importance result in output that captures how the 
ethical subject might actually react in a comparable real world scenario, or might the construct 
capture something else entirely?  And what of the body, excluded in all its visceral being of 
contemplating pushing men off bridges by being required to lie perfectly still for the MRI scan 
to be deemed reliable?  Furthermore, the assumption that an undergraduate student – the 
typical participant in these studies (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan, 2010: 65) – could saliently 
fathom the gravity of such courses of action in ways that are representative of the wider 
population, along with satisfying other standard requirements of measurement validity in 
experimental constructs, altogether seems highly questionable.  Suffice to say improvements 
in the spatial and temporal acuity of MRI will do little to resolve these persistent incongruities.  
As it stands we may achieve little, presume much, and self-fulfil more in seeking to produce 
morality in a vat. 
Nevertheless, there are those who wish to shift the terrain upon which we consider morality, 
positing that rather than observing morality at the interpersonal, institutional, or cultural level, 
we instead need to dig further into our neurological constitutions.  This is a claim to epistemic 
authority in proposing that only when we understand the molecular mechanisms through 
which morality is enacted can we truly know our ethical capacities, and hence determine what 
                                                          
22
 This acronym denotes Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic societies.  The Henrich 
and colleagues meta-analysis cited here pertains to a persistent problem in psychological and 
neuroscientific research, wherein study participants are usually recruited from the student population in 




the good subject is and can be (Hartmann, 2011).  Consequently, the material scaffolding of 
our being is now deemed ‘normatively significant’ in ways that are historically novel (Greene, 
2014: 26-7).  In this way intentional acts may be decomposed into neuronal mechanisms that 
brought said action into existence, and so threatens to reinscribe the brain as a rigidly 
bounded entity, an organ to be assessed with regard to its functioning as an ethical entity.  The 
result of such a project, I will suggest, is a conflation of multiple branches of ethical inquiry 
that may in time prove unhelpfully restrictive. 
 
 
Conflating ethics and the ideal subject into the brain terrain 
  
At this stage the reader may be wondering why ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ are deployed largely 
interchangeably throughout this discussion.  The primary reason is that, in practice, the kind of 
empirical moral philosophy and applied neuroethics that I am concerned with here does not 
recognise a distinction between the two.  Whether it be ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, ‘internal’ or 
‘external’ referents, and ‘character’ or ‘custom’, all these previously held distinctions and 
counter-referents of ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ become subsumed under that which can be traced 
inside the skull.  The main branches of ethical inquiry – descriptive, normative, applied and 
meta-ethical – are conflated in the cause of establishing a ‘common currency’ of wellbeing 
(Greene, in interview with Suttie, 2013).  Such common currency is sought through the 
intensive gaze upon our neural mechanisms, so that ‘once those inner workings are revealed 
we may have less confidence in some of our judgments and the ethical theories that are 
(explicitly or implicitly) based on them’ (Greene, 2014: 2).  Understanding these ‘inner 
workings’, suggests Greene, will allow the development of a ‘metamorality’ which we could 
reasonably be expected to subscribe to as neurological citizens furthering the interests of 
collective flourishing (Greene, 2013: 15).  
The philosophical and ethical debate of centuries is thus reduced to a biomarker, neatly 
contained within single subjects lying in MRI machines, and made readable in the equally 
technical and artful constructions of brain images.  In this configuration, the complex loops and 
tangles of ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ are ‘not jettisoned, so much as absorbed, never to re-surface 
because the overall research trajectory sufficiently continues to ensure only new areas of 
doubt or complication will arise’ (Cohn, 2011: 188).  From the data generated from these 
experimental constructs Joshua Greene (2013: 289-346) claims to have found the basis for a 
comprehensive ethical framework of ‘deep pragmatism’.  This framework, Greene suggests, 
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could resolve the seeming incongruence between the obligations we uphold to those in our 
immediate vicinity and our failures to recognise comparable obligations to those further afield, 
thus addressing some of the supposed deficits of our ‘common sense morality’, as I discuss 
further in Chapter Three. 
Once translated into the common currency of the functionally localised brain the once elusive 
ethical property to be measured now takes on a ‘denuded nature’, one that renders it more 
flexible (albeit in narrow, pre-set parameters), and able to swiftly move up and down the chain 
of transformation; from molecular assembly to shaping policy development (Cohn, 2011: 196).  
What is especially distinct about empirical neuroethics, moreover, is the degree to which 
increasingly abstract and contextually nuanced qualities are now intensively gazed upon, and 
correlated to material differences in the brain that are not necessarily the result of trauma, 
disease, or other comparable aberrations.  Rather, such qualities are widely prevalent, 
arguably normally distributed differences, yet now are being tied to weaker propensities to 
accord oneself to prevailing normative standards.  This poses a radically new means by which 
to reconfigure subjects.   
Greene (2008: 38) is unflinching in leading such a charge to circumscribe normative ethics 
under the gaze of neuroethics, even to the point of directly challenging the authority of 
philosophy in this territory: 
‘It is assumed that philosophers know exactly what deontology and consequentialism 
are because these terms and concepts were defined by philosophers.  Despite this, I 
believe it is possible that philosophers do not necessarily know what consequentialism 
and deontology really are. 
How could this be?  The answer, I propose, is that the terms “deontology” and 
“consequentialism” refer to psychological natural kinds.  I believe that consequentialist 
and deontological views of philosophy are not so much philosophical inventions as 
they are philosophical manifestations of two dissociable psychological patterns, two 
different ways of moral thinking, that have been part of the human repertoire for 
thousands of years.  According to this view, the moral philosophies of Kant, Mill, and 
others are just the explicit tips of large, mostly implicit, psychological icebergs.  If that 
is correct, then philosophers may not really know what they’re dealing with when they 
trade in consequentialist and deontological moral theories, and we may have to do 
some science to find out.’  
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Recall the eliminative materialist position that opened this thesis, an uncompromising stance 
in which scientific inquiry ‘can be seen as a gradual process whereby speculative philosophy 
cedes intellectual space to increasingly well-grounded experimental disciplines’ (Churchland, 
2008: 409).  The above thesis from Greene, proposing the ‘natural kind’ affixing of normative 
thought, is this very kind of eliminativist program in action (see also Greene et al. 2004).  In 
Greene’s estimation the expounding of ethical systems was never really the domain of 
philosophers to begin with, for Kant, Mill, and others have merely overlain neatly aligning 
rational abstractions on what was already present in ‘underlying structures’ or ‘essences’ of 
volitional being (Greene, 2008: 38).  That is – to channel neuroethical views discussed earlier – 
we used our most ‘human’ quality of rationality only to justify weaker, ingrained preferences 
not driven by our ‘higher’ humanity.  Greene’s ‘deep pragmatism’ is based upon the conclusion 
that deontological judgments are typically swayed by emotional, immediate responses, while 
consequentialist judgment is usually more considered.  From this the assertion is made that 
Kantian ethics and deontology in general – while in principle defensible through ‘fancy 
philosophising’ (Greene, 2008: 39) – is in practice often simply a coherent narrative overlay for 
emotional dispositions that subjects are averse to untethering themselves from, resulting in 
cases of ‘intuition-chasing’ (Greene, 2014: 37).   Hence the entire school of deontological ethics 
is open to dismissal as ‘a kind of moral confabulation’ (Greene, 2008: 63), presumed to be 
‘affective at its core’ (65), and dodging the supposed real labour of being a moral citizen in 
adopting ‘just so’ (68) explanations that too easily accord with comforting preconceptions.   
Responses to Greene’s attempted dismantling of deontology argue that he too hastily reduces 
deontology to the unyielding observance of duty, and then unduly expands the breadth of 
consequentialism in positing it as equally capable of respecting the humanity of others, despite 
this being the generally agreed comparative advantage of deontological stances (Timmons, 
2008; Nagel, 2013).  Timmons (2008) goes further with this rebuttal in tentatively suggesting 
that we should not be dismissive of the comfort derived from a principle of action that can be 
willed for others; that is, there is consolation that may come in knowing that we all subscribe 
to categorical imperatives, even if such obligations may not ‘maximise’ overall outcomes in 
measurable ways.  Further to this, and a more sociological standpoint, would call for greater 
epistemological humility in recognising that single moral dilemmas shorn of social 
contingencies – so that they may serve as independent variables – are highly artificial 
constructs of experimental method, rather than perfectly mimetic representations of reality 
(regardless of our chosen point of entry into ‘reality’ that may come to inform how we conduct 
ourselves as ethical subjects).  Corollary to this, the aversions to action that Greene associates 
with ethical failure are not necessarily instances of neurologically ‘faulty’ reasoning, but rather 
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learnt dispositions, whereby the undertaking of highly confronting acts such as, say, pushing 
someone off a bridge, requires not only that we overturn our initial affective reaction of 
revulsion.  It also entails that in this correction we effectively concede and confess ourselves to 
be flawed as ethical subjects, plagued by evolutionary hangovers not befitting the complexity 
of modernity and the maximising of wellbeing.  Greene’s empiricism risks generating hard 
prescriptions that seem unlikely to hold together in practice unless we consent to 
individualised practices that subvert affective responses – that our ‘intuition-chasing’ be dulled 
and diverted – which in turn will likely have unforeseen consequences for the subject if we opt 
to enact such a regime.   
From its beginnings sociology has dedicated itself to tracing such effects, but in recent decades 
sociological efforts have tended to eschew the analysis of ‘morality’ in favour of the study of 
structure, conflict, stratification etc. (Hitlin and Vaisey, 2013: 52-3).  There are, however, 
notable exceptions to this trend that look to reinvigorate a ‘sociology of morality’ (Bellah, 
1985; Lamont, 1992; Hitlin and Vaisey, 2010; Stets and Carter, 2012).  Furthermore, given the 
emergence and increasing scope of the new life sciences and other ‘third culture’ efforts that 
seek to ground assessments of conduct and wellbeing in the fixity of our biological and 
neurological constitutions, perhaps the sociological study of ‘morality’ and ‘meaning’ is worth 
further developing in response.  Such efforts – which this thesis in part seeks to contribute to – 
aim to elucidate the entangled quality of moral being, and the futility of attempts to cleave 
‘morality’ from its contextual binds: 
‘If the old sociology of morality was Durkheimian—seeing morality as a property of 
entire societies and binding its members together—then the new sociology of morality 
is more Weberian… Moral sharing exists, but at many cross-cutting and competing 
levels.  Moral motivation exists, but these motivations struggle with one another and 
with nonmoral concerns in their expression. Morality can bind groups together but it 
can also be the subject of negotiation, contestation, and exclusion. The new sociology 
of morality looks beyond just norms and values, casting a broader net that includes 
narratives, identities, institutions, symbolic boundaries, and cognitive schemas.’  
Hitlin and Vaisey, 2013: 53-4 
Morality is thus multiply valanced, and not to be easily bound in one single ontological terrain.  
It is both independent and constitutive of the subject; something of a moral reality exists 
separate to us, but we cannot conceive of ourselves as agents without reference to it.  With 
this and the possibility of looping effects in mind, we should therefore remind ourselves to 
practice an epistemological humility in not presuming to have finally ‘revealed’ – or indeed to 
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ever ‘reveal’ – the underpinnings of our morality, for if the concept is to retain its productive 
and instructive quality we must recognise how morality circulates through multiple 
substantialities and contexts. 
It should be noted that Greene is (somewhat) cognizant of these considerations, and likewise 
does not wish to see ‘morality’ become entirely cleaved from the willing and feeling subject, 
and wider social contexts.  Greene (2008: 76) concedes that there may be limits to the 
‘empirical debunking of human moral nature’, for we must consider how to best ‘draw the line 
between correcting the nearsightedness of human moral nature and obliterating it 
completely’.  Similarly Thomas Metzinger (2009: 212) advises that with the ‘Consciousness 
Revolution’ promised by some neuro-advocates must be tempered against the risk that a 
‘vulgar materialism may take hold’.  It is this tension between ‘correcting’ and ‘obliterating’ our 
supposed faults without rendering ourselves into vulgar forms that will now be addressed. 
The assumption built-in to Greene’s moral dilemma studies is that through observing the 
machinations of ethical thinking at the neurological level we may avoid the problems of 
interpreting (often unreliable) personal testimony in comparable studies that often rely heavily 
on self-reporting.  The participant as ‘blackbox’ – and moreover the sociological complexity of 
morality – can thus be sidestepped, for the effects of the neatly constructed, iterative stimuli 
of moral dilemmas can be observed as they are molecularly realised in close to real time, with 
a presumably fixed and wholly representative substantiality hitherto unseen.  As noted earlier, 
the assumptions regarding the construct validity of these stimuli are questionable, and appear 
to require a strict bounding of the space in which morality is considered operative.  The risk is 
of generating an epistemic circularity, one that presupposes certain worldviews now rendered 
into universal ‘immutable mobiles’ (Latour, 1986) within the brain, when in actuality they are 
inescapably socio-historically contingent.  This newly immutable, universal property may then 
be transferred into practical applications.  For an illustrative example of this potential 
immutability informing practice, observe the following quote from Greene (The Situationist, 
2010) during an interview: 
‘I think that it is really the automatic settings, the emotional responses, we’re opposed 
to that.  And when we understand how they work, and where they come from I think 
we’re going to realize that they’re good for some things, but not for other things, and 
not generally good for public policy, and I think that a better scientific understanding is 
likely to push us in a more utilitarian or consequentialist direction…  And once it’s in 




Consider also this proposition from Neil Levy: 
‘If, for instance, it can be shown that some (and only some) of our moral responses are 
irrational, because driven by raw emotion, then we have a powerful reason for 
rewriting policy to discount these responses.’  
Levy, 2010: xxi 
What Greene and Levy are essentially proposing is a form of neuroscience-based ‘deliberative 
democracy’, where our various positions on issues may be screened and processed through 
the neurological gaze (Sokolon, 2012; Rose, 2010).  Greene’s perspective on our ‘automatic 
settings’ and public policy are also echoed by the (now disgraced due to academic misconduct) 
evolutionary biologist Marc Hauser (2006: x) who argues that it ‘is not only possible but likely 
that some of the intuitions we have evolved are no longer applicable to current societal 
problems’ and so require repurposing through targeted intervention.  The wider implication 
here is that one’s ethical stance at any given time is open to pathologisation through the cool 
gaze of those who claim authority over the ‘neu-normal’ parameters of citizenship.   
As sociologist of culture and cognition Karen Cerulo (2010: 118-9) has observed, such 
applications of insight from the cognitive sciences to complex socio-political issues are already 
occurring, particularly around the use of specific rhetorical strategies in the formal political 
arena as a means of targeting sub-conscious loyalties and volitions.  Similarly, moral 
psychologist Jonathan Haidt – a research collaborator with Joshua Greene (Greene and Haidt, 
2002) – has applied his social intuitionist model of morality to the practices of political rhetoric 
and persuasion, and the persistence of seemingly incommensurable and irreconcilable gaps 
between differing actors and their ideological stances (Haidt, 2012; Haidt and Graham, 2007; 
Graham, Haidt and Nosek, 2009).  Historian of science Joelle Abi-Rached (2008) has also 
observed the willingness of neuroscientists to insert themselves amongst topical political 
debates, with the most egregious recent example being a New York Times op-ed, wherein a 
number of neuroscientists predicated how ‘swing voters’ would vote in the upcoming 
Presidential elections based on fMRI scans conducted while subjects were viewing images and 
videos of the various Democratic and Republican candidates.  As Abi-Rached (2008: 1158) 
notes, these assessments were not preceded with or followed by peer-reviewed research, 
which amounts to a worrisome forgoing of the usual due process such claims should go 
through, especially given their relatively weighty sensitivities.  In any case, with the increasing 
translation of neuroscience into ethical and political arenas it is our faulty (but reparable and 
improvable) brains that are increasingly blamed for our collective ills, and framed as the 
promising new site of enacting our reconfiguration as subjects. 
82 
 
The hope for some neuroethicists is that neuroscience may serve as an independent arbiter of 
our capacity to contribute to society as enfranchised citizens, or to be held as legally 
responsible agents in certain contexts.  Yet the sting of past failures should remind us to be 
exceedingly wary of views that would grant authorities the epistemic privilege to ‘discount’ 
specific utterances by reference to ‘natural’ properties.  If not conducted with due caution 
such undertakings speak to forms of hubris that may not so much deftly reveal the underlying 
strata of selfhood, but rather bludgeon pre-existing worldviews into new containers and 
overlays.  Moreover, the belief that one may find themselves subjected to having their views 
processed for the corrupting influence of what Levy describes as ‘raw emotion’ (see above) is 
likely to result in looping effects difficult to foresee, and thus negates the very precision such 
‘neuro-policy’ seeks to implement.  We should approach with caution the prospect of having 
productively elusive ideals of wellbeing and right thinking hardened, affixed, and then 
bequeathed to authorities who will exercise an epistemic privilege over this new domain.   
Here then, to conclude this chapter, is where I will first signal an alternative approach further 
developed in the following chapters, one that seeks to undo some current idealisations too 
often left unquestioned.  For one, as critical theorist Sara Ahmed (2010: 199-204) pithily 
observes, the catch-all and seemingly unassailable concepts of ‘happiness’ and ‘wellbeing’ may 
well be ‘philosophy’s foundational tautology’, the arbitrary stopping point that ‘might suspend 
obligation to refer to anything else in making a good argument’ (Ahmed, 2010: 203).  But if 
these properties are imported into the brain this tautological foundation may further take on a 
substantiality that renders ‘happiness’ and ‘wellbeing’ even more difficult to interrogate.  
Under such a guise measures of these properties are purportedly cleaved of contingency, 
girded by objective empiricism and hypothetico-deductive rigour, but in actuality are 
potentially obscuring mechanisms ‘orthogonal to the real value judgment’ (Rosenquist and 
Rothschild, 2012: 173).  Such rigid and strictly circumscribed epistemic capture of wellbeing 
risks producing, suggests Ahmed (2010: 123), what Nietzsche admonished as that peculiarly 
‘English’ variety of utilitarianism; seeking a precision of maximising wellbeing that arbitrarily 
reduces such things to hollow and bland maxims that simply reinscribe in diminishing fashion 
already prevailing norms.  Today this process may take on a greater urgency as ideologies of 
good citizenry are increasingly mapped into their material correlates, thus adding layers of 
hard verisimilitude by way of creeping reductionism.  
Philosopher and critical theorist Catherine Malabou (2008) similarly illustrates this process in 
action by tracing how narrow understandings of ‘neuroplasticity’ are being folded into current 
overarching norms as ethical injunctions of living well.  Enthusiastic proclamations of the 
‘plasticity’ of the brain are abundant in current discourses, elucidated in popular science books 
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designed to capture the public imagination and inform new personal ethics of potentiality.  
This trend, argues Malabou (2008: 8), is one of both promise and peril, for conceiving the brain 
as a ‘plastic’ entity may well create the potential for ‘neuronal liberation’, but only if we can 
resist trends towards a ‘cybernetic frigidity’ that reduces and contains the brain within ‘a 
domain of implacable organic necessity’, while also rejecting ‘liberation’ framed in purely 
neoliberal drives towards maximising one’s value-bearing capacities.   
Malabou (2008) contrasts ‘plasticity’ with ‘flexibility’ in terms of both conceptions of the brain 
and overarching societal structures and normative expectations.  To be ‘flexible’ is to be 
adaptable only in a submissive sense, but to be (truly) ‘plastic’ is to be adaptable to a realm of 
potentials.   When framed as such within the relation between technologies of production, 
biopower, and governmentality, we see that Malabou (2008: 30) is proposing that we are 
currently amidst an ideological struggle of great consequence, for ‘our brain is in part 
essentially what we do with it’.  As it stands, the brain is often pedagogically framed within the 
modes of operation characteristic of Post-Fordist capitalist society, wherein we are called to 
exercise our capacities as ‘flexible’ subjects, adaptable to according ourselves to those tasks 
that produce the greatest possible value in a given setting (Malabou, 2008: 40-46).  This 
flexibility is spun as an aspirational term, making a virtue of the willingness to maximally 
realise one’s market potential as a commodity of labour (Malabou, 2008; see also Slaby, 2010; 
Hartmann, 2011).  However, if the ethical injunction inherent in ‘flexibility’ is rendered 
equivalent to the popularly-invoked rhetoric of ‘plasticity’ – in the neurological sense – then 
contingent ideological stances risk being firmly inscribed into the brain terrain.  Slaby (2010) 
echoes this observation, fearing that neuroscience may smuggle ideological presumptions into 
our ‘natural’ constitutions, thus substantialising it in ways that tacitly support overarching 
imperatives. 
Yet our neuroplasticity is a much too complex and entangled phenomenon to be wrangled into 
narrow ends of our own devising through currently crude moral spectroscopes and synaptic 
ledgers.  Neurology, the body, and the social interdetermine each other, but, suggests 
Malabou (2008: 9), we seem unable to recognise this relationship, for it fades into the 
background noise of a ‘naturalisation effect’ (see also Wilson, 2004, 2015, who regularly 
describes these inter-relations and co-dependencies as processes of ‘imbrication’).  However, a 
re-imagining of the brain that recognises this entanglement promises a generative – rather 
than simply ‘productive’ – plasticity (Papadopoulos, 2011).  If we are willing to humbly admit, 
to paraphrase Deleuze (1987: 257) channelling Spinoza, that we simply don’t know what a 
brain can do – of how it is unpredictably malleable, and modifies itself in ways we do not yet 
even hope to fully understand – then through this admission we may be better oriented 
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towards realising possibilities of the brain in ways we cannot yet envisage, but should hope to 
allow to emerge.   
However, it appears that today the neoliberal, Post-Fordist ‘spirit’ of capitalism elevates those 
subjects who seek to accord themselves and thrive within a constant state of flux, and 
endorses a supposed ‘freedom’ found in narrowly derived ‘flexibility’ (Malabou, 2008; Vander 
Valk, 2012: 10).  Such conceptualisations didactically feed into equally narrow 
conceptualisations of the brain within the formalised machinations of bureaucratic and 
political arenas.  This is made strikingly evident in projects like the ‘Foresight Mental Capital 
and Wellbeing Project’ in the UK, an exploratory initiative that produced a final report titled 
‘The Mental Wealth of Nations’ (Beddington et. al 2008).  This report, observes Jan Slaby 
(2010: 406), places a form of neurological care of the self as a means to the ‘good life’, one 
that is conveniently also ‘a perfect fit to the neoliberal market orientation’.  Making this 
perspective abundantly explicit, the report authors frame their discussion through the notion 
of cognitive ‘capital’, and note that this analogising ‘naturally sparks association with ideas of 
financial capital and it is both challenging and natural to think of the mind in this way’ 
(Beddington, 2008: 2).   
That this type of brain – a resource to invest in, leverage, and extract value from – is 
considered ‘both challenging and natural’ aptly captures the strange ethic we may come to 
find ourselves labouring within.  The brain is framed as a resource of iterative dividends, a 
property to be conscientiously exploited in accordance with wider dictates and processes of 
rationalisation.  However, to foreshadow a discussion in the following chapter, such labouring 
over our brains is in turn purported to be ‘natural’ to our sense of species-being, so that this 
relationship to our neurological makeup is part of our uniquely ‘human’ quality, rather than 
merely the current anomalous mode of our infinitely malleable subjectivities.  Furthermore, 
the brain is subjected to ideals of perpetual growth and the re-circulation of capital, and so 
effectively ‘recommends a lifelong regime of control, regulation, and intervention to assure 
the maximizing of mental capital’ (Slaby, 2010: 407).  The brain is increasingly seen as 
operating within an array of possibilities and potentials to be enacted, a paragon of 
adaptability and willing, and therefore a ‘site of choice, prudence, and responsibility for each 
individual.’ (Abi-Rached and Rose, 2013: 52).  As I will argue in the next chapter, this framing of 





Conclusion – Who is the ‘secret joke’ really on?  
 
 
To conclude, we shall gradually shift here from the intensive gazes discussed above to the 
expansive ends that will be addressed in the next chapter.  Joshua Greene opens a book 
chapter – titled ‘The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul’ – with this epigraph, taken from Nietzsche’s 
The Gay Science: 
‘Kant’s Joke—Kant wanted to prove, in a way that would dumbfound the common 
man, that the common man was right: that was the secret joke of this soul. He wrote 
against the scholars in support of popular prejudice, but for scholars and not for the 
people.’ 
Greene juxtaposes Nietzsche’s critique with another epigraph, this time from Kant’s 
‘Concerning Wanton Self-Abuse’ in The Metaphysics of Morals, wherein Kant rails against the 
‘mere unpurposive use of one’s sexual attributes as being a violation of one’s duty to himself’.  
The inference Greene wishes the reader to draw is that given Kant’s anti-onanist prudishness – 
which appears to be unduly dictating for him what he determines to constitute an ethical 
principle – we should reconsider Kant’s authority in laying claim to cool, measured judgment 
over duties to oneself and others.  Leaving aside the obvious question of whether this may be 
a finicky and ungenerous way of critiquing Kant, we might in turn respond by noting that some 
lines of inquiry within neuroethics seem in large part founded upon devising ways of rendering 
more apparent what simply amounts to today’s form of ‘popular prejudice’.  The common 
currency that ‘hard’ neuroethics advocates such as Sam Harris, Michael Gazzaniga, and Joshua 
Greene are leveraging is the popularly-held view that definitive assessments of wellbeing can 
be arrived at through hypothetico-deductive methods, promising insights that somehow 
negate the muddying vicissitudes of the contemporary subject.  That is, we are assured that 
we can derive measures of the ‘good’ through increasingly intensive gazes into our material 
ontogeny.  Yet there are underlying assumptions – again, certain ‘popular prejudices’ – at play 
here when it comes to wellbeing and the maximisation of utility, and these assumptions will be 
explored further in the next chapter. 
Moreover, while Nietzsche was certainly averse to any convenient post-hoc moralising (that 
Kant may or may not have been guilty of), nor is it likely that he would have readily embraced 
the ‘reading’ of the moral actor through the hemodynamically-measured stimuli of trolley 
problems given by disembodied voices to ‘WEIRD’ subjects in loud plastic tubes, with findings 
then used to speculate on the continuing validity of deeply-held normative stances.  The 
collapse of spatial, temporal and affective considerations in exchange for simply comparing 
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hypothetical choice against localised function – not to mention the heavy reliance on language 
to carry the emotional impute of considering a life-and-death scenario and one’s grave 
responsibility to effect a beneficial outcome – altogether makes for an awful lot of variables 
negated or regressed in service of illuminating weighty and elusive ideas.  Nietzsche, Greene’s 
supposed champion against Kant, was long suspicious of such too-neat unities:   
 ‘All intense moods bring with them a resonance of related feelings and moods; they 
seem to stir up memory.  Something in us remembers and becomes aware of similar 
states of their origin.  Thus habitual, rapid associations of feelings and thoughts are 
formed, which, when they follow with lightning speed upon one another, are 
eventually no longer felt as complexes, but rather as unities; in truth they are rivers 
with a hundred sources and tributaries.  As is so often the case, the unity of the word 
does not guarantee the unity of the thing.’  
Nietzsche, 2004: 22 
My larger point here is that while Greene may contend that we can isolate ‘psychological 
natural kinds’ of ethical stances through his experimental model, what he is instead reading 
within, and then translating down into our neurology, is something far less immutable and 
unified.  Once such claims make their way out of the lab, however, and as the next chapter will 
show, then what is risked is inadvertently hardening and reifying current varieties of ‘popular 
prejudice’.  As already noted, such fashionable prejudices include the aspiration to be ‘plastic’, 
but only in narrow ways aligned to the productive neoliberal subject.  It comes to pass then 
that the ‘secret joke’, ultimately, is on us, entrained and labouring to uphold a mode of ethical 
thought grounded in flawed empiricism that worms and loops itself further into our self-
construction.  Again, this affixing of the ideal subject through mistaking the contingent 
tributary for the universal property will be explored further in the next chapter. 
Nietzsche (2004: 13-4) wonders why philosophical inquiry for the past two millennia has 
largely concerned itself with the question of ‘how can something arise from its opposite … 
reason from unreason, sensation from the lifeless, logic from the illogical, disinterested 
contemplation from covetous desire, altruism from egoism, truth from error?’.  Alternatively, 
Nietzsche poses that this is the wrong question to ask, or at least, one should not even 
presume to have found – in a teleological fashion – the appropriate properties to ‘oppose’ to 
one another.  Applied to the neuroethical case at hand, perhaps ‘morality’ and ‘neurology’ are 
not the epistemic estuaries of the Nietzschean tributaries we are trying to find.  More 
specifically, ‘consequentialist v. deontological ethics’ and ‘hemodynamically-read localised 
brain function’ are not teleological unities, but their own small paths carved from much more 
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elusive understandings of ethics and consciousness.  Finding our way out of these ontological 
tributaries will not be achieved if we too hastily funnel both our gaze and that which we gaze 
upon. 
To sum up, this chapter has traced the emergence of neuroethics as a discipline in its own 
right.  In particular I have been concerned with a small but ambitious cadre of neuroethicists 
who proclaim – in both academic and lay contexts – that their field may lead the way to a 
‘second Enlightenment’ by revealing our ethical constitutions at the neurological level.  By 
reducing the complexity of ethical thought and behaviour to the ‘common currency’ of their 
differing activation in the brain, proponents hope that a ‘universal ethics’ might be revealed 
through an epistemic privilege to which they lay claim.  However, given the looping effects of 
assessments of our ‘essential’ human qualities, such endeavours threaten to have greater 
effects in their propounding to wider society, rather than through the actual validity of their 
findings.  Moreover, I have suggested that some neuroethical experimental constructs are 
laden with false categorical neatness unbefitting the import and complexity of the properties 
they seek to measure, resulting in narrow materialised analogues that may corrupt and 
diminish the very ideals they seek to protect.   
The challenge we are left with then, as social scientists, is to trace and monitor the claims of 
neuroethics, looking to collaborate where possible, but also to sharply critique narrow 
demarcations that threaten to close off promising lines of inquiry before they are even 
glimpsed.  A collective of hard neuro-empiricists proclaim that ‘the world of measurement and 
the world of meaning must eventually be reconciled’ through neuroscience (Harris 2010: 10).  
However, given the delicate epistemological and ontological sensitivities involved we should 
resist such rhetoric of the supposedly imperative need to precisely delineate all that we 
consider ‘ideal’ in our humanity, only so that we are then obliged to engineer its propensity at 
the neurological level.  Such a project will likely only inscribe current normative contingencies 
in ways that may later prove detrimental.  If a proposed ‘science of human flourishing’ 
succeeds by dint of epistemological validity – or, perhaps more likely, through self-fulfilling 
prophecies and looping effects generated through governmentality and care of the self – then 
there will come a time where assessments of the ‘right’ and ‘good’ are subjected to the clinical 
gaze, and so (further) opened to pathologisation.   
Hence we must tread carefully, for as variously noted by Foucault (1998: 255), Hacking (1995: 
361-9), and Paul Rabinow (1992: 241-2) those sciences which purport to illuminate the subject 
through law-like explanations of behaviour loop into effect forms of self-production laden with 
normative expectations, that is, the pronouncements of how we are ‘naturally’ constituted 
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inevitably come to pedagogically instruct us on how we should live.  We should consider then 
how neuroethics might shape new ‘regimes of normativity’ (Pickersgill, 2012) through the 
ways in which we consider the brain a property to be instrumentalised, and of what qualities 
of being we impute to this molecular terrain.  This may prove especially pertinent given the 
hopes for practical applications of neuroethics on a wide scale in order to solve collective 




















Not Fit for Purpose? – On Enhancing the Ethical Citizen and 
Neurological Care of the Self 
 
‘Formerly one sought the feeling of a grandeur of man by pointing to his divine origin: 
this has now become a forbidden way, for at its portal stands the ape, together with 
other beasts, grinning knowingly as if to say: no further in this direction!  One 
therefore now tries the opposite direction: the way mankind is going shall serve as 
proof of his grandeur and kinship with God, Alas, this, too, is vain!  At the end of this 
way stands the funeral urn of the last man and gravedigger (with the inscription ‘nihil 
humani a me alienum puto’23).  However high mankind may have evolved – and 
perhaps at the end it will stand even lower than at the beginning! – it cannot pass over 
into a higher order, as little as the ant and the earwig can at the end of its ‘earthly 
course’ rise up to kinship with God and eternal life.  The becoming drags the has-been 
along behind it: why should an exception to this eternal spectacle be made on behalf 
of some little star or for any little species upon it!  Away with such sentimentalities!’  
Nietzsche, 1881[1997]: 47 
 
Introduction – ‘What we most essentially are’ 
 
The previous chapter traced the rise of neuroethics as a discipline comprised of increasingly 
influential proponents who envisage their field as the route by which a ‘universal ethics’ may 
be developed.  This claim holds significant implications in how we may view ourselves as 
ethical subjects, perhaps regardless of the ultimate legitimacy of importing the measurement 
of the properties that purportedly constitute wellbeing and proper conduct into the 
neurological terrain.  Through empirical studies – such as the fMRI-based correlation of 
normative ethical positions with neurological states – this line of neuroethics seeks to produce 
a ‘moral spectroscope’ and ‘synaptic ledger’ that converts the complexity of moral practice 
into the common currency of our molecular assembly.  The supposed causal mechanisms of 
‘deontology’ and ‘consequentialist’ thought and feeling are to be translated through the 
                                                          
23 ‘Nothing human is alien to me’ 
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‘wetware between our ears’, and so in the process narrowly blackboxing once elusive 
measures of how we may best conduct ourselves.    
Sociologists, and the social sciences more broadly, have raised ample concerns about the 
forms of hasty reductionism that underpin these claims, and specifically I am concerned here 
with those knowledge claims that then fold back onto the subject as injunctions upon their 
conduct.  As Foucault (1998: 255) pithily observed ‘Every psychology is a pedagogy, all 
decipherment is a therapeutics’, and thus every knowledge claim regarding our constitutions is 
part of an ongoing dialectic in the ‘making up’ of subjects (Hacking, 1985).  This process of 
coolly and precisely delineating the bounds of the ethical subject – as some neuroethicists are 
wont to do – aspires to the generation of ‘human kinds’ to match the law-like properties of 
‘natural kinds’ (Hacking, 1985).  However, a manifest distinction between the two is that 
‘human kinds’ inevitably have ‘intrinsic moral value’ (Hacking, 1985: 367) that ‘affects the field 
of possible intentional actions’ (368).  This, argues Ian Hacking (1985: 369), results in a ‘looping 
effect’, for ‘to create new ways of classifying people is also to change how we can think of 
ourselves, to change our sense of self-worth, even how we remember our own past’.  There is 
a constant churn of ‘new causal knowledge to be gained’ and ‘old causal knowledge to be 
jettisoned’ that works against the definitive affixing of the subject (Hacking, 1985: 369).  This 
looping effect should not be considered a source of frustration for those scholars who hold 
‘romantic cravings’ of revealing our ‘universal’ properties (Hacking, 2002: 7).  Rather, we 
should consider ourselves as productively elusive and reflexive in ways yet unknown, and so as 
social scientists we are obliged to trace the ways in which our ‘historical ontology’ has been 
brought to bear in various contexts (Foucault, 1984; Hacking, 2002: 1-26).   
This task is crucially important, for it encourages caution towards current knowledge claims 
and what ideological stances may underpin them.  Today, such universalising claims often 
emerge through ‘the notorious tendency of life scientists to support socio-political arguments 
by transposing their research on animal models – such as fruit flies or mice – directly to the 
realm of human society and culture’ (Rose, 2013: 12).  Philosopher of mind Daniel Dennett 
likewise describes such overreaching translations as forms of ‘greedy reductionism’ where 
‘… in their eagerness for a bargain, in their zeal to explain too much too fast, scientists 
and philosophers often underestimate the complexities, trying to skip whole layers or 
levels of theory in their rush to fasten everything securely and neatly to the 
foundation.’  
Dennett, 1996: 82  
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The naïve rationalism that characterises aspects of neuroethical thought should be cause for 
concern, for as I demonstrated in the previous chapter there are growing ambitions to 
intensively work prevailing models of morality and normative ethics into the brain terrain.  This 
chapter is concerned with the looping effects that may result, that is, the question of how 
current understandings of our ethical subjectivity as it relates to our neurological constitutions 
fold back into injunctions for how the morally upright citizen-subject should conduct and care 
for themselves.  Too often in their ‘greedy’ rush to map morality onto neurology some 
neuroethicists neglect to consider the validity and viability of the properties they seek to 
import to the brain.  For example, with a confidence in the essential rationality of human 
beings that feminist, postcolonial, and other critical scholars might find galling, Neil Levy (2008: 
2) confidently claims that 
‘Our rationality is not only definitive of what we most essentially are, it is also what is 
most prized in us, providing us with a standard to live up to.  For Aristotle once again, 
the life of reflection was the highest to which we could aspire; for Socrates the 
unexamined life was not worth living and for John Stuart Mill it was better to be a 
Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.  For us, the merely animal (unreflective) life is 
a life that is unworthy.’  
Levy, 2008: 2  
Levy’s appeal to historical authority aside, many social theorists would shrink from this 
universal kind of ‘iconic image’ of the citizenry that ‘combines the biological, discursive and 
moral expansion of human capabilities into an idea of teleologically ordained, rational 
progress’ (Braidotti, 2013: 13).  Still, Levy (2008: 2-3) insists on the legitimacy of this aim of 
heightening our ‘higher’ capacities for rationality, and in the following example does so by 
tying the enhancement of rationality to an evolutionary imperative: 
‘System 1 [unconscious, automatic, rapid] processes are evolutionarily more ancient; 
they are the kind of cognitive process we share with many other animals, whereas 
system 2 processes [conscious, deliberative decision making] are the kind distinctive of 
us.  If we are rational animals, and that is what distinguishes us, it is only inasmuch as 
we deploy system 2 processes that this is true.’ 
This delineation of higher, rational functions and processes as essentially human is certainly 
not peculiar in neuroethical discourse, nor is the implication that these species-unique 
qualities should be set in contrast and competition with the ‘automatic’ and ‘lower’ cognitive 
processes we share with the rest of the animal kingdom (see Evans, 2003).  Yet while such 
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conceptualisations might sit well with the kind of ‘species ethic’ that Jurgen Habermas (2003) 
and Francis Fukuyama (2002), for example, defend (see below), for many other social scientists 
such confident assertions of our ‘humanity’ would recall deeply problematic histories for 
scholars attentive to questions of race and ethnicity, gender and sexuality, and other axes of 
difference.  Still, some influential and publicly prominent ‘hard’ transhumanists – who aspire to 
‘enhancing’ ourselves as subjects through direct interventions upon our biological assemblies – 
promote this essentialist perspective of the rational subject with relative impunity: 
‘When we make decisions to improve our lives by biological and other manipulations, 
we express our rationality and express what is fundamentally important about our 
nature. And if those manipulations improve our capacity to make rational and 
normative judgements, they further improve what is fundamentally human. Far from 
being against the human spirit, such improvements express the human spirit.’ 
Savulescu, 2008: 38 
The ‘fundamental’ properties of our humanity are thus construed as a perpetual project of 
malleable self-objectification, which, as it so happens, would appear to conveniently align with 
current overarching ideological frameworks of the ideal subject in late modernity.  This 
entwining and conflation of what is ‘fundamental’ of our being with what is particular to our 
socio-historical context generates some unsettling proposals as to how we may best conduct 
ourselves in the world.  For instance, advocates of ‘moral enhancement’ by way of neurological 
intervention often frame justifications in terms of the imperative need to foster ethically 
upright citizens in order to avoid collectively edging ourselves towards global catastrophe 
(Douglas, 2008; Persson and Savulescu, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2013; Buchanan, 2011a, 2011b).  
Allen Buchanan (2011b: 2), for example, suggests that ‘to solve problems we have created—
such as environmental pollution, over-population, and global warming—human beings may 
have to enhance their cognitive capacities and perhaps their moral capacities as well’.  We are 
considered to be actors who generally know the ‘good’ and the ‘right’, but too often suffer a 
weakness of will that causes a rift between our first order desires (what we want) and our 
higher order desires (what we want to want) (Frankfurt, 1971; Wasserman, 2004; Persson and 
Savulescu, 2012: 123).  The proposed solution, then, is of reconfiguring our purposes and 
propensities for the better by way of consciously but self-subversively modifying the 
underlying mechanisms of our intentionality (Sorenson, 2014).  That is, intervening at the 
neurological level as a means of better governing ourselves as ethical citizen-subjects (for 
examples of those broadly in favour see Gazzaniga, 2006; Douglas, 2008; Buchanan, 2011a, 
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2011b; Harris, 2007; Rakic, 2014; Raus et al. 2014, Persson and Savulescu, 2008, 2010, 2012, 
2013a, 2013b).  This is an intensive gaze directed to evermore expansive goals.  
Justifying such a view in a modern liberal democratic setting, however, has resulted in 
proponents framing these interventions as the means by which we might better realise 
‘higher’ goals, and so achieve a greater form of individual freedom by unbinding ourselves 
from ‘weaker’, baser desires (Churchland, 2002; Savulescu, 2010).  We are called to make a 
vocation of instrumentalising our neurology in order to cultivate our ‘best’ and most 
autonomous selves within the free enterprise market of personalised consumption (Buchanan, 
2011a: 172-182; 2011b: 243-277).  This ‘double movement of autonomization and 
responsibilization’ has given over to the subject the freedom to pursue ends of their own 
devising, but – in exchange for this devolution of overt state control – subjects are urged to 
take on an ethos by which they consider themselves most fulfilled through upholding qualities 
that foster a ‘transactional reality’ of community living (Rose, 2000: 1400-1).  In other words, 
we must be so composed as to frame our intentions and actions in ways that align self-interest 
with collective betterment.  How this collective betterment is defined, though, is clearly a 
highly contested debate.  As the following will demonstrate, it appears that there is a 
particular model of the ideal socio-political subject privileged in hard transhumanist views.  
This subject is steeped in rational thought, and dedicated to a consequentialist view of 
wellbeing in an individualised society that values those acts of self-improvement which also 
contribute to collective prosperity.  This individualism is predicated upon an ethic of personal 
responsibility over an increasing gamut of ways we can manage our constitutions and 
mechanisms of our higher being, including through the possibility of neurological 
enhancement.  In response, some thinkers of a broadly conservative or classically humanist 
bent are concerned over what neuro-enhancement means for maintaining a supposed ‘natural 
wholeness’ (President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003: 287).  However, such naturalist appeals 
presuppose a clean delineation of the natural from the sociotechnical that new materialist and 
related critical perspectives would find deeply problematic (Connolly, 2002; Wilson, 2004; 
Braidotti, 2013; Coole and Frost, 2010).   
Furthermore, the often unacknowledged but mutually constitutive qualities of neoliberal 
frameworks with current understandings and practices of our biology have been aptly 
demonstrated in numerous sociological and geographical works (Rabinow, 1992; Harvey, 2000; 
Martin, 2000; Waldby, 2000, 2002; Cooper, 2008; Pitts-Taylor, 2010).  Melinda Cooper (2008), 
a sociologist specialising in biomedical economies, has been particularly insightful here in 
tracing the production of ‘life as surplus’, demonstrating that developments in recent decades 
in the life sciences and the accompanying biotech industry cannot be considered separate 
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from the ‘neoliberal revolution’ and its overarching models of the subject and their value-
bearing capacities.  Cooper further observes that the ‘biotech revolution’ of recent years has 
served ‘to relocate economic production at the genetic, microbial, and cellular level, so that 
life becomes, literally, annexed within capitalist processes of accumulation’ (2008: 19).  When 
combined with the neoliberalist ‘tendency to couple the idea of the self-organizing economy 
with the necessity for continual crisis’ – and then shipping the resolution of this crisis to norms 
of personal responsibility – the body thus becomes a site of perpetual accumulation (Cooper, 
2008: 43).  Such a propulsive mechanism is characterised by ‘delirium’ (Cooper, 2008: 20), for 
our future as both individual subjects and functioning collectives is thought to be predicated 
upon pushing the possibilities of our biology as a resource to be utilised, of constant 
regeneration to counter ever-escalating risk (Cooper, 2008: 49).  No longer do practices of 
mental hygiene instil within us an accord to moderation and temperance, but rather to living 
‘beyond the limits’, maximising ourselves with regard to whatever qualities are deemed 
valuable in a given context (Cooper, 2008: 20).  It is significant, suggests Cooper, that ‘these 
new ways of theorizing life are never far removed from a concern with new ways of mobilizing 
life as a technological resource’ (Cooper, 2008: 33). 
This translational drive to instrumentalise our biology is also addressed in Catherine Waldby’s 
(2000, 2002) tracing of ‘biovalue’, wherein our growing technical sophistication produces 
proliferating ways in which we may extract value-potentials from our material constitutions.  
This requires making the body ‘visible’ in evermore varied ways, a body to be ‘rendered as 
compendia of data, information archives which can be stored, retrieved, networked, copied, 
transferred and rewritten’, so that our bio-composition may ‘become permeable to other 
orders of information, and liable to all the forms of circulation, dispersal, accumulation and 
transmission’ (Waldby, 2000: 7).  The paradox of this, notes Waldby (2000), and as will become 
clear throughout this chapter, is that such projects espouse new ways of mapping our 
‘essential’ ontology while in turn disaggregating our being into discrete packets of data, 
bounded and laden with functional possibilities dictated by current overarching frameworks.  
These efforts generate ‘iconographic’ representations of the high-functioning human 
according to certain prevailing instrumental logics, which ‘open the human to multiple 
incursions, demonstrating the body's possibilities for commodification, for instrumentalisation, 
demonstrating also its use value within technically driven orders of rationality’ (Waldby, 2000: 
8).  In this way we may be made and remade in accordance with this shifting ‘iconic’ image.  In 
current emerging discourses around the neurosciences and their genuflection to neoliberal 
imperatives this iconographic evangelism is evident in the popular rhetoric of neuroplasticity, 
where the brain is considered to be ‘limitless’ and ‘flexible’, yet the ways in which we are 
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encouraged to harness this plasticity are constricted to narrow and already prevailing 
presumptions of how our ‘best’ selves may be realised (Malabou, 2008; Pitts-Taylor, 2010).  
We presume to already know what to do with our brains. 
When such urgings to self-manipulation are laden with normative assumptions we must 
consider the looping effects that may ensue in how we are enjoined to conduct ourselves as 
subjects.  In particular this chapter is concerned with two lines of emerging ethical injunctions 
regarding our brains.  The first is the notion that – due to the escalation of global risk within 
modernity – our moral capacities are in need of upgrading, lest we find ourselves ill-equipped 
to conduct ourselves as a species into an uncertain future.  However, this proposal for ‘moral 
enhancement’ smuggles in many disconcerting presuppositions that, if such a regime of 
enhancement were to be enacted, may actually prove self-defeating.  The second injunction I 
will discuss pertains to the rapid rise of the ‘brain training’ or ‘neurobics’ industry, wherein 
appeals to harnessing the potential of our ‘neuroplasticity’ are funnelled through narrow 
conceptions of the high-functioning brain that also happen to neatly align with contemporary 
ideals of the productive subject.  Though the direct efficacy of such products is highly 
questionable it cannot be ignored that these programs are often laden with ethical appeals 
regarding the ‘virtuous’ quality of diligent brain training, and thus may prove influential in our 
ongoing constitution as subjects.  Finally, the chapter will briefly turn to some alternative, 
more humbly expansive ways we might approach our relation to our brains.  Firstly, though, I 




Recalibrating the moral citizen 
 
Moral enhancement by way of neurological intervention, argues Thomas Douglas (2008), is 
significantly distinct from other avenues of biomedical enhancement, for while other 
interventions may benefit some to the relative harm of others moral enhancement will 
axiomatically be of benefit to society, on balance.  Such views are echoed by Allen Buchanan 
(2011b: 35), who believes that the ‘Personal Goods Assumption’ against enhancement –
whereby benefits accrue only to the person who enhances themselves, thus risking 
perpetuating already prevalent inequalities – represents a flawed take on the wider effects of 
self-improvement.  Rather, suggests Buchanan, given that enhancements are chosen by 
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individuals within parameters shaped by their social value – ie. individual choices are weighed 
within what the greater collective accords worth – then presumably the rational subject will 
align their choices with these valued properties, and so contribute to collective betterment.  
Perhaps we might consider this rationale to be that of the invisible hand of the market of 
virtue.  Other advocates raise the possibility of enhancing civic virtue and social cohesion 
through neurological interventions that foster liberal democratic principles and the recognition 
of an expanding circle of others as worthy of our care (Jefferson, Douglas, Kahane and 
Savulescu, 2014).  Though there are several objections that can be raised here already it would 
be worthwhile to first provide one proposed definition of moral enhancement: 
‘A person morally enhances herself if she alters herself in a way that may reasonably 
be expected to result in her having morally better future motives, taken in sum, than 
she would otherwise have had.’  
 
Douglas, 2008: 229 
 
Of course, ‘having morally better future motives’ than one might have had previously is a quite 
vague and somewhat circular framing.  Digging deeper into the proposed applications of moral 
enhancement, however, reveals that proponents have quite specific ideal subjects and motives 
in mind.  Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu (2008), for example, suggest that moral 
enhancement by ‘traditional’ and ‘cultural’ means has been far slower than development in 
our other capacities, resulting in a growing incongruence between the destructive potentials of 
the technologies we develop and our ethical fortitude to use them wisely.  These appeals to 
the imperative need to enhance our morality are ‘infused with futurity’, stretching the reach of 
governmentality into the management of possibilities and uncertainty at the level of the 
individual psyche (Abi-Rached and Rose, 2013: 13).  Within this precarious milieu some neuro-
advocates – looking to minimise risk without subverting the very principles they seek to defend 
– propose ‘not abandonment of the democracy, but enhancement of the morality of its voters’ 
(Persson and Savulescu, 2012: 90).  Yet this is clearly a question-begging proposal, for 
embedded within these aims are presuppositions of the ‘ideal’ citizen-subject, thereby 
smuggling in conceptions of the self that, while now contemporaneous in the Western world, 
are anomalous socio-historical constructions.  Robert Sparrow (2014a) has described such 
proposals of moral enhancement as unfounded acts of epistemic elitism, for ‘it presumes that 
those who embark upon it know what being more moral consists in’.  Under such a regime, 
assessments of ‘virtue’ may come under an epistemic privilege, with designated authorities 
urging us to accord ourselves to intensively-derived normative ideals by way of neurological 
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self-fashioning.  Therefore such claims – which come packaged in pragmatic rhetoric, yet in 
reality are weighty acts of epistemic colonisation – should be approached cautiously, lest we 
affix a model of the citizen-subject that may be difficult to later reconfigure, perhaps to our 
ongoing detriment.   
One outcome of this intensive gaze coupled with expansive scope is that neuroethics, as a 
scientific field of knowledge with translational appeal, can serve as a ‘strategic phenomenon’ 
deployed to act as ‘a pillar of support for edifices of extra-scientific origin’ (Vander Valk, 2012: 
9).  In this way knowledge claims filtered through hard experimental constructs may be used to 
justify the composition of a new socio-political subject.  Thomas Metzinger (2009), for 
instance, proposes drastic future overhauls to public policy based upon insight from the 
neurosciences, changes he argues can ensure principles of ‘neuronal liberty’ for all subjects.  
Needless to say this will place an enormous strain on our regulatory capacities if we choose to 
exert control over phenomenal states, as evident here in Metzinger’s (2009: 230) wide-ranging 
proposal:  
‘The key question is, which brain states should be legal? Which regions of 
phenomenal-state space (if any) should be declared off-limits? … we must decide 
which of these altered states can be integrated into our culture and which are to be 
avoided at all cost. In free societies, the goal should always be to maximize the 
autonomy of the citizenry. That being said, we should adopt a sober perspective on 
the problem. We should minimize the price we pay in terms of deaths, addiction, and 
the damage that might be done to our economy by, say, a marked loss of productivity.’  
Note the dual appeals to typical liberal democratic ideals, such as autonomy, with the 
neoliberal imperative to maintain sufficient levels of productivity.  This delicate balance of 
maximising autonomy while also minimising harm as we look to further instrumentalise our 
brains, we are told, requires a new ‘consciousness ethics’, whereby rather than delineating 
‘good action’ we must take step back in the transformational chain by determining ‘a good 
state of consciousness’ (Metzinger, 2009: 233).  Thus through a ‘normative 
neurophenomenology’ where ‘the task is to assess the ethical value of various kinds of 
subjective experience’ the subject will be disaggregated into their varying phenomenological 
states to be assessed by cool gazes (Metzinger, 2009: 233).   
Again, the notion that certain designated authorities might assess the ethical weight of a 
subjective state seems question-begging, but in any case Metzinger’s hope is that we may be 
able to map a ‘good state of consciousness’, then accordingly labour upon our ‘wetware’ to 
induce such a state, and so in theory create overall better citizens.  Such potential oversight of 
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permissible brain states entails a new shift in practices of self-examination through 
technologies of the self (Foucault, 1988: 46).  In practicing this new form of mental hygiene so 
that we may protect and uphold Metzinger’s ‘neuronal liberty’ we will be further compelled ‘to 
be money changers of our own representations of our thoughts, vigilantly testing them, 
verifying them, their metal, weight, effigy.’ (Foucault, 1988: 37).  We become ‘hermeneuts of 
ourselves’ (Foucault, 1988: 47), engaging in practices of interpreting and crafting our own 
neurological assembly.  This new layer of hyper-reflexive ‘biological citizenship’ (Rose and 
Novas, 2008) thereby threatens to become a burdensome addition to the ways and means in 
which we are ‘obliged to be free’ (Rose, 1999: 87).     
Still, there are some who espy great promise in the ‘revival of biological arguments in the 
interpretation of what makes us human’, for here in the inscribing of morality into our 
neurology may lie a true Cartesian ‘universal method’ and a new ‘intellectual authority’ for 
governing ourselves (Meloni, 2012: 26).  At times these hopes and claims verge on the 
fantastical, perhaps dangerously so: 
‘My hypothesis is that the prospect of moral principles “firmly grounded” in 
neurobiology … as well as the promise of bringing to light – via neuroscience – the 
building blocks of ethics and even politics, have gained attractive force today as they 
provide a vital solution to two profound intellectual needs of the post-1989 world.  On 
the one hand, neuroscience … has started to work as a substitute of the grand 
narratives discredited by the shortcomings of the twentieth century (Marxism, 
psychoanalysis, and also a certain Kantian rationalism in political and moral theory), 
filling the void they have left behind.  On the other hand … neuroscience’s project of 
bringing to light the natural, bare substrate of human faculties, no longer 
contaminated by cultural and linguistic differences and resistant to the pressures of 
society and political regimes, seems to offer solid ground, and a safe anchor against 
the return of many of the traumas of the twentieth century: neuroscience appears to 
promote a message of universal brotherhood (as we all share the same 
neurobiological structures of which all cultural differences are just superficial variants) 
and, with its emphasis on our natural, hardwired inclination to moral life and empathy, 
seems to provide a firmer basis for a newly possible ethics.’  
Meloni, 2012: 37 
 
These claims from social theorist Maurizio Meloni are deeply unsettling, and ironic in ways 
likely not intended.  Was not many of ‘the traumas of the twentieth century’ also predicated 
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on the belief of having finally arrived at an objective measure of the ideal composition of our 
species?  Should we place any trust in an intellectual authority that seeks to remove the 
‘contamination’ of cultural and linguistic differences in order to reveal the ‘natural, bare 
substrate’ of our species?  How would such an authority quarantine themselves from this 
supposed contamination, finding an Archimedean point by which to delineate the bounds of 
our humanity?  The previous chapter has already demonstrated that current aspirations 
towards a ‘universal ethics’ seem anything but universal, and instead are highly contingent and 
indeed socio-historically anomalous impositions.  Would we wish such tenuous frameworks to 
be our ‘safe anchor’ against the traumas of the past, pinning our hopes on this narrow 
brainhood to ‘promote a message of universal brotherhood’?  To frame the neurosciences as a 
‘foundational narrative … with normative force’ (Meloni, 2012: 37) would seem to commit the 
very forms of hubris and excessive faith in the life sciences that may well hasten the 
rationalised onset of the next mass atrocity we commit upon each another.   
This is the very kind of narrow epistemic colonisation that Emily Martin (2000) presciently 
warned against, expressing concern that the urge to map our sociality and subjectivity onto 
the brain would only serve to flatten these properties into a pale reflection of their actual 
complexity, but which would then become the determining reference point to by which we 
trace and measure these qualities into the future.  That is, a looping effect would kick in that 
further entrenches these flattened, hollow conceptions of self and sociality.  Moreover, 
Meloni’s above claim ‘of bringing to light the natural, bare substrate of human faculties, no 
longer contaminated by cultural and linguistic differences’ commits a form of ‘ontological 
apartheid’ that Elizabeth Wilson (2004: 68) urges us to reconsider, rejecting commonly held 
stances where the psy, the bio, the neuro, and the socio-cultural are presumed to ‘operate in 
disjunctive realms’.  Instead, Wilson (2004: 21-2) calls upon us to recognise the porous, co-
constitutive, and ‘obliging’ qualities of these entwined ontologies.  Kirmayer and Gold (2012: 
317) similarly warn against this one-way conflation into the brain, for  
‘The self is not an arrangement of synapses and the cultural world is not an aggregate 
of individuals’ cognitive or neural representations.  The brain cannot stand in for the 
person and the person cannot stand in for society or culture.’ 
Simply put, the brain is not the holding silo for self and society.  Notwithstanding such critiques 
from the social sciences and humanities, the hope remains amongst some hard transhumanists 
for a new and scientifically rigourous form of citizenship by way of illuminating our 
neurological scaffolding.  It is through understanding the molecular underpinnings of our 
agency that proponents aim to better govern towards an ‘ethopolitics’, a rationalised program 
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for instilling those ‘self-techniques by which humans should judge themselves and act upon 
themselves to make them better than they are’ (Rose, 2001: 18).  In time, suggests Vander 
Valk (2012: 260), such developments may provide us with the means to remake politics ‘as the 
deliberate cultivation of particular patterns of response across multiple levels of being, on 
several temporal scales, and both within and outside of individual human bodies’.  
Such hopes have already entered into the formal development of exploratory policy papers 
that aspire to implement neurological insight through various existing and speculative 
interventions upon the subject, seeking societally legitimate means of enhancing our capacities 
for optimisation, self-governance, and resilience (Broer and Pickersgill, 2015b).  The most 
ambitious of these policy documents invoke a translational drive that will allow us to ‘work 
with and not against the grain of human nature’ (Grist, 2009: 34).  Such proposals raise the 
possibility of cultivating a ‘neurological reflexivity’ so that we may truly realise Anthony 
Giddens’ ‘third way’ model of politics (Grist, 2009: 33-6), itself described by Rose (2000: 1397-
8) quite unfavourably as old ideas repackaged with a veneer of ‘therapeutic individualism’ and 
the endorsement of ‘active responsible citizenship’ (thus shifting once ‘social’ problems to 
problems of the ‘individual’).  Proposals of this kind, which combine our understanding of the 
brain with fashionable models of liberal democratic governance, demonstrate the wide and 
varying terrain that conceptions of the neurological subject can now traverse.  While, for the 
most part, these working policy papers are generally measured, cautious, and tentative in their 
proposals (see, for example, The Royal Society’s Brain Waves working policy papers), others 
breathlessly argue for the necessity to truly understand our brains so we may discern whether 
we are working with the ‘wrong model’ of ‘human agency’ (Grist, 2009: 5), thereby edging us 
closer to realising the ‘progressive possibilities of our social, pro-social and happy brains’ (64).  
We are supposedly obliged as citizens  
‘… to reflexively evolve the social institutions that protect against our myopic brains, 
and develop our pro-social brains fully.  For example, the problem of tackling climate 
change can really be seen as, writ large, the human endeavour of counteracting 
myopia through self-control and pro-social commitments.’  
Grist, 2009: 65  
This cultivation of the ‘pro-social brain’ is thought to be of aid in overcoming our ethical 
blinkers such that we may extend the sphere of those to whom we recognise a duty of care.  
This neurological reconfiguring of the bounds of ethical recognition and group membership is 
considered to be a ‘crucial socio-political challenge for our age’ (Keestra, 2012: 222).  For many 
proponents of this gaze upon the subject the increasing ability to pinpoint our neurological 
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shortcomings opens the prospect of overcoming and perhaps even repurposing them to new 
ends, all for our collective benefit in a time of escalating global inequality and risk.  
We should observe the magnitude of such claims, for under this proposed regime the 
neurological aetiologies of your various socio-political persuasions in themselves may now 
become a legitimate matter for surveillance, judgment, coercion, and intervention by 
designated authorities.  To reiterate a concern raised in the previous chapter this step back in 
the causal chain results in desired states now being contained in newly bounded material 
spaces, which in time may shift our conceptualisation of such qualities in ways difficult to 
predict, but may well diminish and narrow the scope of possibilities for generating new ways 
of considering ourselves as ethical beings.  Yet proponents of neuroscience-based moral 
enhancement often underpin their views by suggesting the imperative need to find solid 
grounding upon which to remake the citizen-subject, before our cognitive weaknesses damn 
us.  They suggest that we must dive further into our ontological makeup, digging down to the 
molecular level of our being, in order to best address problems of ever-increasing socio-
political magnitude.  It is on this question of the imperative need to know and corral our risky 
neurology that I will now turn to. 
 
 
Appeals to the imperative need for moral enhancement 
 
To reiterate, this epistemic colonisation achieved by importing qualities of self and wellbeing 
into the brain is often framed in broadly neoliberal terms: autonomy and freedom of choice 
must be preserved, productivity is closely correlated with overall wellbeing, and ultimately the 
market shall determine what attributes open to modification deliver social utility.  This line of 
translation is then paired with the actuarial view that – given the ever-increasing complexity 
and manufactured risk inherent in our societies – without a willingness to modify our 
capacities we may find ourselves ill-equipped for the future.  This sense of our impending 
‘unfitness’ and the consequent need for social engineering may even extend to the global 
socio-political dimension.  For example, note the not-too-subtle implication here from Oxford 
bioethicist Julian Savulescu on implementing eugenics-informed reproduction: 
‘There are reasons to think we will need some rules and some regulation, but much 
less than we have today in some parts of the world. You’re not allowed to test for 
things that are obviously beneficial, such as genetic dispositions for higher intelligence, 
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in most of Europe and Australia; whereas the Chinese have a billion-dollar project for 
these sorts of genes and will be using that information in their reproductive decisions.’  
Savulescu, in interview with TED, 2014 
Again, note the preference for personal autonomy against the regulatory hand of the state.  
Observe also the assumption that higher intelligence is ‘obviously beneficial’.  And finally, in 
observing that global superpower China are forging ahead on these projects note how 
Savulescu is implying that we may risk losing our relative international standing and global 
competitiveness if we persist in resisting calls to eugenically enhance our cognitive capital.  
The sense of the imperative stoked here is that we must be willing to reconfigure ourselves in 
order to protect our very way of life.  Such appeals and more are also present in arguments 
from Michael Gazzaniga (2006: 73-4): 
‘One could argue that evolutionary theory suggests that if we are smart enough to 
invent the technology to increase our brain capacity, we should be able to use it. It is 
the next step in the survival of the fittest. We all attempt to find a mate who is the 
smartest, richest, most attractive, and most engaging we can find—this is sexual 
selection at work. Yet no matter whom we end up with, we turn in the millions to 
products and services provided by the culture to enhance ourselves and our children. 
While some people’s avidness or narcissism in pursuing these activities can be 
annoying and offensive, the freedom to engage in them should ultimately be in the 
hands of the individual, not society.’  
Here we see appeals to: evolutionary imperatives; grossly unjustified assumptions that the 
invention of a technology entails our ability to countenance its wider ramifications; an 
equivalency drawn in the ways we already consume products to ‘enhance’ ourselves; and the 
unwavering subscription to preserving individual autonomy.  This is all despite the 
understanding that – even if we cannot agree on exactly what model of justice we should 
subscribe to – very few of us (I suspect) would be comfortable in framing neurological 
enhancement as ‘the next step in the survival of the fittest’.  Again, what is evident here are 
the strange dual appeals to essentialist ideals of our species, while also urging the imperative 
need to remake ourselves in light of flawed constitutions deemed not fit for modern life.   
It should be clear by now that some neuroethicists – and especially those within the field 
firmly advocating for ‘hard’ notions of ‘neuro-enhancement’ – appear to be anachronistically 
framing justifications within decidedly Western late capitalist parameters, while 
simultaneously proclaiming the need for a new ontological subject for the ‘approaching post-
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human era’ (Kahane, Savulescu and ter Meulen, 2011: i).  This growing chorus comprised of 
bioethicists, moral psychologists, and cognitive philosophers posit that some aspects of 
cognition – whilst perhaps beneficial in an evolutionary sense – are now clearly no longer 
conducive to maximising wellbeing in post-industrial societies, and thus should be opened to 
external scrutiny and modification.   
Perhaps most influential in this area has been Julian Savulescu, a forthright advocate for 
enhancing ourselves directly at the neurochemical level, along with endorsing other means of 
targeted transhumanism.24  With philosopher Ingmar Persson, Savulescu suggests that we are 
currently ‘unfit for the future’ (2012) and so have an obligation to enhance the moral character 
of the human species (Persson and Savulescu, 2008) by aspiring towards a ‘moral 
transhumanism’ (Persson and Savulescu, 2010).  Shortfalls in our capacities as ethical agents, 
argue Persson and Savulescu, make collective action towards reducing threats of mass 
catastrophe (with terrorism and climate change being their primary examples) all but 
impossible, and perhaps we simply do not have the necessary capabilities at the neurological 
level to resolve these issues.  Buchanan (2011b: 2, 78) similarly endorses like-minded 
imperatives of mitigating global risk, adding ageing and over-population to the list of problems 
requiring enhanced citizens, while Douglas (2008: 231) posits as a permissible use of moral 
enhancements the reduction of implicit aversions to certain racial/ethnic characteristics that 
may lead to undesirable anti-social behaviours.    These proponents argue that it ‘is crucial that 
we be aware of the moral limitations of our nature, and do whatever we can to correct these 
limitations, by traditional or new scientific means’ (Persson and Savulescu, 2012: 133).  This, 
essentially, is a proposal for ethics as an actuarial exercise informed by sociobiology.   
A number of justifications are given for this proposal.  One is that our ‘default’ moral settings – 
in those that pertain to our evolutionary lineages at least – were not adapted for the societies 
we live in and the collective problems we face.  Rather, argues Savulescu (2011), we remain 
precariously wedged as small group animals, competing with one another for resources as 
subjects neurologically tethered to our violent ancestors, of whom 40% died at the hands of 
another of our species.  We are also prone to temporal biases and other heuristic flaws that 
risk causing unnecessary harm (Persson and Savulescu, 2011: 27).   Moreover, the range of our 
altruism tends to be highly conditional, for our relative scope insensitivity entails that we are 
incapable of proportionately contemplating the suffering of many relative to the suffering of 
one (Persson and Savulescu, 2012: 30).  As a consequence, Persson and Savulescu argue, our 
                                                          
24 It is for his wide-ranging and unflinching ‘hard’ transhumanist claims that Julian Savulescu has been 
described by fellow philosopher John Harris (2011a: 110) as ‘one of the smartest people I know’ but 
‘also one of the most dangerous’. 
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current moral constitutions – when directed to address large scale collective problems unique 
to late modernity – often finds itself in a state of dissonance, paralysed to act, splintered by 
interests to which our currently evolved brains are not tailored. 
Parallel with these counter-productive evolutionary volitions is the exponentially greater harm 
we can cause thanks to technological developments, including the potential to cause Ultimate 
Harm: that which is incredibly destructive, irredeemable, catastrophic etc. (Persson and 
Savulescu, 2012: 46).  In emphatically ramming home this catastrophic possibility Persson and 
Savulescu (2012: 126) cite the astronomer Martin Rees (2003: 8), who estimates that there is a 
50% chance the human race will meet its end within the century, by our own hands.  The clear 
implication is that there is a fundamental mismatch, indeed ‘a horrifying trend that must be 
broken’, between the potentials of our technology and our capacities as an ethical species 
equipped to responsibly handle such catastrophic possibilities (Persson and Savulescu: 2012: 
126).  Therefore, it is proposed, we should look towards embracing a subject-citizen made by 
design (Powell and Buchanan, 2008).  In this time of late modernity harm is increasingly 
committed at a geographical and temporal distances, where tiny little transgressions (eg. 
producing more carbon emissions than we might need to) can cumulatively amount to 
potentially disastrous outcomes.  The subsequent implication, then, is that we are not 
‘psychologically set up’ to orient ourselves through the problems we have manufactured 
(Savulescu, 2011).  Rather, our ‘common sense morality’ is stuck in narrow, outdated modes of 
operation, and is in desperate need of upgrading (Persson and Savulescu, 2012: 122-3).    
Persson and Savulescu (2012: 103) posit that ‘it is necessary to widen the horizons of our 
moral consciousness’, for large-scale and fiendishly complex issues such as anthropogenic 
climate change, global inequality, and sensitive geopolitical relations will remain intractable 
under current circumstances.  We are thus framed as failed citizens, testing the bounds of our 
willingness to express due recognition and care for an expanding circle of others for whom it 
appears we currently lack the requisite empathy.   Our continuing existence may therefore 
require a program of society-wide moral enhancement, for ‘the ideology of human equality 
must exercise a stronger motivational influence and overcome the limitations of our altruism 
and sense of justice’ (Persson and Savulescu, 2012: 105).  Disconcertingly, it is even proposed 
that such a program may be enforced compulsorily by the state: 
‘If safe moral enhancements are ever developed, there are strong reasons to believe 
that their use should be obligatory, like education or fluoride in the water, since those 
who should take them are least likely to be inclined to use them. That is, safe, effective 
moral enhancement would be compulsory.’ 
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Persson and Savulescu, 2008: 174 
Yet coupled with such statements are still found appeals to the ideal of maximising personal 
autonomy, with moral enhancement presumed to provide greater capacities by which we can 
exercise our already existing desire to do good (Persson and Savulescu, 2012: 112-3).  Hence 
such methods of intervention upon the citizen-subject  
‘… does not restrict freedom; it rather extends it, by making the subject more capable 
of overcoming urges which counteract the doing of what is seen as morally good… 
when we influence the motivational states of people, this could be liberating rather 
than constraining’  
Persson and Savulescu, 2012: 114  
Here we return then to the supposed desirability of reconciling first order with higher order 
desires.  A purported freedom found in serving one’s better inclinations through the ‘rather 
modest extension’ of neuro-enhancement that consists in simply ‘motivating ourselves to do 
what we already believe to be right, of overcoming our moral weakness of will’ (Persson and 
Savulescu, 2012: 123).  With respect to Persson and Savulescu it should be acknowledged that 
the underlying concerns that motivate their equally fascinating and unnerving argument are 
not by any means unreasonable.  Their views are presented with an urgency that comes in 
considering the genuinely rapid and unpredictable proliferation of manufactured risk.  We are 
inescapably aware of global suffering, and of social, political, and environmental problems that 
may seem intractable, and yet such problems are often brought about through little 
cumulative failures of ethical agency that add up to calamities we cannot seem to alleviate.  
Perhaps, then, it is apparent that ‘the predicament of humankind is so serious that all possible 
ways out of it should be explored’ (Persson and Savulescu, 2012: 123).  But does mitigating this 
risk of ‘Ultimate Harm’ require reconfiguring ourselves as citizens at the neurological level?  As 
Hartmann (2011: 76) observes, such dictates ‘reduce rationality to instrumental rationality’, 
whereby we render ourselves as apparatuses within technocratic assemblies, modified to 
serve pre-determined ends, rather than communicative agents endowed with capacities to 
collectively shape those ends.  Needless to say, the looping effects of such regimes of self-





Cautionary responses  
 
Before continuing this exploration of calls for neuro-enhancement I would like to briefly 
interpolate here a particular vein of critical responses, for running counter to neuro-
enhancement interests are firm cautionary voices, ones that (ironically) often adopt positions 
inflected with their own essentialist ideals of humanity.  In this regard perhaps the most 
prominent and outspoken voice of resistance in recent years has been the President’s Council 
of Bioethics (PCoB), in operation during the Presidency of George W. Bush.  This conservative-
leaning group expressed great disquiet over many proposed biomedical enhancements, 
arguing that such prospects are driven by ‘hubris’ in failing to ‘show proper respect for what is 
naturally and dignifiedly human’ (PCoB, 2003: 286-7).  Such bioconservative stances have 
sought to defend ‘the naturally given’ and the dignity of ‘full human flourishing’ (PCoB, 2003: 
287), however loosely and contingently such properties may be delimited.  In any case, not to 
be forgotten is that this delimitation was almost certainly informed by conservative Christian 
principles throughout the PCoB’s existence under both Leon Kass and Edmund Pellegrino 
(though Kass’ tenure is the period we are primarily concerned with here). 
The PCoB (2003: 287) stridently warned against ‘any ill-considered attempt at “improvement”’, 
suggesting that interventions ‘beyond therapy’ may distract us from cultivating our ‘natural 
wholeness’, and instead induce an acute anomie resulting from ‘absent natural standards’ and 
arrogant aspirations of mastery.  One could certainly raise an eyebrow here regarding our 
supposed ‘natural wholeness’ and the corollary insistence that we can and should distinguish 
between ‘treatment’ and ‘enhancement’.  Such essentialist and retrograde appeals are often 
vague in their argumentation, and may consciously or otherwise serve as obscuring 
smokescreens for ideological appeals towards preserving an alternate idealised subject that is 
equally anomalous, contingent, and rigid as that proposed by the transhumanists they so 
vehemently oppose.  However, it is understandable that some conservative responses are 
beholden to forms of hard-won classical humanism, and although cracks and fissures may be 
showing in this model of the subject it is (maybe) still worth defending against (some) ill-
considered alternatives.  Such stances may serve as a bulwark against rapid societal change 
and those forces of rationalisation which threaten to render us ‘less’ than human, or remove a 
sense of authorship from our own lives (Kass, 2002; Fukuyama, 2002; Habermas, 2003; Sandel, 
2007).  Francis Fukuyama (2004) – who was also a member of the PCoB – has been one of the 
most outspoken in defending this notion of the modern subject as the product of the long 
struggle of humanist ideals: 
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‘The first victim of transhumanism might be equality. The U.S. Declaration of 
Independence says that "all men are created equal," and the most serious political 
fights in the history of the United States have been over who qualifies as fully human… 
Underlying this idea of the equality of rights is the belief that we all possess a human 
essence that dwarfs manifest differences in skin color, beauty, and even intelligence. 
This essence, and the view that individuals therefore have inherent value, is at the 
heart of political liberalism. But modifying that essence is the core of the 
transhumanist project. If we start transforming ourselves into something superior, 
what rights will these enhanced creatures claim, and what rights will they possess 
when compared to those left behind? If some move ahead, can anyone afford not to 
follow?’ 
Like many other bioconservative approaches it is not exactly clear what Fukuyama means by a 
‘human essence’ supposedly under threat, and given what follows in this passage we can 
surmise that this supposed holistic ‘essence’ actually pertains to defending a very particular 
socio-historical construction.  Let me reiterate that this is not to denigrate views that seek to 
defend our current socio-political models and institutions against radical change.  Such 
perspectives are generally whole-hearted and sincere, but when they are argued for through 
essentialist frameworks there is a risk of stultifying the productively malleable historical 
ontology of ourselves, all in the very same way such advocates fear it may be done by others.  
So, while we might admire the earnestness of such arguments that seek to protect broadly 
humanist principles we should be wary of doing so by conflating such principles with our 
‘essential’ qualities.  
Still, Fukuyama (2004) fears that the ability to enhance ourselves through targeted 
interventions will perpetuate already existing inequalities, and so what was won ‘slowly and 
painfully’ may be undone in one fell swoop of industry where our ‘Promethean desires’ allow 
over-zealous transhumanists ‘to deface humanity with their genetic bulldozers and 
psychotropic shopping malls’.  Some enhancement advocates took offence from this 
overwrought broadside against hard transhumanism, among them risk philosopher Nick 
Bostrom (2004), who responded to Fukuyama’s appeal to protecting our ‘human essence’ by 
noting that given recent developments in ethnology and evolutionary biology ‘a thick concept 
of human essence has arguably become an anachronism’.  Bostrom also posited that a 
potential growing inequality of intellectual capacity need not necessarily result in a parallel 
inequality with regard to rights, if anything, our acuity to these issues could be greatly 
improved through neuro-enhancement of our morality, thus protecting such principles all the 
better.   
108 
 
An approach similar to Fukuyama’s can be found in Michael Sandel’s The Case Against 
Perfection (2007), in which Sandel calls upon us to recognise the forthcoming onslaught of 
biotechnological innovation and the accompanying ethical necessity to thoroughly interrogate 
the means and ends of these developments: 
‘… we need to confront questions largely lost from view in the modern world – 
questions about the moral status of nature, and about the proper stance of human 
beings toward the given world. Since these questions verge on theology, modern 
philosophers and political theorists tend to shrink from them. But our new powers of 
biotechnology make them unavoidable.’  
Sandel, 2007: 9  
It should be noted that Sandel was also part of the conservative-leaning PCoB, and that the 
Council’s arguments on our ‘naturally given’ qualities are similarly found in Sandel’s own work.  
Sandel’s (2007: 26) views amount to an updated version of the Council’s stance, urging us to 
recognise the ‘giftedness’ of our capacities, and not to presume to know our best ends through 
a Promethean ‘hyper-agency’ that aspires to ‘mastery’.  As such Sandel is exceedingly wary of 
current calls for biological enhancement, taking Julian Savulescu head on with regard to the 
question of whether we are ethically obliged to ‘enhance’ our children: 
‘According to Savulescu, parents not only have a duty to promote their children’s 
health; they are also “morally obliged to genetically modify their children.”  Parents 
should use technology to manipulate their children’s “memory, temperament, 
patience, empathy, sense of humor, optimism,” and other characteristics in order to 
give them “the best opportunity of the best life.”  But it is a mistake to think of health 
in wholly instrumental terms, as a way of maximizing something else. Good health, like 
good character, is a constitutive element of human flourishing. Although more health 
is better than less, at least within a certain range, it is not the kind of good that can be 
maximized.  No one aspires to be a virtuoso at health (except, perhaps, a 
hypochondriac).  During the 1920s, eugenicists held health contests at state fairs and 
awarded prizes to the “fittest families.”  But this bizarre practice illustrates the folly of 
conceiving health in instrumental terms, or as a good to be maximized. Unlike the 
talents and traits that bring success in a competitive society, health is a bounded good; 
parents can seek it for their children without risk of being drawn into an ever-
escalating arms race.’   
Sandel, 2007: 48-9 
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Here, in its starkest form, is the distinction between those who, like Sandel, wish to maintain a 
distinction between ‘treatment’ and ‘enhancement’ and to defend a broadly classical humanist 
view of the subject, against those, like Savulescu, who wish to reconceptualise ‘health’ in 
terms of functions to be maximised within an equally contingent neoliberal subject.  However, 
Sandel’s guilt-by-association argument in likening Savulescu’s proposals with ‘bizarre’ state 
fair-promoted eugenics is not especially convincing, and popular momentum is certainly with 
the pro-enhancement camp.  As will be discussed further below assessments of one’s ‘fitness’ 
are emerging in new ways through the growth of self-improvement industries – such as ‘brain 
training’ or ‘neurobics’ – where seemingly precise measures are given of one’s value-bearing 
cognitive capacities.  The neuro and biological subject is increasingly framed today in terms of 
malleable aptitudes of productivity, rather than neatly bounded states of health or illness 
(Lupton, 2016).  As a consequence, Sandel finds himself defending a position perhaps already 
lost and unlikely to ever be reclaimed, for ‘health’ has now become an abundantly 
‘accommodating rhetoric’ that can incorporate conceptions of the ‘good life’ into its 
epistemological terrain, charged with appeals to perpetual maximisation (Thornton, 2011b: 
66).  The insistence on defending some supposed ‘natural’, ‘given’, or ‘gifted’ quality of the 
subject through attempts to distinguish between ‘treatment’ and ‘enhancement’ appears 
increasingly arbitrary, and thinly obscures underlying ideological stances.   That said, while 
Savulescu may urge us to conceive of health as ‘instrumentally valuable’ we should be 
exceedingly wary of what ends such transhumanists consider of value, for these assessments 
risk exacerbating rigid ways of framing the ideal subject. 
 
 
A duty to neuro-enhance? 
 
For now, it appears that constructs of the ‘ideal’ citizen envisioned by pro-enhancement 
advocates are relatively fixed in current contingencies, even when the underlying justifications 
for such proposals are frequently conflicting.  Michael Gazzaniga, for example, adopts a form 
of parity argument (ie. that this is only a continuation of practices already undertaken) in 
defending the ethical legitimacy and relative safety of neuro-enhancement.  Here, for example, 
Gazzaniga (2006: 81) looks to placate concerns regarding the outcomes of enhancing intellect 
on a wide scale: 
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‘Backstopping many of the ethical concerns about unleashing millions of really smart 
people on the world is the fact that millions of really smart people are already here… 
Increasing the pool size of smart people won’t change or challenge our values.’ 
This is both naïve and blithely dismissive, for what would be the point of enacting large-scale 
programs to increase our collective intelligence if not to effect some kind of change in our 
values, even if only to better realise already prevailing norms?  The mere positing of 
‘intelligence’ as a capacity we should direct our efforts towards enhancing is a value statement 
in itself, for it presumes that we will better achieve our ‘essential’ humanity by enhancing our 
higher, rational capacities.  Despite their shared advocacy for neuro-enhancement, Gazzaniga’s 
assuaging parity arguments contrast dramatically with the views of other aforementioned 
transhumanists, who contend that we must embrace enhancement in order to be ‘fit’ to face 
the challenges of the future.  That is, contra Gazzaniga, these proponents are hoping that the 
shifting of our values is exactly what neuro-enhancement will achieve (but only in certain pre-
set ways they have already determined to be ideal).   
Hence whatever it is we mean by ‘values’ is precisely what is at stake here, and such debates 
are now gradually being imported into the brain terrain.  This makes manifest a strange form 
of neuro-essentialist, instrumental logic, whereby we must decide what aspects of our 
‘humanity’ to embrace and cultivate at the neuronal level (Racine and Costa-von Aesch, 2011).  
Here, for instance, is Thomas Metzinger (2009: 213) demonstrating this parsing of all that 
constitutes ‘humanity’ through the brain: 
‘How are we to live with this brain? Which states of consciousness are beneficial, and 
which are harmful to us? How will we integrate this new awareness into our culture 
and our society? What are the likely consequences of a clash of anthropologies—of the 
increasing competition between the old and the new images of humanity?’  
Such a framing of humanity entails that in time we may disaggregate the self into neurological 
functions and causations that are deemed either ‘operational’ or ‘defective’ in any given 
context of citizenship.  This may confer a new form of somatic ethic upon the individual, with 
many theorists noting the ironic constructions of ever greater responsibilities apportioned to 
the subject to accord themselves to societally-desired values, yet are achieved through 
increasingly minute and targeted forms of surveillance and intervention upon our selves (Rose, 
1992; Malabou, 2010; Pitts-Taylor, 2010; Ortega, 2011; Thornton, 2011b).  We are informed 
that we must labour upon ourselves ever more intensively in order to expand our capacities as 
ethical agents.  We are also informed that we are plastic, malleable entities, laden with 
potential, adaptable, but of course always beholden to and inextricably entangled with the 
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material.  As such we are expected to labour further down this transformational chain of 
being, pre-emptively cultivating dispositions and phenomenological states according to 
prevailing norms, and so enacting yet another means typical of modernity by which we labour 
to ‘articulate and decompose bodies that are already dismembered.’ (Kittler, 1990: 215, cited 
in Pruchnic, 2008: 167).  We are breaking up into smaller, more discrete packets of data that 
which was already contingent and lacking in substance in its ‘whole’ form.   
Such an array of considerations are emerging concurrently with extensions of self and agency 
via emerging technologies, resulting in a hybrid ontology of virtual extension and molecular 
intension (Pruchnic, 2008: 168-9).  This, for Jeff Pruchnic (2008: 169), generates not necessarily 
alienation, but certainly an ‘internal alterity’ of a subject now expected to diligently trace these 
lines of ontology as they are translated from one substance to another.  Our neurology has 
thus become ‘persuadable’, and so it may prove to be seen a virtue to practice brain-
persuasion on oneself (Pruchnic, 2008: 194).  All that we supposedly need then, say the hard 
materialists of neuroethics, is sufficient knowledge of this malleable, persuadable substance 
inside the skull and this ‘descriptive knowledge of the brain will inform us on what we should 
do’ (Schleim, 2014: 3).  Then it will simply be a case of enjoining the dutiful citizen to take up a 
vocation of ‘neuroasceticism’, an ethic of self-care towards developing techniques to best 
corral our brains to our chosen ends (Ortega, 2011).  Such practices are timely, say Persson and 
Savulescu (2012: 2), for in this age of escalating risk ‘It is desirable that only beings who are 
morally enlightened, and adequately informed about the relevant facts, should be entrusted 
with such formidable technological powers as we now possess’.  We must be kinder and wiser, 
according to a standard they presume to know.  But does whatever we mean by ‘autonomy’ 
and ‘morality’ retain its appeal and coherence if it is ‘enacted only at the price of relying upon 
experts of the soul’ (Rose, 1996: 17)?   
Altogether this amounts to an ethic of purposefully – but also subversively, for interventions 
are directed at the neurological level – modifying ourselves in ways adhering to overarching 
dictates that we presume to be universal and unimpeachable.  Tangled up in this process are 
‘recurrent histories’ (Canguilhem, 1988), ‘situated knowledges’ (Haraway, 1988), and 
‘immutable mobiles’ (Latour, 1986) of authority through which we gaze upon the self in order 
for designated mechanisms to determine how we may best conduct ourselves.  In this way 
multiple temporalities are put to work in justifying an enhancement regime: our primitive 
ancestors were violent, small-minded, fiercely communal creatures beyond reason, while our 
Enlightenment and Age of Reason forebears valued rule of law, secularism, individual rights, 
and responsible autonomy.  In navigating between these duelling legacies of our animalist and 
rationalist bio-psycho-social constitution, the future presents itself as an array of risks to be 
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mapped and managed, perhaps only traversable by way of reconfiguring our neurological 
makeup.  All these temporalities and their contextual baggage arrive at once in considering 
subjectivity and citizenship today.  But if governing of the neoliberal subject is ‘to act upon 
action’ (Rose, 1999: 3) in ways that do not constrain agency and ‘freedom’ but rather governs 
through such aspirations by aligning individual volitions with societal imperatives (1999: 62, 
69; 1996: 155), then how will the citizen-subject be formed in a time where an ethos of self-
governance makes a virtue of hyper-reflexivity, urging subjects to labour upon the molecular 
mechanisms of their ‘freedom’? 
In such a complex entanglement it seems that current rationales for enhancement are too 
closely tied to rigidly affixed frameworks, precluding the possibility that we may not actually 
know our ‘best’ ends.  Further to this is the disquieting irony that, in attempting to maximise 
the upholding of espoused broadly liberal democratic principles, we would take action that 
subverts those very same principles by potentially intervening upon ourselves through a 
governmentality of ‘moral perfectionism’ (Sparrow, 2014a).  Those of us wary of the hard 
transhumanist program may thus inadvertently find ourselves wedged in defending a more 
traditional form of humanism that has arguably become banal and equally rigid beyond worth, 
for it is stuck with notions of our ‘essential’ and ‘inalienable’ qualities that obtain less and less 
in our ‘nomadic’ and ‘hybrid’ ontologies, but require more and more upkeep to uphold 
(Braidotti, 2013: 16-26).  Enhancement advocates Persson and Savulescu, to their partial 
credit, do not entirely duck this consideration of whether we should offload certain cherished 
liberal democratic principles in order to better realise our capacities, and indeed rather 
chillingly suggest that in tandem with moral enhancement by neurological means we must also 
be willing to sacrifice some weighty ideological loyalties: 
‘We believe that in order to come to grips with the risk of terrorist attacks with 
weapons of mass destruction liberal democracies will have to become less liberal, by 
intensifying the surveillance of their citizens and, thus, curtailing their right to privacy.’  
(Persson and Savlescu, 2012: 1, see also 124-5) 
Yet this curtailing of personal freedoms is presumed to occur simultaneously with a society-
wide regime of ‘moral enhancement’.  Does this compromise not generate a discomfiting 
irony, for as we are morally ‘enhanced’ we must acquiesce privileges that our former and 
supposedly morally lesser selves were granted?  This is a strange position, one pithily likened 
to ‘Hobbes with a technological determinist twist’ (Sparrow, 2014b).  A frightening, dystopian-
baiting regime is on offer here, one that has little faith in our current socio-political institutions 
and their actors to deal with current global issues, but does have faith in the equally ambitious 
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task of implementing society-wide moral enhancement.  Indeed, it is difficult to envision how a 
widespread regime of moral modification at the neurological level does not risk becoming co-
opted by the very same inequalities, elite interests, or narrow and flawed perspectives it seeks 
to negate.   
Though I do not wish to belabour the point what is also odd about this neuro-governmentality 
is how much baggage it carries from prevailing normative ethical thought.  All too often what 
we are being presented with is not the possibility of reconfigurations that allow for extensions 
of the self in ways not previously envisaged, but rather the invocation of imperatives that 
serve to constrain the citizen-subject in set paths; ‘enhanced’ towards a narrow universalism 
that fails to recognise its narrow contingency.  John Harris (2011a: 104) similarly observes a 
‘fundamental problem’ in current debates around moral enhancement in that ‘the sorts of 
traits or dispositions that seem to lead to wickedness or immorality are also the very same 
ones required not only for virtue but for any sort of moral life at all’.  We therefore risk 
hollowing out whatever it is we mean by ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ through strategies that 
advocate a crude and restrictive circumscribing of the thinking and feeling subject: 
‘These strategies propose operating directly on the mainsprings of action, on emotions 
or other dispositions, and in particular they operate by cutting out or bypassing what 
they perceive as a dangerously paralyzing or dilatory process that might somehow get 
between an impulse and the moral action it impels. This sometimes, but not 
necessarily, dilatory process is thought or reﬂection.’   
Harris, 2011b: 2 
Thus we may find ourselves practicing an ethic of hyper-reflexivity that blazes straight past the 
reflective subject in itself.  This ‘bypassing’ of that which may be seen as inefficiently ‘dilatory’ 
can be likened to the earlier delineation between higher order and first order volitions, 
whereby some proponents of moral enhancement hope that our impulsive wants might be 
corralled and aligned with our more thoughtful and considered inclinations, thus producing a 
citizen imbued with volitions that default to realising the ‘good’.  The result is that whatever 
we mean by morality risks becoming fixed and rigid, subverting and foreclosing variabilities we 
may not yet fully understand.   
Coupled with calls to enhance our morality are related appeals to enhance our executive 
cognitive capacities, often under the rationale that subjects cannot perform their duties as 
citizens of liberal-democratic societies if they lack the requisite intellectual capacities.  For 
instance, Savulescu (2010: 4) cites research from the US Department of Education suggesting 
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that a significant proportion of the population ‘are below the literacy level required for 
‘competing successfully in a global economy and exercising fully the rights and responsibilities 
of citizenship’.  Furthermore, citing DARPA’s claim that even minor cognitive enhancement on 
a large scale could ‘have an impact on the world economy rivalling that of the internet’, we are 
enjoined to embrace a program of society-wide neuro-enhancement so that we may better 
accord ourselves to the complexity and possibility of modern living, and thereby collectively 
raise overall quality of life (Savulescu, 2010: 4).  Such views echo and extend a prevailing ethos 
of modern liberalism, in which citizens ‘must come to recognize and act upon themselves as 
both free and responsible, both beings of liberty and members of society, if liberal government 
is to be possible’ (Rose, 1999: 68).  Envisioned here is a subject who will duly accord 
themselves to overarching logics of governmentality with a sense of hope and enterprise, 
finding self-actualisation through the articulation and comportment of their minds and bodies 
within the parameters of value-producing ends: 
‘It was not a question here of active involvement in public affairs, in local democracy, 
in the conduct of politics.  Rather, the model of the active citizen was one who was an 
entrepreneur of him- or herself.  This was not simply a re-activation of values of self-
reliance, autonomy and independence as the underpinning of self-respect, self-
esteem, self-worth and self-advancement.  It is rather that the individual was to 
conduct his or her life, and that of his or her family, as a kind of enterprise, seeking to 
enhance and capitalize on existence itself through calculated acts and investments.’  
Rose, 1999: 164 
This ideal citizen is fitted to participate within the pre-given scripts and mechanisms by which 
society perpetuates itself.  Such an enterprising subject will ‘seek to maximize its own human 
capital, project itself a future, and seek to shape itself in order to become what it wishes to be’ 
(Rose, 1996: 154).  Guided in part by neuro-expertise, the ideal enterprising subject today not 
only observes rules and prescriptions, but contributes to their perpetuation by labouring upon 
those cognitive properties they believe to be conducive to maximising emancipation from their 
own perceived inadequacies.   
One might suggest that interventions that enable persons to better function within the 
complex rationalised and bureaucratic mechanisms of late modernity are not at all 
unreasonable.  But what if the ‘duty’ to neurologically enhance ourselves were to extend 
beyond those spaces in which we conduct ourselves as public citizens?  Julian Savulescu and 
Anders Sandberg (2008), for example, propose that we consider the prospect of the neuro-
enhancement of ‘love and marriage’.  The rationale for this call – similar to the 
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aforementioned broader call to enhance our morality as citizens – is that rapid socio-cultural 
shifts have resulted in gaps between the complexity of social life and the cognitive tools we 
can use to parse this space.  As a result ‘trends in divorce, as well as findings in evolutionary 
psychology, suggest that love might need a helping hand’ (Savulescu and Sandberg, 2008: 31).  
Thanks in part to our longevity our relationships are ‘on borrowed time’, for ‘our biology 
wasn’t constructed to keep people together for that long’ (Savulescu, in interview with Storr, 
2013).  Justifications for neurochemical intervention into ‘love’ often look to the example of 
the humble vole: 
‘There is intriguing overlap between the brain areas involved in vole pair bonding and 
those associated with human love.  Dopamine-related reward regions of the human 
brain are active in mothers viewing images of their child.  Similar activation patterns 
are seen in people looking at photographs of their lovers.’  
Young, 2009 
Note the numerous implicit translations emerging in just this brief passage.  Collated together 
are measures of wellbeing, the pair bonding of voles, maternal love, and marital love, all 
imported and converted into the common currency of the neurochemical.  Love and the 
institution of marriage thus threatens to come under the gaze of this ‘normative facticity’ of 
neurology (Hartmann, 2011: 75), rendering as an act of matrimonial duty – or indeed an 
obligation towards whatever we mean by love itself – the acquiescence to neurochemical 
intervention.  We shall remake ourselves in the image of the faithful vole.  Strangely, Savulescu 
and Sandberg (2008: 38) even invoke a deontological skew in suggesting a ‘duty to love’, 
questioning Kant’s famous rejection of this idea: 
‘Love is a matter of feeling, not of willing, and I cannot love because I will to, still less 
because I ought to (I cannot be constrained to love); so a duty to love is an absurdity.’ 
Kant, 1797: 161 
But, submit Savulescu and Sandberg, in this forthcoming age of moral enhancement one can 
potentially repurpose the self and engineer such feeling via neurochemical means, or at least 
‘… we can make love more probable by manipulating its biological determinants, in the 
same way as setting the lighting to a romantic level. If there is a duty to be faithful to 
one’s partner, or a duty to do the best for one’s children (and so remain in a stable 




Savulescu and Sandberg, 2008: 38    
Suffice to say that ‘setting the lighting to a romantic level’ is an oddly drawn equivalency that 
we might wish to question.  Savulescu and Sandberg ‘s (2008: 35-7) proposed ‘love’ 
enhancements that they deem of parity to amorous light-dimming include the use of 
pheromones, testosterone, along with oxytocin and vasopressin for ‘pair bonding’, and even 
enactogens like MDMA.  They suggest that potential fears of diminishing widely-held ideals are 
unfounded, rather Sandberg (in interview with Storr, 2013) seeks to assuage our potential 
misgivings by stating that ‘it might be that the systems underpinning the pair's bond are giving 
up for completely biological reasons. Nothing to do with you or your partner’.  In response, we 
might ask if the strengthening of our treasured ‘pair bonds’ via neurochemical means would 
not feel hollow and inauthentic somewhere in the recesses of our psyche, for – given that our 
prior falling out of love had ‘nothing to do with you or your partner’ – what credit, comfort, 
and delight could we then take for our better, stronger, love generated by neurochemical self-
subversion?  What looping effects might this potential dissonance generate?  Through such 
modelling of ‘love’, whatever we mean by this elusive ideal may find itself disaggregated into 
parts that are perhaps less than its sum.   
It is strange to consider that we may be normatively expected to cultivate our dispositions at 
the molecular level, so that we may dutifully uphold our ‘happiness scripts’ (Ahmed, 2010: 59).  
But might such acts of literally ingesting or injecting one’s propensity to marital fidelity 
displace the ‘virtue’ of marriage to the substance itself, while further entrenching the 
purported wider societal benefit of the good old nuclear family?  Moreover, through 
injunctions to neurochemical intervention the ‘family unit’ may once again be reconfigured as 
one of the societal surfaces of emergence: the spaces and collectives within which normative 
frameworks classify and arrange subjects in daily life, and through which rationalise 
permissible interventions upon them (Foucault, 1972: 41).  In this way ‘neuro-enhancement’ 
may become laden with normative expectations so overdetermined as to be hollow 
caricatures of virtue.  In a future society of widespread neuro-enhancement we are at risk of 
chemically bludgeoning each other into preformed categories, rather than exploring new 
socio-political possibilities afforded in exploring our psychosomatic complexity.  Rather than 
going down the obvious well-trodden path in critiquing the rise of psychopharmaceuticals, 
however, I would like to turn to an emerging industry, one seemingly less invasive, but often 
accompanied by ethical injunctions that may prove similarly formative in shaping our relation 





Neurobics as technologies and techniques of the self 
 
So far in this chapter I have discussed how hard transhumanists have proposed we embrace a 
‘culture of enhancement’, in part for reasons of both virtuous personal endeavour and 
collective benefit (Sandberg and Savulescu, 2011: 106).  Such a culture is to be variously 
enacted and perpetuated through: an ethos of ‘healthism’ over an expanding terrain of the self 
(Crawford, 1980); personal ‘responsibilization’ combined with the ‘marketization’ of life (Rose, 
2007: 4) that encourages a very particular form of ‘reflexive hermeneutics’ (Rose, 1996: 32, 
77); the spread of technosomatic instrumental rationality (Hartmann, 2011: 71; Pickersgill, 
2011: 449); the ‘valorization of self-control’ (O’Connor & Joffe, 2015: 727) and ‘neuroascesis’ 
(Ortega, 2011); and altogether propelled by the promissory, evocative rhetoric embedded in 
the touting of new, scientific means of ‘objective self-fashioning’ (Dumit, 2004).  A 
contemporary, everyday example of this heady confluence can be found in the rapid 
emergence of the ‘brain training’ or ‘neurobics’ industry, which, despite its increasing 
popularity, has largely escaped the critical gaze of the social sciences, with some notable 
exceptions (see Brenninkmeijer, 2010; Ortega, 2011; Pitts-Taylor, 2010; Thornton, 2011b; 
O’Connor and Joffe, 2015, Pickersgill, Martin, and Cunningham-Burley, 2015).   
Brain training, as it is currently conceived, operates under the presumption that through 
carefully designed and cognitively-demanding activities – usually packaged as small gaming 
tasks – a person may improve their cognitive abilities in ways that generalise beyond the 
iterative and highly scripted bounds of the ‘training’ undergone (see Hardy, Farzin and Scanlon, 
2013).  Since its emergence proponents of neurobics have vigourously sought to ground the 
industry in scientific rigour – though the actual efficacy of brain training still remains hotly 
contested – while also appealing to desires for maximising our intellectual capabilities and our 
fear of cognitive decline.  Neurobics is therefore of particular interest here, given that current 
debate over its efficacy entails that the ‘looping effects’ of these habits – ie. how neurobics 
reflexively shapes the way we think of ourselves – may prove far more influential in 
reconfiguring the subject than the actual intended therapeutic and enhancement effects.  
Neurobics is also curious for being wrapped in the pleasures of consumption and leisure, a 
rejection of the ascetic virtue of old in favour of the co-production of both fun and self-
improvement.  The lively and promissory rhetoric of neurobics marketing urges consumers to 
see potential in their malleable brainhood, and the accompanying possibilities of self-
fashioning through neuroplasticity.  In this way ‘sculpting the brain’ may become ‘a form of 
moral practice’ (Thiele, 2012: 119), with evolutionary analogies combined with neoliberal 
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imperatives likewise advising that we should hone a ‘synaptic survival’ ethic in order to 
adequately adapt to modern life (124).  Popular outputs touting our neuroplasticity inform us 
that  
‘… moment by moment we choose and sculpt how our ever-changing minds will work, 
we choose who we will be the next moment in a very real sense, and these choices are 
left embossed in physical form on our material selves.’  
Merzenich and deCharms, 1996: 77, cited in Thiele, 2012: 127   
This ethos of brain optimisation has gained (some) traction amongst lay subjects, with the 
effort to train one’s brain viewed a ‘virtuous, admirable objective’, while those ‘who flouted 
this norm sometimes attracted disapproval’ (O’Connor and Joffe, 2015: 17).  However, we 
should be careful not to overstate the current influence of ‘brain training’ for, as observed by 
Pickersgill, Cunningham-Burley, and Martin (2011), neuroscientific discourses are not yet 
totalising the subject’s conduct as they accord themselves to the demands of the social world 
in everyday life, rather, the neuro constitutes only one part of our practices as ‘bricoleurs’ of 
various logics and normative regimes.  That said, the authors also note in a later paper that the 
reflexivity of lay subjects shown towards brain training is remarkably varied, and will likely 
inform ongoing socio-cultural framings of how we might position ourselves in relation to our 
brains (Pickersgill, Martin and Cunningham-Burley, 2015). 
These qualifications aside, what I would like to suggest here is that – through the promise of 
enhancing oneself by means of ‘brain training’ – the terrain of the neurological becomes a new 
site of an ‘accumulation strategy’, a new space through which capital may circulate (Harvey, 
2000).  The subject – embarking upon a project of ‘accretive’ life building (Berlant, 2011: 98) – 
willingly presents themselves for assessment before the ‘calculated technology of subjection’, 
and so becomes ensconced ‘in that circulation process as consumer and reproducer of self’ 
(Harvey, 2000: 110).  Altogether this is a perfect assemblage of all those volitions that sustain 
and perpetuate late capitalism, of subjects having fun while also improving their value-bearing 
capacities, and moreover paying for the privilege.  The mind and body are always an ongoing 
project to be worked on by the individual, another site for the production of ‘biovalue’ 
(Waldby, 2000, 2002) and ‘life as surplus’ (Cooper, 2008).   But such ledgers are always shifting; 
what constitutes cognitive surplus at any point in time is of course contingent upon socio-
geographical context (Harvey, 2000: 98).  In this way assessments of our value-bearing 
capacities are now working their way into our neuronal wetware, even if the scientific rigour 
behind such assessments matters less than its looping effects and ‘normative facticity’ 
(Hartmann, 2011: 75).  In this way we position ourselves in relation to our own brains as a 
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resource to be maximally cultivated and then extracted for its ‘mental capital’ (Slaby and 
Gallagher 2015; Pitts-Taylor, 2010; Thornton, 2011b).   
This neurological self-fashioning occurs through technologies and techniques of the self ‘by 
which a human being turns him- or herself into a subject’, labouring within given prescriptions 
and affordances ‘so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, 
purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality’ (Foucault, 1988: 18).  This labouring upon the self 
has increasingly taken on qualities of a prudential, anticipatory ethos, sustaining a ‘political 
economy of hope’ (Rose and Novas, 2008: 442, see also Pickersgill, 2013b: 328).  Idealised 
biological citizens will speak of themselves in frames that disaggregate and apportion 
propensities and measures of ‘wellbeing’ and ‘happiness’ to the (dys-)function of biological 
mechanisms, an approach to self-fashioning informed and shaped by rhetorical channels of 
designated expert gazes (Rose and Novas, 2008: 445-6).  To live well, then, is determined by 
one’s willingness to heed such dictates of personal responsibility and self-governance, and to 
diligently apply them, even if that means one has ‘to take up Sudoku and mind gyms in the 
belief that if they act this way, they may be saved’ from neurodegenerative disease and 
decline (Rose, 2013: 7).  The ‘soul’, which is today resubstantialised as the ‘brain’, must be 
rendered visible and tangible through mechanisms that are predicated on confirming what is 
already valued in the socio-political sphere, and it is through this circulating logic that the 
soul/brain will come to know itself (Foucault, 1988: 25).  
It is within this context of prudence, hope, and rendering oneself more visible, that the 
neurobics industry has thrived, looking to crack ‘the brain fitness puzzle’ and ‘the key to self-
empowered aging’ (Fernandez, 2015).  Marketing and popular media outputs on brain training 
have often framed complex phenomena as ‘essentially neurobiological’, and espouse the brain 
as something to be ‘trained’ (Pickersgill and Van Keulen, 2011a: xiii-xiv).  We are, for instance, 
frequently warned of the forthcoming ‘epidemic’ in the prevalence of neurodegenerative 
disease, while also being informed of ways we might be able to stave off such cognitive decline 
(see next chapter).  With this considered in light of the somewhat stalled progress from the 
‘pharmaceutical machine’ it is not surprising to see other commercial entities stepping into the 
fray to both assuage and exploit our concerns (George and Whitehouse, 2011: 591).  It appears 
that ‘brain training’ fits our contemporary ethos of self-improvement that is seen to be 
grounded upon scientific foundations, for to be considered astutely self-governing today ‘is to 
be condemned to seek an authority for one's authority’, and thus we willingly give over 
assessments of our own wellbeing to parameters set by the expert gaze (Rose, 1999: 27).  In 
many ways, therefore, the rise of the brain training industry is part of the broader trend of the 
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‘quantified self’, where seemingly precise metrics and measures are overlaid, or simply 
supplant, more holistic and self-generated assessments of our wellbeing (Lupton, 2013; 2016).   
Proponents of neurobics have striven to assert the empirical credentials and scientific 
legitimacy of their products and services through frequent appeals to neuroplasticity (see, for 
example, Hardy, Farzin and Scanlon, 2013: 2-7).  However, evidence for the efficacy of such 
methods of brain training is still inconclusive, with some studies suggesting moderate 
improvement in cognitive function (Au et al. 2015; Smith et al. 2009), while other studies have 
found no evidence of generalizable benefit (Melby-Lervag and Hulme, 2013; Owen et al. 2010).  
This debate has become quite contentious, recently entering the public arena through 
opposing open letters penned in 2014, each signed by dozens of scientists, with the first 
arguing that  
‘… claims promoting brain games are frequently exaggerated and at times misleading… 
aggressive advertising entices consumers to spend money on products and to take up 
new behaviors, such as gaming, based on these exaggerated claims… However, as the 
findings accumulate, compelling evidence of general and enduring positive effects on 
the way people’s minds and brains age has remained elusive.’ 
Stanford Center of Longevity, 2014 
The second open letter firmly countered that  
‘… a substantial and growing body of evidence shows that certain cognitive training 
regimens can significantly improve cognitive function, including in ways that generalize 
to everyday life. This includes some exercises now available commercially.’ 
Cognitive Training Data, 2014 
Yet while it cannot yet be conclusively proven that ‘brain training’ – as it is currently conceived 
– is efficacious or otherwise (Jak, Seelye and Jurick, 2013), there does appear to be a 
promissory imbalance given that the ‘popularity of products designed to slow brain aging 
might have outpaced credible scientific data to show that these interventions are effective’ 
(Papp, Walsh and Snyder, 2009).  Such popularity has occurred, in part, through the increasing 
emphasis placed upon the individual to labour towards cultivating their mental acuity, both to 
improve their day-to-day performance and to perhaps forestall the onset of 
neurodegenerative disease and disorder.  Rationales for this personal ethic are captured aptly 
in this statement from Sharp Brains (Fernandez, 2015: 37), an entity that positions itself as ‘an 
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independent market research firm tracking health and performance applications of neuro-
science’: 
‘When we conducted in-depth focus groups and interviews with respondents, the 
main question many had was not what has perfect science behind, but what has better 
science than the other things people are doing—solving crossword puzzle number one 
million and one, taking ‘brain supplements,’ or doing nothing at all until depression or 
dementia hits home.’  
The implication here – and very much endorsed by ‘Sharp Brains’ – is that although efficacy 
may not yet be conclusively proven, this does not absolve the individual from undertaking a 
personal regime of brain training, for as upstanding ethical citizens something must be done 
with an eye to tending to our cognitive capacities, otherwise one would be seeming to 
embrace an indolent, defeatist lifestyle, waiting for depression or dementia to ‘hit home’.  
Crosswords are implied to be a monotonous, repetitive, and quaint method of the past, crude 
placeholders before the rise of rigourous and practically applicable neuroscience, while ‘brain 
supplements’ are in turn only briefly noted with a pejorative, sceptical tone.  Overall this 
amounts to a clever rhetorical appeal to embrace ‘cross-training our brains’ (Fernandez, 2015), 
with frequent analogies to aerobic exercise evincing     
‘…the belief that this new generation of strenuous games, puzzles, and brainteasers 
can encourage the growth of synapses and dendrites and enhance cognitive health just 
as aerobic workouts improve pulmonary health...’  
George and Whitehouse, 2011: 591 
However, while excessive claims do seem to abound wherever the neuro prefix emerges, we 
should not dismiss the entire gamut of brain training as snake-oil opportunism.  The increasing 
prevalence of dementia, for instance, has become an enormous public health issue and source 
of personal concern (see next chapter), so we can (perhaps) forgive some speculative 
proclamations and accompanying hopes of averting neurodegeneration through new forms of 
care of the self.  Furthermore, the typical labours of current brain training are largely harmless 
in any direct sense, although we should cast a watchful eye over the longer term looping 
effects that may emerge through the fervid desire to tame and train our brains in accordance 
with prescribed standards. 
To this end, the following discussion will address the current most popular product within the 
‘brain training’ industry: the web-based subscription service Lumosity.  This product is one 
amongst a litany of similar services that combine self-help with leisure through the 
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‘gamification’ of cognitive attributes deemed virtuous, valuable, or otherwise desirable 
(Rabipour and Raz, 2012).  Lumosity has become hugely popular in just a few years, and 
currently boasts 70 million paying members, tempted by the offer of ‘cutting edge 
neuroscience personalized for you’.  Like other commercial brain training products, the 
veracity of Lumosity’s claims have been widely questioned, both in academia (Redick et al., 
2013), and in the popular media (Cook, 2013).  In response, Lumosity has sought to establish 
their scientific credentials through their ‘Human Cognition Project’ and ‘Lumos Labs’, where 
‘In-house scientists refine and improve the product’ (Lumosity, 2014), along with producing 
research papers that effectively double as customer and investor pitches (Hardy, Farzin and 
Scanlon, 2013).  Lumosity (2015b) also draws the potential customer’s eye to research that has 
been conducted using their service.25  In addition advertising attempts to contextually place 
Lumosity within the history – and now at the forefront – of neuroscientific research (Lumosity, 
2015a).   
Like so many popular science books and other mass media outputs it is tempting to simply 
dismiss Lumosity as exaggerative marketing blather, not worthy of our scholarly attention.  But 
such a dismissal would be to turn a blind eye to the ways in which we are constituted as 
subjects by such everyday popular rhetoric and practice, for it is 
‘… at this vulgar, pragmatic, quotidian and minor level that one can see the languages 
and techniques being invented that will reshape understandings of the subjects and 
objects of government, and hence reshape the very presuppositions upon which 
government rests.’   
Rose, 1999: 31 
                                                          
25 While it remains highly questionable as to whether Lumosity’s games can actually produce 
generalisable improvements in cognition there is no doubt that the sheer popularity of the product has 
generated an incredibly valuable data set.  By January 2013, Lumosity games (or ‘cognitive exercises’) 
had been played over 600 million times (Sternberg et al., 2013).  Thus even without conclusively proving 
the efficacy of their product this data set has provided a fruitful cache for other research (collected at a 
profit, no less).  Peer-reviewed research published by Lumosity employees or others using the Lumosity 
platform can therefore provide some useful insights on the general correlation between self-reported 
sleeping habits, alcohol intake, age, and exercise with performance in Lumosity games, all without 
actually needing to prove the cognition-improving efficacy of the product.  Indeed, the promoted 
studies published ‘using Lumosity as a cognitive training tool for diverse populations, including healthy 
adults, cancer survivors, elderly people, and children with a genetic disorder’ (Zhang, 2014) tend to be of 
this general statistical aggregation kind, rather than actual measures where the effectiveness of the 
product itself is the independent variable to be tested (see, for example, Kesler et al., 2011; Rattray and 




As such Lumosity is worthy of further investigation, if only because of its great success and 
savvy rhetorical strategies, presenting logics that espouse a particular ethical relation we 
should adopt towards our brain; a type of brain, moreover, that has been reduced to a 
narrowly derived set of functions which we are enjoined to maximise.  Here, for example, is 
how Lumosity (2014) pitches itself to consumers: 
‘Lumosity is a personal trainer that helps you exercise your brain.  We’ll help create a 
training program that’s right for you, based on neuroscience research from top 
universities around the world.  Here’s how it works: Lumosity scientists have taken 
common neuropsychological tasks out of the lab, designed some new ones, and 
transformed these scientific tasks into over forty fun games.  You’ll play five games in 
each of your daily work outs.  Every game targets an ability important to you, like 
memory, attention, problem solving, and more.  Train 15 minutes a day, three to five 
times a week, to challenge and exercise your brain.  Then track your progress over 
time, see how you compare to people like you, and enjoy your brain training journey.  
Start a workout right now and discover what your brain can do.’ 
There are a number of appeals made in this short pitch.  The first is of equating neurobics with 
other forms of ‘fitness’ and habits of vigourous self-discipline by emphasising the similarity to 
using a personal trainer, and where sessions are ‘work outs’ designed to ‘exercise your brain’.  
The recommendation to ‘train’ fifteen minutes a day, three to five times a week also speaks to 
this aerobic fitness analogy.  Also noteworthy is the offer of a personalised and tailored 
service, giving the user the ability to focus on what is ‘important to you’.  This implies the 
promise of comfortably domesticating Lumosity not only into daily routines and practices, but 
also enables the program to serve as the storehouse and measure of one’s aspirations to 
wellbeing.  Appeals to precision are also present, whereby consumers can closely monitor their 
progress and compare themselves to their cohort.  There is also an appeal to the ‘fun’ of brain 
training in the above pitch, and, lastly, there is a petition of potential waiting to be realised, for 
with Lumosity you will ‘discover what your brain can do’. 
Such appeals are somewhat more subtly embedded in other promotional material, as evident 
in the screenshot below, purported to be depictions of Lumosity members.  Note the 
resounding emphasis on young, physically active users, generating an aspirational ethos by 
equating health, youth, vitality, and an adventurous approach to life with caring for and 
maximising one’s brain.  Members from 182 countries across the globe certainly constitutes a 
diverse group, but, we are told, ‘no matter where they come from or what they do, they can 
challenge their brains with Lumosity’.  Such rhetoric espouses a democratic ethos of self-
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Cropped screenshot sourced from lumosity.com, taken 15/11/2014   
In 2012 Lumosity launched a marketing campaign to introduce, normalise, and ultimately sell 
the ethos of brain training to consumers.  The ‘Why I Play’ campaign combined elements of 
aspiration and emulation, along with presenting to potential customers a new science-based 
means of care of the self.  This campaign featured a series of commercials, designed primarily 
with television in mind, but also used in other media outlets.  Each commercial, thirty seconds 
in length, was fitted to the same template: an actor portraying a happy Lumosity user would 
speak to a personal example regarding the imperative need to enhance their brain, while also 
not neglecting to emphasise the pleasurable aspects of the product.  The actor appears to be 
addressing an interviewer off screen, and each commercial is shot in a seemingly public area, 
thus creating the impression of an impromptu vox pop endorsement of Lumosity from a 
random passer-by.  As the actor waxes lyrical lively animations play around their heads to 
signify buzzing cognition, with imagery matched to whatever the actor is discussing.  Each 
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actor was, of course, impossibly attractive and the perfect embodiment of the late modern 
subject, one who possesses an unending personal drive for both self-improvement and the 
consumption of pleasure, thereby tying Lumosity to an aspirational ethos.    
 
Screenshot of ‘Why I Play – Going to the Gym’ advertisement, accessed 3/1/15, note the 
image’s analogy of the brain as a muscle to be strengthened and aerobically exercised.   
Each advertisement in the series ended with the same voiceover: 
‘Any brain can get better, and Lumosity.com can help, it’s like a personal trainer for 
your brain, improving your performance with the science of neuroplasticity, but in a 
way that just feels like games.  Start training with lumosity.com right now, and 
discover what your brain can do’ 
This rhetoric results in curious cleavings and attachments, for the brain is given a bounded 
quality, framed almost as if it were external to the subject, and somehow both an agent in 
itself and a property to be tended to.  This external agent/object is corralled and tamed by the 
subject, ‘trained’ in order to take advantage of its neuroplasticity in ways that improve 
‘performance’.  This process of externalising the brain and then reintegrating it into a new 
instrumentalist framework results in an ethos ‘not only of one’s personal destiny, but even of 
reality itself’, for to repurpose the brain is to reconfigure the very way in which one 
approaches the world (Ortega, 2011: 42, see also Brenninkmeijer, 2010: 108-9, 115-118).  As 
George and Whitehouse (2011: 591) observe, the result of this both ascetic and pleasurable 
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ethos is ‘a certain “fetishization” of the brain that renders the 3-pound organ in our heads 
both an object of alterity and veneration’. 
Such a fetish-ethic is encouraged by Lumosity advertising, wherein the actors posing as 
devoted adherents will speak of their desire to ‘stay sharp’, and that with Lumosity ‘I am 
happier with my brain’ or ‘my brain feels great’.  Analogies to aerobic and weight-training 
exercise occur throughout these advertisements, espousing the goodness of training the body, 
and expressing gratitude that now there is a way to similarly train the brain eg. ‘Now my body 
is strong and so is my brain’.  Several of these faux-enthusiasts also praise ‘the science behind 
the games’, along with noting the desire to maintain their cognitive capacities as they age 
(thus gently touching upon the dread of neurodegeneration, see the following chapter).  This 
gentle invocation of the imperative of neurological self-care – then smoothly tied to the 
uptake of a habitual practice – resonates with Foucault’s observation that the modern subject 
now moves within a regime of ‘permanent medical care’, a vocation where they ‘must become 
the doctor of oneself’ towards an end of ‘a certain complete achievement of life’ (Foucault, 
1988: 31).  This ‘complete achievement of life’ is bounded within overarching imperatives that 
determine the success of one’s day-to-day ‘completion’, and along these lines another 
Lumosity ‘Why I Play’ commercial draws attention to the burdensome expectations placed 
upon our brains today: 
‘I’ve got emails, phone calls, news to stay up on, it’s like my brain’s under siege out 
there!  I just needed an edge, and Lumosity has all these games based on 
neuroscience, and my brain can really tell the difference.  I’m still under siege, I’m just 
better armed.’ 
Again, there is an insistence on this ethic-fetish of both being and having a brain, a property to 
be tailored and trained so that it ‘can really tell the difference’ and give you that ‘edge’ to 




Screenshot of ‘Why I Play – Friends’ advertisement, accessed 3/1/15 
Another variant of this ‘Why I Play’ template gently instils the notion that brain training may 
even be a necessary obligation for those who desire to be the kindest, most caring persons 
they can be:   
‘I started Lumosity for me, but it’s been pretty good for the people around me too.  I 
remembered my friend’s birthday, which is good, but I also remembered this bag she liked 
and I remembered the store where we saw it.  Better friendship through neuroscience, 
who’d a guessed?’ 
A similar appeal is made in another ‘Why I Play’ iteration, wherein a mother expresses her 
relief that now ‘each brain in the house gets a little better’.  The implication is that to care for 
another is to care for their brain, along with maintaining and enhancing your own.  Such 
examples of better friendship and parenting ‘though neuroscience’ also touches on the 
‘generosity’ of psy and neuro discourses in fostering the translation of once rarefied frames 
and jargon into everyday vocabularies and habits (Rose, 1996: 33-34).  This ‘generous’ 
translation is even made apparent in the visual imagery of advertisements, where (see above) 
hearts stand in for neurons as little potentiating synapses of affection.  To train one’s brain is 
thus framed as an admirable quality of those who seek to be a source of joy, comfort, and care 
for others. 
Upon starting their ‘brain training journey’ Lumosity users are spurred on with encouragement 
to ‘build your personalized training program!’.  Novice trainers are asked questions around 
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what time of day they feel most productive, their sleeping habits, their general mood, exercise 
habits, age etc., along with what qualities of their cognition they would most like to improve.  
A competitive drive is stoked, urging users to ‘see how you stack up against different types of 
members’.  To further ensure the association between brain fitness and aerobic fitness users 
are informed that ‘Our neuroscientists recommend 3-5 workouts a week to maximize the 
results of your training’, while also enabling the user to integrate data from a ‘Fitbit’ device (a 
self-tracking device typically used to measure aerobic fitness).  The neurobic and the aerobic 
thus become twinned as complementary endeavours.   
After a prescribed number of daily training sessions are completed the user will receive their 
‘Performance Report’, which includes a comparison of their results with others arranged by 
occupation group, implying – in a broadly neoliberal fashion of maximally realising one’s value-
bearing capacities – which line of work your particular brain may best be suited.  Users can 
also regularly look over their ‘Brain Profile’ to see their ‘Best Brain Areas’.  This is where crude 
looping effects and narrow reductionism threaten most perniciously, for in the schema given 
by Lumosity the ‘brain’ is divided into the five categories of ‘Attention’, ‘Flexibility’, ‘Speed’, 
‘Problem Solving’, and ‘Memory’.  That these all happen to be the ideal capacities of the 
conscientious and productive neoliberal subject hardly needs pointing out, but more 
worrisome is the implied ontological refiguring of these qualities into properties of the brain 
itself.  The five qualities measured by Lumosity make up your entire ‘Brain Profile’, and the 
‘Brain Performance Index’ ensures that ‘users know where they fall with respect to their own 
performance using a single number’ (Hardy, Farzin and Scanlon, 2013: 10).  As a result the 
wondrous complexity and infinite potentiality of our cognitive assembly is reduced to a narrow 
‘profile’ of functions, percentages, and indexes, all framed and labelled through the buzzwords 
and mantras of the corporate world.  
So while it remains contentious as to whether such services may, as they claim, ‘train’ a brain 
by harnessing our neuroplasticity, be apprised that the claims of this rapidly growing neurobics 
industry most certainly contribute to entraining and championing a particular kind of subject.  
This ideal subject thinks of themselves with regard to their always improvable capacities of – in 
the case of Lumosity’s ‘Brain Profile’ – attention, flexibility, speed, problem solving, and 
memory, and turns over the assessment of these narrow properties to the objective, rigourous 
gaze of a purportedly lab-developed program.  Within these parameters and prescriptions 
subjects will be ranked against their peers (all 70 million of them) down to one tenth of a 
percent.  Care of the self thus extends to the subject conscientiously tracing their relative 
performance against the cohort, conducted through a mechanism that purports to be the 
objective ledger of their cognitive capital. 
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Lumosity is designed to be a habitual practice, routine while also fun, an exemplar of the 
consumption of virtuous leisure in a socio-economic milieu that heaps praise upon the 
‘hypercognitive’ subject and fears the degenerating one.  Within the rapidly increasingly 
prevalence of neurodegenerative disease George and Whitehouse (2011: 591) suggest that 
brain training enterprises have thrived in this ‘therapeutic void’, so that 
‘Rather than being understood as one of many vulnerable organs within an intricate 
biological system, the brain is perceived as a separate privileged entity that healthy 
individuals must constantly stimulate, rewire, rebuild, nurture, and attend to if they 
are to maintain soundness of mind and selfhood.’  
The brain is consequently rendered both as equivalent to one’s self, while also being a terrain 
the owner must assiduously cultivate, and practice good stewardship over.  In typical fashion 
for late capitalism, though, these appeals to care of the self are made palatable by the promise 
of fun and the realisation of their best selves, altogether generating a hopeful, anticipatory 
ethic of ‘perfecting themselves from the molecular level outwards’ (George and Whitehouse, 
2011: 592).  But these promissory discourses – especially when tied to evocative ethical 
appeals that dictate the ascetic virtue of ‘training’ the brain – are potentially harmful, for 
espousals of personal responsibility and agency regarding how we care for our brains implies a 
relation to this organ that is both narrow and unrealistic, and thus in time may prove 
burdensome. 
Lumosity, in part, develops its measures based upon what they believe the consumer will find 
of most value, but in turn the consumer also gives themselves over to the program’s built-in 
prescriptions, believing the program’s measures to be capable of capturing both what is 
societally-valued and personally virtuous.  This mutual reinforcement brings a particular kind 
of relation to our brains further into practice.  A new form of both ascetic and pleasurable 
subjectification is found in the current commercial offerings of brain training, where persons 
give themselves over to a form of expertise that turns their clicks, taps, and swipes into the 
making up of their ‘Brain Profile’.  Consumers willingly acquiesce to this pleasantly-packaged 
authority, while these games also serve as an act of tolerable ‘confession’, for before and 
through them we lay bare the extent of our cognitive capacities (Rose, 1990: 244-5, Foucault, 
1978: 59-67).  Ultimately this fetish-ethic may serve to become a cruel labour, for it adds a 
supposed layer of technical precision to conceptualisations of the brain that in actuality are 





Towards an alternative approach 
  
Of course, consumer-friendly brain training products like Lumosity are at the low-intensity end 
of interventions upon the neurological subject and path-setting of the ways and means by 
which we are ‘obliged to be free’ (Rose, 1990: 217-232).  As such I do not wish to overstate 
these discourses and practices as completely totalising in their shaping of the subject.  
Nevertheless, even at this seemingly harmless level can be found invocations of highly charged 
ethical appeals and promissory rhetoric that may generate an unease that ‘divides, imposes 
burdens, and thrives upon the anxieties and disappointments generated by its own promises’ 
(Rose, 1996: 3).  I am concerned with how these logics that measure only a narrow range of 
cognitive capacities may become more normatively-laden over time, yet also constrains the 
space within which we work towards improving ourselves.  Holistic, if imprecise, measures of 
performance and wellbeing are thus replaced by precise, but ultimately hollow measures.   
Here, then, we may relate these concerns regarding the escalating labour of ‘neurobics’ and 
similar enterprises to Lauren Berlant’s (2011) Cruel Optimism.  Such a relation ‘exists when 
something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing’ (Berlant, 2011: 1) and ‘whose 
realization is discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic’ 
(Berlant, 2011: 24).  Neurobics certainly fits either or both of these criteria at any point in time, 
it may initially seem ‘too possible’ that – if one ‘trains’ hard enough – they may preserve and 
enhance their cognitive capacities.  But sooner or later either one’s neuroascetic virtue will fail, 
or the labour will be shown to be driven by the ‘sheer fantasy’ of averting neurodegeneration.  
This ethic of self-care may thereby sustain and perpetuate the sufficiently productive subject, 
but only through squeezing a narrow array of capacities of the individual; it does not necessary 
sustain us as expansive subjects but rather as an intensively disaggregated bundle of functions, 
and thus is potentially ‘toxic’.   
We invest our time and energies, attaching ourselves with optimism to a promissory object, 
toiling within its given parameters in the hope that ‘nearness to this thing will help you or a 
world to become different in just the right way’ (Berlant, 2011: 2).  Such an optimism becomes 
cruel when we are bound to it, equally reassured and disheartened by its unflinching reflection 
upon us, wedging us in ‘a situation of profound threat that is, at the same time, profoundly 
confirming’ (Berlant, 2011: 2).  The hope in achieving our best selves through quotidian labours 
and precise assessments risks creating ‘a landfill for overwhelming and impending crises of life-
building and expectation’ so that ‘the activity of living demands both a wandering absorptive 
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awareness and a hypervigilance that collects material that might help to clarify things’ 
(Berlant, 2011: 3-4).  Our ‘hypervigilance’ requires that we seek firm ground on which to know 
ourselves, and to this end our Lumosity ‘Brain Profile’ and ‘Performance Index’ – compiled 
through rigourous metrics developed by trained neuroscientists – provide the authority for this 
practice of vigilance, gently instructing us on how and when to ‘train’, and then assessing our 
performance in precise quantifications and rankings against others, urging us to ‘challenge 
yourself to reach the top’.   
In this framework we become cruelly attached to the perpetual promise of realising our best 
selves, with ‘best’ here narrowly bounded in objects and scripts to which we bequeath the 
authority to assess us.  Products like Lumosity may package themselves in fun promissory 
containers through the offer of attainable vigilance and self-improvement through play, but 
even here the rhetoric of imperatives made to the consumer risks generating burdensome 
appeals, instilling ever greater personal responsibilities but in ways reduced to ever more 
rigidly defined tasks.  It is this narrow ‘profile’ of the ideal brain that generates ‘the drag of 
practical sovereignty, of the obligation to be reliable’ (Berlant, 2011: 116), for notions of 
‘reliability’ are already predicated upon diligently according oneself to immutable pre-
determined paths.  This construction of the subject might thus initially appear to be at odds 
with our actual daily meanderings of agency: 
‘Most of what we do, after all, involves not being purposive but inhabiting agency 
differently in small vacations from the will itself, which is so often spent from the 
pressures of coordinating one’s pacing with the working day, including times of 
preparation and recovery from it.’  
(Berlant, 2011: 116) 
Brain training products like Lumosity, however, position themselves as both a small meditative 
relief from such pressures of coordination, while also (ostensibly) enhancing our capacities to 
deal with them.  The ‘play’ of brain training is therefore not a ‘vacation from the will’, but 
rather its reinscribing and endorsement through a form of virtuous leisure.  Therefore, while 
such products are packaged under the guise of fun and leisure, they remain a form of cruel 
optimism in affixing ever more tightly the ‘ideal’ subject, for they also heap more responsibility 
on the individual for this narrow realisation of self.  This creates a perpetual labour within the 
milieu of hyper-competitive individualism, given that the implicit corollary of Lumosity’s 




Our brains are being resubstantialised into a new terrain, rendered malleable in accordance 
with overarching dictates.   Yet it is lamentable that what is prioritised in light of this 
potentiality seems so desperately unimaginative, reduced to envisioning incremental 
improvements on the iterative tasks of today; sufficiently ‘fit’ brains designed only for the 
quotidian vicissitudes of modern life.  Compounding this stultifying vision is its own promissory 
excess, where ‘Technologies with a radical potential to transform ourselves and our societies 
seem always to be “just around the corner”’ (Conrad and De Vries, 2011: 314), stoking 
fantastical excitement over heightened ways to instrumentalise ourselves in line with current 
role expectations, but never stopping to question the potential effects of configuring our brain 
strictly in accordance with contemporary vicissitudes.   
We should thus reconsider what we might generate in our efforts to tightly affix the ideal 
neuroethical being – whether it be through the ‘imperative’ need to better manage collective 
risk, or via the hyper-reflexive self-help individualism of neurobics – so that those lines of 
possibility outside of current ideal types can ‘register as more than what gets in the way’ 
(Ahmed, 2010: 195).  Surely, it would seem axiomatic that to truly embrace an ethos of 
plasticity requires that we not presuppose precisely how we should be plastic.  Perhaps a new 
orientation to the neurological subject is required, one that adheres less to emerging dictates 
of labouring upon the substrates of ourselves in order to induce our own wellbeing. 
To this end Sara Ahmed (2010, 2014) provides a fruitful means of circumscribing new forms of 
ontological freedom, offering a rejection of the imperative to be ‘happy’ while endorsing a 
turn to the ‘willful’.  In rejecting what amounts to a burdensome task of perpetually 
‘maximising’ our wellbeing we may be better able to interrogate the underlying rationales of 
such injunctions, and so open up possibilities for ‘a new political ontology’ (Ahmed, 2010: 195).  
Ahmed proposes that we might turn away from the construction of a subject who is urged to 
cultivate themselves to will ‘rightly’, and this chapter has echoed such a view in expressing 
concern with current aspirations towards aligning ourselves with our ‘best’ volitions through 
self-subversive mechanisms.  There is something strange and anomalous within late modernity 
in the insistence of being ‘in charge’ of our wills, an injunction that results in a constant state 
of being ‘at variance with yourself’ given that one could always ‘will’ better (Ahmed, 2014: 7 
citing Arendt 1978: 83).  But, says Ahmed, perhaps there is an affirming ‘tactic’ in the 
occasional succumbing to one’s ‘weaker’ wills, for – echoing Berlant – the insistence on 
enhancing one’s will can be an exhausting and unending project, and not necessarily affirming 
of volitions that are immanent to us.  Not only is it odd to think of ‘will’ today as a property set 
to work upon itself – that the ‘will trains the will; the will works on the will’ (Ahmed, 2014: 61) 
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– but even stranger to countenance working upon the will through practices of self-help 
gamification.   
In contrast to the categorical neatness of much current neuroethical discourse, then, Ahmed 
(2014: 18) suggests we reinvigorate will as a ‘sweaty’ concept.  Such a ‘sweaty’ will requires a 
more visceral and unwiedly conception of being, of bodies through which volitions circulate to 
form brief coalitions to action, with paths not taken leaving residual affects that may compel 
us differently next time.  Similar to an underlying theme in this chapter, this framing of will 
also requires that we shake off the ‘belief that we can know “in advance” what will improve 
people’s lives’, for such presuppositions only generate a tightening, self-defeating circularity of 
wellbeing (Ahmed, 2010: 8).  Too often these qualities of wellbeing, known ‘in advance’, are 
then given over to artefacts that impose scripts and habits upon us within which we labour, 
and so the promissory becomes contained and bounded within them.  Through these 
immutable external authorities we adopt habits of dutifully managing volitions, of cultivating 
dispositions, and upholding our somatic citizenship.  Ahmed (2010: 28) suggests that we need 
to loosen our deferential binding to these authorities that induce within us a feeling of 
‘anticipatory causality’ towards the object of enhancement, for ‘we might go further with 
happiness, if we don’t follow its objects around’ (217).  The neuroascetic urge to align 
ourselves with current ideals through a corrupted hyper-reflexivity risks foreclosing other lines 
of possibility in how we may realise new ways of being. 
More broadly, Rosi Braidotti (2013) has been similarly incisive in observing the strangeness of 
our narrow subscription to humanist ideals that presume ontologically bounded subjects, 
endowed with rational capacities deemed ‘fundamental’ and ‘essential’ to its being.  This view 
of the subject, argues Braidotti, seems increasingly at odds with our shifting engagement with 
the world, and so we are now stuck in a ‘post-human predicament’, no longer certain of the 
‘basic unit of common reference for our species’ (Braidotti, 2013: 2).  This need not be 
crippling to our self-conception though, and instead presents the opportunity of productive 
reconfiguration, but only if we can carve out a space for such experimental ontology against 
the ever-forward motion of set paths of late capitalism. 
Braidotti’s (2013: 29) anti-humanist philosophy is not an excoriation of our supposed 
fundamental flaws, nor a call to eschew hard-won socio-political privileges.  Rather, Braidotti’s 
anti-humanism starts from encouraging us to recognise that the way we engage with the world 
– now and likely even moreso into the future – renders conceptions of ‘humanism’ a thin, 
dogmatic, and ultimately obscuring way to describe our various modes of being.  N. Katherine 
Hayles has similarly warned that what is ‘lethal’ regarding the ‘posthuman’ is not that we 
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might lose our ‘essential’ humanity, but rather that our insistence on retaining old 
essentialisms and ideals may result in the ‘grafting of the posthuman onto a liberal humanist 
view of the self’ (Hayles, 1999: 286-7).  We will not be well served by remaining beholden to 
such nostalgic conceptions.  Our curious mix of rationalised and affective interactions with 
animals, the way we instrumentalise natural processes to our own ends, our desire to 
repurpose our genetic and neurological matter, and the global scale of our production all 
render essentialist appeals to humanist stances as unhelpful cries of wistfulness (Braidotti, 
2013: 7).  Consequently, we need a conception of posthumanism that provides a way out of 
‘the twin pitfalls of conservative nostalgia and neo-liberal euphoria’ (Braidotti, 2013: 11).  
Further, as this chapter has shown, this instrumentalisation of narrow conceptions of ideal 
subjects serves to foment an ever-escalating ethos of cultivated individualism that ultimately 
does harm to the potential generativity of being.  For Braidotti (2013: 26-35), the turn to 
posthumanism requires that we embrace a nomadic form of micro-politics, one that edges 
away from the counterposing of matter with culture, and technology with the natural, but 
rather sees them as entangled and continuous.  This will equip us with novel – albeit perhaps 
less assured – ways of approaching subjectivity, and through this entanglement will afford the 
space necessary for a subject ‘worthy of the present’ to emerge (Braidotti, 2013: 51). 
For now, however, one odd contradiction of the many proposed neuro-enhancement projects 
is the contrast of the great ambition of the technologies to be applied – eg. remaking the 
subject at the neurochemical level – with the relative banality of the desired ends, framed by 
those ‘who attempt to index them to either a predictable conservative profile, or to a profit-
oriented system that fosters and inflates individualism’ (Braidotti, 2013: 58, see also Haraway, 
1991).  Further, this rigid affixing of the citizen-subject emerges through imperatives of ‘a pan-
human bond of vulnerability’ – such as the threat of catastrophic climate change or terrorism 
invoked by aforementioned neuroethicists – that provides only a hollow, negative, and 
reactive cosmopolitanism (Braidotti, 2013: 63).  Thus, while collective crises may usefully 
compel us to reconsider our relation to the world our too-reactive stances may see the further 
entrenchment of a stubbornly actuarial form of humanism, only this time rendered into being 
through the ‘spinning machine of advanced, bio-genetic capitalism’ (Braidotti, 2013: 87).  
Braidotti (2013: 93) proposes that we instead develop means by which ‘to escape the regime 
of commodification that is the trait of our historical era, and experiment with virtual 
possibilities’, in part through a principle of being ‘not-One’.  Within the context of this thesis, 
this ‘not-Oneness’ entails that we must find means by which we can undo readings of the brain 
as the sole container of our being, and the likewise insistence on the subject as a wholly 





Conclusion – A plea for enchancements 
 
In this chapter I have demonstrated how neuroethical insight – particularly through those hard 
transhumanists who propose that we consider neurologically ‘enhancing’ ourselves – has 
sought to translate the knotty, nuanced, elusive, and ever-present questions about our 
purpose and wellbeing into precise, technical, and rigidly demarcated assessments, designed 
to gauge our varying (dys-)function as cognitive subjects, and to provide the means by which 
the ideal subject can be better brought into being through neurological interventions.  Such 
means – even when packaged in the pleasurably virtuous play and low-intensity interaction of 
‘brain training’ – may prove to be burdensome, for they come laden with ethical injunctions 
regarding how the ideal subject stands in relation to their cognitive capacities.  Moreover, 
appeals to neurological enhancement from those who deem us ‘unfit for the future’ are often 
motivated by what Foucault (2006: 362) described as the ‘dread of unreason’: the fear that the 
irrationality of deviant subjects will unravel the delicate fabric of society, and thus those who 
do not accord themselves with given prescriptions pose a threat to our ongoing prosperity and 
must be attentively managed into proper conduct.  As I have shown, however, the way in 
which neuro-enhancement is commonly framed today is with the assumption that we all, in 
some way, are deviating from a socially desirable state, whether it be through the potential 
enhancement of our morality, or through the unending possibility of improvement in our 
value-bearing cognitive capacities. 
Therefore, a degree of humility and rapprochement is needed, for ‘just as we do not know 
what posthuman bodies can do, we cannot even begin to guess what postanthropocentric 
embodied brains will actually be able to think up’ (Braidotti, 2013: 104).  The problem we are 
faced with is whether our potential posthuman brains will be able to ‘think up’ such 
possibilities if they are unsparingly subjected to a ‘hard’ transhumanist regime of neuro-
enhancement that comes a priori packaged with presuppositions of the ‘good citizen’.  Will 
‘ethics’ still have generative power under such a program, or will it become fixed and rigid, 
perhaps ironically rendering ourselves ill-equipped to collectively address the inevitable – but 
inevitably different from now – future issues we will face as a species?  Perhaps then, rather 
than insisting on current notions of enhancement, we should open lines of inquiry towards the 
enchancement of subjectivity, an approach girded by the humble admission that we are still so 
very far from truly understanding the interplay of cognition and ethical wellbeing.   
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Along these lines Foucault – in one of his final interviews – was asked about the relation 
between normalisation processes and the production of knowledge regarding the human 
subject.  On this question of the entanglement of these two lines he responded 
‘Through these different practices – psychological, medical, penitential, educational – 
a certain idea or model of humanity was developed, and now this idea of man has 
become normative, self-evident, and is supposed to be universal …  What I am afraid 
of about humanism is that it presents a certain form of our ethics as a universal model 
for any kind of freedom. I think that there are more secrets, more possible freedoms, 
and more inventions in our future than we can imagine in humanism as it is 
dogmatically represented on every side of the political rainbow...’  
Foucault, 1988: 15 
We might consider this as the more positive, but still compatible expression of the epigraph 
from Nietzsche that opened this chapter.  Such a stance of enchancement towards ways of 
being that we cannot yet imagine asks us to unshackle ourselves from presumptions on how 
we may best be ‘human’.   
What makes such an imaginative unshackling difficult, however, is the shift in practice since 
Foucault (1978: 59) wrote of ‘Western man as a confessing animal’, whereby we are no longer 
‘forced’ either by ‘internal imperative’ or ‘violence or threat’ to rack the depths of our 
interiority and render them apparent to relevant authorities, all so that we may supposedly 
realise a new, liberating accord with the composition of our being.  Instead and increasingly, 
the ‘confession’ of today is ‘driven from its hiding place in the soul’ (ibid.) through various non-
human actors who ‘read’ our internal states, spitting out hard data to be parsed by 
aforementioned authorities who then refer to this data in prescribing modes of virtuous 
thought and proper conduct.  This introduction of the mediating device and its intensive gaze, 
along with the parallel emerging ethos of ‘biological citizenship’ (Rose and Novas, 2008) and 
‘neurochemical selves’ (Rose, 2003), has resulted in ever-increasing responsibility accorded to 
the subject to maintain a state of wellbeing, yet with non-human actors and agents 
supplanting the role of the intervening and intermediary means by which ‘wellbeing’ is 
measured and calibrated.  Likewise, the human actor is increasingly trained to give oneself 
over to the measures of the non-human actor, in the understanding that to ‘confess’ requires 
ceding oneself to be read.  Yet this confessional reading – in this case through the molecularly 
intensive gaze interpreted as ethical functioning – neglects the possibility that we know not 
what to confess to in interpreting such output, nor what remains hidden in elucidating new 
modes of ethical being.  As I have noted throughout this chapter, such a reading results in 
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forms of neuro-actuarialism – where the brain is seen as a risky asset to be hedged and then 
leveraged for its productive capacities – that reduces subjects to upholding an ethos that 
‘demands the abandonment of our intellect, of our personal will in order to come to the 
essential by becoming essential’ (Nietzsche, 2004: 24). 
Yet, as Nietzsche (in his typically evocative way) argues in this chapter’s epigraph, we need not 
insist on our ‘divine’ being, nor – once that divine quality is deemed to be false or unattainable 
– alternatively insist on working our way back to an elevated status through the ‘progress’ of 
perpetually confessing our supposed shortfalls and improving those qualities considered 
unique and essential to our species.  Too often such hubris only serves to rigidly affix a 
contingency that we mistake for a universal, one to which we then cruelly labour upon 
ourselves to instil within.  Perhaps there are more ways of approaching neurological difference 
in the hope of chancing upon generative entanglements, more reservoirs of ontology to be 
discovered, and less restrictive conceptions of ‘enhancement’, and in this spirit the following 
chapter aims to contribute to such an endeavour in exploring the experimental depiction of 
















Dementia in a Hypercognitive World: Fictional Representations of 
Subjectivity within Neurodegeneration   
 
 
‘In dementia many aspects of the psyche that had, for a long time, been individual and 
‘internal’ are again made over to the interpersonal milieu.  Memory may have faded, 
but something of the past is known; identity remains intact, because others hold it in 
place; thoughts may have disappeared, but there are still interpersonal processes; 
feelings are expressed and meet a validating response; and if there is a spirituality, it 
will most likely be of that kind Buber describes, where the divine is encountered in the 
depth of I-Thou relating.’ 
Kitwood, 1997: 69 
 
For this final substantive chapter I would like to turn from the ambitious proposals of 
neuroethicists and hard transhuamnists in configuring the ideal ethical citizen by repurposing 
our brains, and instead look towards a seemingly mundane but, I would suggest, far more 
urgent and promising task.  This urgent task is found in rethinking neurological subjectivity in 
ways not only sensitive to cognitive difference and diversity, but also in considering whether 
escalating efforts towards neuro-enhancement of ethical capacities both further marginalise 
those who are neuroatypical, while also neglects to consider avenues of realising alternate 
modes of ethical being.  The promise of this task is made apparent, I will argue, in contrasting 
the elevation of the ‘hypercognitive’ (O’Neill, 1997; Post, 2000) subject espoused in the 
previous chapter, with the consequent discourses around, and interactions with, persons living 
with dementia.  Neurodegenerative diseases that result in dementia are capturing the public 
imagination through fears of succumbing to devastating cognitive debilitation, amongst wider 
concerns regarding our collective ability to manage practices of care and wellbeing as the 
prevalence of such conditions rises into the foreseeable future.  However, such fears, while 
understandable, may prevent us from approaching neurodegeneration and neurodiversity in 
more productive ways.  Perhaps, in our fevered desire to maximise our rationality and all those 
other ‘hypercognitive’ capacities that align with the demands of today, we neglect to consider 
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the potential expansion of the sense and experience of life that we can achieve if we are 
willing to understand our varying cognitive qualities in more diverse and inclusive terms.  
Works of literary fiction – with their special ability to experiment in depictions of interiority 
and subjectivity – can play an important role here as a means of becoming cautiously 
entangled and opening up parallel narratives to prevailing neuroscientific discourses around 
function and difference.  In the spirit of being open to ‘experimental entanglements’ 
(Fitzgerald and Callard, 2015) with the neurosciences, then, this chapter seeks ways in which 
we can rethink the recognition we accord to others based on perceptions of their neurological 
makeup, and so is also an attempt to make a worthwhile contribution to the broader 
movement of ‘neurodiversity’ (Ortega, 2009) against the narrow prescriptions of 
aforementioned neuro-enhancement advocates.    
Popular accounts of dementia have largely focused on the perspectives of family and primary 
caregivers, rather than looking to explore the subjectivity of the person with dementia.  
However, more recent efforts in literary fiction suggest that this creative form may be a 
powerful means of ‘bringing the social back in’ to representations of dementia (Lyman, 1989). 
The novels of dementia to be discussed in this chapter wedge their protagonists between third 
age promises of what possibilities in life may still be realised and fourth age anxieties of 
reckoning with the loss of capacities and autonomy (Higgs and Gilleard, 2014). These works 
emphasise the importance of moment-to-moment self-actualisation achieved not through 
neuroethical hyper-individualism, but rather – as Tom Kitwood suggests in the epigraph – 
through an interpersonal exchange less reliant on higher cognition than on the fostering of 
affirming volitions, however they may be realised. 
 
 
Introduction: Dementia as entangled phenomena 
 
There is perhaps no other condition that contrasts more strikingly with the elevation of the 
‘hypercognitive’ subject of our advanced Western societies than that of dementia (O’Neill, 
1997; Post, 2000).  This broad umbrella category of symptoms resulting from 
neurodegenerative diseases and other conditions (eg. Alzheimer’s disease, Lewy’s body 
dementias, Parkinson’s disease, cerebrovascular complications, amongst other causal agents) 
has a prevalence never before seen, and is likely to worsen into the foreseeable future (Ferri 
et.al. 2005).  In many ways, dementia is the exemplar of the double-edged quality of progress 
and rationalisation, for after either eradicating entirely, curing upon onset, or otherwise 
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reducing the incidence of many other once terminal afflictions, we are now increasingly 
undone by an insidious process that we do not yet fully understand, and instead only possess 
meagre measures by which we can trace its course.  We who are fortunate enough to live in 
the highly developed world are living longer than any of our forebears, thereby pushing the 
fragile ‘wetware’ of our brains into unprecedented territory.   
Our aging populations, combined with a lack of laboratory breakthroughs and effective clinical 
interventions, may culminate in a predicted quadrupling of Alzheimer’s cases worldwide by 
2050, afflicting 1 in every 85 people or around 120 million worldwide (Brookmeyer et al., 
2007).  In the US, Alzheimer’s disease alone is listed as the sixth leading cause of death, and 
this is likely an underestimate given the vagaries around formal determinations of cause of 
death (Alzheimer’s Association, 2014: 25).  Between 2003 and 2013 Alzheimer’s and other 
forms of dementia-inducing conditions have risen from the sixth to second leading cause of 
death in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2015), while in the UK dementia-related 
deaths currently sit as the third most common across the population, but the most likely cause 
of death for women (Office for National Statistics, 2015).   But of course such figures, startling 
though they may be, do not really capture the social impact of disease, emergent through the 
‘nexus between biological event, its perception by patient and practitioner, and the collective 
effort to make cognitive and policy sense out of those perceptions’ (Rosenberg, 1989: 4).  Yet 
for now, unfortunately, it seems that prevailing considerations of dementia are rather limited 
in scope.  Public discussion of dementia – once again slipping into neoliberal frameworks of 
assiduously measuring our value-bearing capacities – has often framed the rise of 
neurodegenerative disease as an urgent crisis in health policy, a forthcoming ‘expenditure time 
bomb’ that raises the pressing need for somatically responsible citizens ‘to take steps to 
prevent the wastage of their mental capital’ (Beddington et al. 2008: 1060, MacDonald and 
Cooper, 2007).  Such ‘apocalyptic demography’ (Robertson, 1990) can dominate public forums 
to the detriment of micro-sociological questions of autonomy, agency, care, and the value of 
‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild, 2012) in ensuring quality of life for those with dementia.  
The collective effort to develop effective counter-measures within standard frameworks of 
health and wellbeing has proven fiendishly difficult, for dementia as a medical category 
‘oscillates uncomfortably between neurological and psychological referents’; often diagnosed 
through behavioural and cognitive measures, but only confirmed post-mortem in the brain’s 
neurofibrillary tangles, plaques, and erosions (Kitwood, 1989: 3).  Attempts to precisely 
categorise types of dementia are likewise beleaguered by the brain’s highly variable 
manifestations of pathology, which are ‘expressed more clearly in text than in tissue’ (Gilleard, 
2000: 102).  Adding to dementia’s categorical problems are problematic social constructions of 
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ageing and accompanying assessments of value and self-worth (Post, 1995; Gergen and 
Gergen, 2000; Beard, Knauss and Moyer, 2009).     
Clinicians and laboratory scientists alike hold that the aetiology and causal agents of dementia 
are the result of complex heterogeneous interactions, with causality almost impossibly difficult 
to disentangle from: processes of age and degeneration; mental illness (especially depression, 
see Jorm, 2000); and elusive theories of a ‘cognitive reserve’ that may stave off functional loss 
despite neuropathology being present (Samet and Stern, 2011; Stern, 2006).  Practitioners are 
also acutely aware of causing unnecessary distress and inadvertently enabling stigma through 
diagnoses of dementia, particularly in cases where no effective therapeutic intervention is 
available (Johnson, Bouman and Pinner, 2000).  Consequently, this diagnostic reluctance may 
have knock-on effects in accurately measuring rates of prevalence (Vernoorj-Dassen et.al., 
2005).  Furthermore, long-debated considerations of both categorical nuance and social stigma 
have led to the recently released DSM-5 removing the term ‘dementia’ from the manual 
entirely, replacing the previous diagnostic ascription with ‘minor’ or ‘major’ neurocognitive 
disorder.  This is arguably a welcome development given that ‘dementia’ has a battery of 
ingrained connotations that may generate harmful presumptions of incapacity, of being 
‘demented’.  However, this change may also prove unhelpful, for the vagueness and lack of 
cultural cachet of the new terminology may render advocacy and other political engagement 
all the more difficult. That said, for the following discussion I retain the umbrella term of 
‘dementia’ despite its socio-historical stigma and etymological origins of being ‘without mind’.  
For better or worse, ‘dementia’ has ‘symbolic power’ worth protecting while we 
simultaneously labour to remove its associated stigma (Lock, 2013: 241).  I think it is unlikely 
that the categories of ‘minor’ and ‘major’ neurocognitive disorders will be taken up in the 
wider public consciousness and, for this reason, I maintain that scholarly and advocacy 
interests are better served by retaining ‘dementia’ as an orienting and rallying term, and from 
this terminological foundation working towards adjusting popular misconceptions.26     
Issues of taxonomy and terminology aside, the phenomenon of dementia certainly raises 
fraught ethical quandaries, for principles of beneficence, avoidance of harm, and the 
accordance of autonomy and respect take on complexities not typically present in other cases 
of terminal illness.  A notable example of this complexity is the consideration of when and 
whether it is permissible to lie or mislead persons with dementia for their own benefit, a 
dilemma not normally encountered in comparable illnesses (Schermer, 2007; James et al. 
                                                          
26
 However, while I retain the use of the category of ‘dementia’ there will be little reference to those 
living with dementia as ‘victims’, ‘sufferers’, or the ‘demented’.  Rather, in accordance with guidelines 
from advocacy groups (Alzheimer’s Australia, no year), less evocative and reductive language is used, 
such as ‘living with dementia’ rather than ‘being’ one’s dementia. 
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2006).  The already weighty considerations of end-of-life processes may become even knottier 
when they butt up against the cognitive deficits and associated social isolation of those 
suffering dementia (Schulz et al., 2003).  Prior to this late stage of dementia, the sufferer often 
finds themselves in a situation of having to reckon with a life that is being stripped of its 
narrative drive; the narrative propulsion towards a synthetic and linear sense of ‘my life’ 
becomes more and more disturbed.  Once fulfilling and self-affirming occupations and 
activities may need to be relinquished, further disaggregating the self and disrupting its 
narrative, and social engagement becomes increasingly difficult as language capacities 
diminish (Bender and Cheston, 1997; Fontana and Smith, 1989; Gubrium, 1987, Holst and 
Hallberg, 2003; Lyman, 1988; Sabat and Harre, 1992; Werner, 2005).  Objects lose their 
previous referents, temporalities clash and collapse, shrinking the temporary coalition that 
makes up the self into ever smaller windows of coherency (Cappa et al., 1998; Orona, 1990).  
Once casual displays of personhood will become strained undertakings, punctured with the 
increasing frequency of failures in the ability to pass as neurologically ‘normal’, and so 
resulting in increased dependence on close confidants to uphold performative aspects of 
identity (Fontana and Smith, 1989).  Ascribed statuses may shift and stigmas can wound and 
fester, with all behaviours now framed by others through the new master status of being 
‘demented’ (Van Gorp and Vercruysse, 2012; Milne, 2010; Blay and Peluso, 2010).   
Neurodegenerative diseases are incredibly idiosyncratic in manifestation and rarely run a 
smooth course of manageable decline, hence such conditions are not easily amenable to 
precise, rationalised programs of care (Kitwood and Bredin, 1994; Kitwood, 1992).  Capacities 
can wax and wane, sudden losses are frequently observed, while varying degrees of ‘rementia’ 
(temporary regaining of abilities) are also quite common.  What manifests, then, is a gradual 
disorganisation of self, a process requiring a cautiously negotiated ‘structuring and 
destructuring’ of the self and its changing relation to the world (Gubrium, 1987).   
This relational, interdependent labour – characterised by the gradual refiguring of the bounds 
of capacity and negotiating how a person may best feel affirmed within the constraints of 
neurodegeneration – contrasts wildly with the ideal subject envisioned by hard transhumanists 
discussed throughout this thesis, who stubbornly focus on the accumulation of ‘higher’ 
cognitive capacities.  Combined with an overarching ethic of personal responsibility, such 
neuroethical frames may generate a cruel perpetual labour, with care of the self bent upon 
feverish ‘brain training’ in the largely Sisyphean hope of averting neurodegenerative disease.  
However, if we can reorient neuroethical approaches in ways that do not insist – via intensive, 
self-disaggregating means of highly prescriptive ‘enhancement’ and ‘training’ – on heightening 
our rational and ‘productive’ capacities, then we may also discover ways of rethinking our 
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approach to dementia, and to the question of subjectivity and ethical wellbeing more 
generally.  
The emerging somatic ethic bequeathed to the neurological subject – described throughout 
this thesis as undertaken via intensive means, but directed to (narrowly) expansive ends – 
needs to be understood in the context of an equally generalised fear of cognitive decline, with 
dementia ranking amongst the most feared ailments (Blay and Peluso, 2010; Corner and Bond, 
2004; Cantegreil-Kallen and Pin, 2012).  Given the condition’s growing prevalence, a more 
productive rearticulation of what is at stake in the diverse experiences gathered under the 
umbrella term of dementia seems crucial.  In particular, this chapter is concerned with how 
works of fiction might serve to rescue framings of neurodegenerative disease from the current 
wedged position between: a terminal illness to which we look to the laboratory for 
preventative and curative breakthroughs; a parlous, maligned state as the seeming antithesis 
of our ‘hypercognitive’ society; and finally the experiences of those who must live with these 
conditions, usually for several years, and so find themselves in a state of ongoing ontological 
precarity.   
Fictional works, I suggest, provide insight that can alleviate these sociological discords, while 
also looking to mimetically capture something of the elusive subjectivity of living with 
dementia.  This is a pressing task, for it has long been observed that characterisations of 
dementia in popular discourses have unduly skewed towards the horrific and monstrous 
qualities of neurodegenerative disease (Clarke, 2006; Kirkman, 2006; Robertson, 1990; Segers, 
2007; Van Gorp and Veycruysse, 2012).  This focus understandably reflects a commitment to 
gritty realism, but is also an inadvertent outcome of the effective work done by early 
advocates in attempting to raise public awareness, and to attach to the disease a sense of 
legitimacy and urgency (Herskovits, 1995).  Indeed, much of the advocacy-focused literature 
produced in order to stoke awareness and monetary donations has been characterised by its 
tragic rhetoric: 
‘It’s a nightmare. And you can’t wake up … Alzheimer’s will strike 986 more Americans 
today. And tomorrow. We don’t know who will be in that group of victims. It could be 
someone you know. Someone in your family. Your closest friend. It could be you. We 
just don’t know. We know this: 986 more will be taken today, and every day, until we 
stop it!’ 




One unintended consequence of these nightmarish, fear-inducing representations has been 
the imposition of stigma, whereby those diagnosed with dementia are presumed to have 
crossed a threshold into the incommunicable.  We too readily ‘lean on’ these presumptions of 
incapacities and failings presented to us by overarching discourses, resulting in a ‘discrediting 
effect’ that may bear no fair relation to a person’s actual functioning, but brings disabling 
stigmas into effect (Goffman, 1963: 2-3; Mackenzie, 2006). The identity of the stigmatised 
person is thus, as Goffman (1963) famously put it, ‘spoiled’, insofar as a measured deviance 
from the norm marks it as an ongoing object of management.  Particularly for those in early to 
moderate stages of dementia progression, forms of ‘malignant social psychology’ can be 
generated through the imposition of stigma and subsequent impacts on social engagement 
(Kitwood, 1990, 1997).  It should be stressed that, in considering the contextual elements of 
the disease’s progression, the point I wish to emphasise here is certainly not to reduce the 
shifting relations born of dementia to a social construction.  Rather, my focus here speaks to 
the quotidian but vitally affirming interpersonal labour of maintaining for another the sense of 
life as a propulsive, meaningful narrative.  As neurological insight and the experiences of those 
living with dementia indicates, the materiality of the disease is such that those who live with 
dementia for long enough will likely reach a stage where relational ties between themselves 
and others have changed irrevocably.  Yet, what may persist for a lengthy period prior to any 
final debilitation is a desire to be in the world, to be affirmed as a willing agent still capable of 
affective exchange.  Maintaining these lines and potentials of relationality is thus a major part 
of the emotional labour in dementia care, a labour that tells us much about the necessity to 
accord recognition to the diversity of neurological modes of being. 
Thoughtful and well-researched constructions of dementia in fictional texts can provide a 
much needed ‘epistemology of humility’ by taking seriously the interiority of subjects 
undergoing this transformation of being-in-the-world, rather than simply reducing them to 
their medico-legal condition (Post, 2001: 18).  In this way explorative and experimental 
narratives can help ‘resuscitate the humanity’ of those living with dementia, and may even 
challenge hardened categories of the normal and the pathological by demonstrating the 
complexly entangled qualities of degeneration, ageing, and sociality (Herskovits, 1995).  While 
important research has been done to bring the experiential dimension of neurological 
difference to the fore, the sheer diversity of experiences in living with a condition such as 
dementia is grossly under-represented in the broad cultural sphere, implicitly dispelled to the 
margins of the non-hypercognitive subject within neuroethical discourse.  This, in part, 
contributes to the stigma and fear so often attached to neurological difference.  To counter 
this paucity of perspective, the breadth and slow-burn approach of fictional works can vividly 
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achieve the deftly contextualised weaving of narrative with the gradual onset of a neurological 
condition, and may therefore play a crucial role in representing and opening alternate 
trajectories. 
For this chapter, which explores the entanglement of selfhood, dementia, and narrative, it is 
necessary to firstly indicate the limitations of popular media representations in order to best 
underscore the significance of the literary fiction texts that will inform the rest of the analysis.  
These texts will be addressed through: their attempts towards mimetic depictions of the 
interiority of dementia; the importance they accord to the narrative persistence of their 
protagonists; these characters’ willing urgency; the impact of collapsing temporalities; the ebb 
and flow of psychosomatic and affective experience; and the sense such novels give of how we 




The biomedical and experiential status of dementia 
 
In providing some historical context it should be noted that any formally recorded social 
impact of Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias prior to the 1970s was relatively scarce, 
primarily due to the condition and its prevalence being poorly understood (Beach, 1987; Fox, 
1989; Adelman and Verbrugge, 2000).  Too easily equated with ‘normal’ ageing, diagnoses of 
dementia were rarely applied with confidence, let alone supplemented with provisions of 
support (Fox, 1989; Ming and Fernandez, 2001).  Dementia as a biomedical category was 
effectively stuck in a ‘no man’s land’ in which it was ‘neither neurological nor psychiatric 
disorder’ (Lock, 2013: 35). While some progress has been made in diagnostic methods since 
then, clinical breakthroughs are not forthcoming, with current pharmaceutical treatments 
serving largely as palliative treatments or mild stalling agents if administered in the early 
stages of disease progression (Birks, 2012).   
While current efforts towards pharmacological interventions are ostensibly welcome 
developments, decades of research have perhaps been successful only in lowering our 
expectations of thoroughly understanding the degenerating brain, and most scientists and 
clinicians know better than to promise cures or efficacious preventative measures in the near 
future (Lock, 2013; George and Whitehouse, 2008; Diamond, 2010). This, however, has not 
stopped the proliferation of wishful and overblown rhetoric that often emerges when scientific 
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endeavours align themselves with the machinations of the formal political sphere and popular 
media hype cycles.  One recent example of this is the ‘US National Plan to Address Alzheimer’s 
Disease’, which aims to ‘Prevent and Effectively Treat Alzheimer’s Disease by 2025’ (Office of 
the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 2014).  Such an ambitious target was met 
with public praise, but the reality is that hopes of more effective drugs are dispelled with 
dispiriting regularity, with over twenty promising compounds failing Phase III trials since 2002 
(Diamond, 2010). 
But while biomedical researchers continue to make incremental progress, social scientists have 
a role to play in providing a more attentive and nuanced sense of what it is actually like to live 
with dementia (Lyman, 2000; Beard, 2004; O’Connor et al. 2007; Kitwood, 1997).  Certainly, a 
great deal of progress has been made in the past few decades in according due respect and 
improving the quality of life of those with dementia.  Following the construction of dementia 
as a formal medical category, advancements were made in bioethical issues around informed 
consent and end of life care (eg. tube-feeding, DNRs, and other advance directives), and 
bioethical debate continues on the legitimacy and implementation of these directives 
(DeGrazia, 1999).  These, of course, are all very important issues in minimising unnecessary 
suffering, but they may also amount to a reduction of the subjectivity of the sufferer to a 
pathological form of selfhood, and this may distract from more quotidian realities relevant to 
quality of life (O’Neill, 1997).  In this respect, the shifting emphasis among many scholars from 
‘end of’ to ‘life with’ dementia is a welcome change, for current standard biomedical models 
have little to offer to those who bear witness to a radical change in their very ontology: 
‘No theory of medicine can explain what is happening to me.  Every few months I 
sense that another piece of me is missing. My life, my self, are falling apart.  I can only 
think half thoughts now.  Someday I may wake up and not think at all, not know who I 
am.  Most people expect to die someday, but whoever expected to lose their self first.’  
Cohen-Mansfield, Golander and Arnheim, 2000: 382 
There is no doubt that bearing a form of partial witness to your own ontological oblivion is a 
harrowing prospect.  But the point is not that we should pity those who find themselves 
countenancing such devastating futures, for sympathy by itself ‘misevaluates what is actually 
important in human life, placing material suffering over spiritual independence’, and so 
counter-productively diminishes the one who is suffering (Berger, 2014: 175).  A popular focus 
on the terminal stages of dementia may unhelpfully skew representations of those living with 
the condition, constrictively framing them within schemas of grossly reduced autonomy, and 
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reducing the voice of subjects who are already presupposed to require others to speak for 
them and act on their behalf (Van Gorp and Vercruysse, 2012; Cotrell and Schulz, 1993). 
The threat of the production of social stigmas associated with dementia is abundant.  Subjects 
with dementia are feared, found to be irritating, and seen as persons to be avoided (Blay and 
Peluso, 2009: 167).  Such views are both generated and reflected by popular media, which is, 
here as elsewhere, ‘a powerful transmitter of stereotypes’ (Kirkman, 2006: 74).  On this, 
Herskovits (1995: 152-3) wearyingly observes that: 
‘The lay media are replete with clichéd metaphors and representations in which 
Alzheimer's is characteristically drawn in colorfully dramatic terms that paint vividly 
disturbing images. Words used to describe AD include killer, thief, terrifying, ruinous, 
living death, never-ending funeral, and private hell of devastation and destruction. 
People with Alzheimer's are outlandish, bizarre, deranged and wacky, shells of their 
former selves.’  
For its part, the popular media skews towards a ‘ghoulish interest with extremities to which 
dementia can lead’, producing accounts that, while ostensibly truthful, are often not fairly 
representative of the wide spectrum of life with dementia (Zeillig, 2014: 261, see also Clarke, 
2006).  These popular narratives of dread and hopelessness are ironic outcomes of rhetoric 
that aims for hard veracity but instead generates either hollow affectations or sensationalist 
horror, thus inadvertently edging the supposed source of its concern further across the 
threshold from subject to object, person to patient (Zeilig, 2014: 262).   Unsurprisingly, then, 
there is commonly a social distance imposed upon the subject with dementia, one that 
extends as symptoms become more apparent (Werner, 2005).  The lamentable outcome, then, 
is that dementia ‘seems to act as a very powerful solvent on many kinds of social ties.’ (Taylor, 
2008: 319).  There is, as Beard, Knauss and Moyer (2009) observe in a novel study co-written 
with a person living with Alzheimer’s, a frustratingly dominant ‘discourse of loss’ that 
invariably presents dementia in damning, bleak, and fatalistic ways.  Too often ‘horror seems 
to be the default genre’ in representing dementia to a wide audience (Taylor, 2008: 321).  
Goffman’s (1963) now classic descriptions of stigma through the performative labelling of 
abnormal subjects remains insightful here, even if he may not have directly considered the 
role that popular media might come to play in reducing identity to narrowly ascribed medical 
categories.  The risk here is of creating a ‘disease double’, where those with dementia suffer 
not only from the disease-in-itself – however that may variously manifest – but also ‘the layers 
of stigma, rejection, fear, and exclusion that attach to particularly dreaded diseases’ (Scheper-
Hughes and Lock, 1986: 137-8, cited in Herskovits, 1995: 152).  Yet, as I have suggested, to 
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place all the emphasis on the social construction of stigma would be to fail to attend to the 
material reality of the transformation in selfhood that ‘dementia’ names, along with the 
persistence of the will to remain narratively tethered to the world.   
Let me also be clear in stating that this discussion does not seek to romanticise 
neurodegenerative disease, for forms of dementia constitute a debilitating condition that can 
be a terrifying and devastating experience, one that may result in tortuously long periods of 
suffering before death, and which can impose dreadful burdens on carers and loved ones.  
Persons with dementia commonly suffer a form of ‘social death’, while their primary carers 
may be wracked with a wrenching ambivalence, resulting in ‘compassion fatigue’ and even, in 
many cases, homicidal and/or suicidal ideation (Sweeting and Gilhooly, 1997; Day and 
Anderson, 2011; O'Dwyer et al. 2013; O'Dwyer et al. 2015; Werner, Goldstein and Buchbinder, 
2010).  Over time the indexical self of the person with dementia will gradually slip into the 
ether as the subject loses the very referents of themselves as a unified agent (Sabat and Harre, 
1992).  Similarly, what might be described as the ‘quotidian self’ will steadily recede as once 
seemingly innate cycles of time, habit, and memory become unstuck (eg. the common 
tendency of ‘sundowning’) (Volicer et al. 2001).  The once autonomous socio-political sense of 
agency that makes up a critically constitutive part of the modern subject will also be lost, with 
the rights and obligations of citizenry and responsibility for oneself either struck out or 
accorded to another.   
For now, the popular production of melancholy and pity without the offer of genuine 
consolation, empathy, and alleviation of suffering risks becoming oddly exploitative, reducing 
those with dementia to objects of pity through which we contemplate the fine margins of life.  
In this light, perhaps we should reconsider our current overwhelming focus in the public 
sphere on the very latterly stages of neurodegenerative disease, as these repeated 
perspectives and their accompanying behaviours may actually hasten the unravelling of 
selfhood in self-fulfilling ways (Kitwood, 1990, 1997; Lyman 1988).  Until the mid-1970s it 
seemed ‘scarcely thinkable’ to place neurodegenerative disease within the ambit of sociology, 
social psychology, and related fields (Kitwood, 1993: 541).  The notable absence of reflections 
on selfhood and personhood within biomedical frameworks has primarily been the result of a 
narrowly rigourous approach: 
‘… the psychiatry of old age has had an overwhelming tendency to make the brain 
rather than the personhood of the dementia sufferer its central focus of attention; the 
inquiry has been technical rather than personal.’  
Kitwood and Bredin, 1992: 270   
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The neurosciences’ intensive gaze into the brain – at the expense of a wealth of other 
contextualising nuances – has been a running theme throughout this thesis.  It appears that 
considerations of personhood and subjectivity may have proven too nebulous as concepts and 
categories, too unwieldy to be housed under rationalised metrics of wellbeing, and thus have 
been avoided in laboratory and clinical discourses or rendered in strictly ‘hard’, cognitive, 
functionalist terms.  The result is that those living with dementia have been ‘largely invisible’ in 
the academic literature, with little attention accorded to their subjective experience and views 
(Lyman, 1989: 603, see also Herskovits, 1995).  From the early 1980s this blinkered perspective 
was, slowly, beginning to be corrected.  This progress was aided by developments in theories 
of dementia care, which brought the person with dementia back to the forefront (Gubrium, 
1986, 1987; Kitwood and Bredin 1992, 1994; Kitwood, 1997).  Further changes emerged 
through guidance and discussion of: the difficulties in interpreting cues from those with severe 
symptoms (Allender and Kaszniak, 1989); the importance of ‘active listening’ to better 
understand difficult to interpret intentions (Gubrium, 1986); and empirical work that 
demonstrated the importance of maintaining narrative continuity (Usita, Hyman and Herman, 
1998).  
This is a welcome shift, if only because there is clearly not an absolute correlation between 
cognitive decline and overall wellbeing.  Some subjects with dementia in the very latterly 
stages will ‘still appear to be faring well as persons’, while others in earlier stages may be 
wracked with anxiety, depression, and apathy which may be caused and/or compounded by 
loss of social engagement, altogether hastening a loss of selfhood in ways that can potentially 
be alleviated (Kitwood and Bredin, 1992: 280).  Certain routine habits, patterns of phrases, and 
ritualistic exchanges allow some persons with dementia to pass as fully functioning and 
autonomous, even though there is often a mismatch between the action performed and the 
social milieu in which it occurs (Smith and Fontana, 1989).  Thus, while the overall concert of 
interaction may be lost, many comforting rhythms and routines may linger and these practices, 
when reflected back by others in their performances, can provide a source of ongoing 
affirmation of self even amidst the steady creep of neurodegeneration.  It is therefore worth 
reconsidering the problem of the self ‘in a way that cuts across the dimension of cognitive 
impairment’ (Kitwood and Bredin, 1992: 280).  
One means by which we might reframe dementia is by including the voice of the person living 
with dementia wherever possible, as firsthand accounts remain relatively rare (Cottrell and 
Schulz, 1993; Beard, 2004b; Clarke, 2006).  Subjects living with dementia have noted the 
belittling and disheartening sense of becoming ‘invisible’, ‘dismissed’, ‘smothered’ and left to 
linger in relative solitude (Sterin, 2002).  Through rationalised processes of caregiving under 
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tight resource constraints, persons living with dementia may be cleaved from patterns, 
routines, locales, and rhythms of domesticity and social life, which can exacerbate the loss of 
narrative grounding and emotional engagement (Schreiner, Yamamoto and Shiotani, 2005).  
Alternatively, including the views of those in the early stages of dementia allows them to 
better articulate their preferences for the future, thus potentially alleviating some dilemmas of 
end-of-life care.  This pragmatic adjustment to autonomy provides a potential source of 
comfort, for persons with dementia can now exercise a form of agency that extends their 
temporal being, creating a greater sense of control over their own narrative (Cottrell and 
Schulz, 1993).   
Through such adjustments in care practices the problem of the ‘missing person’ living with 
dementia has improved somewhat of late (Clarke, 2006).   In part this shift has also been aided 
and enacted through the emergence of popular biographies and autobiographies of life with 
dementia, many of which argue persuasively for both pragmatic and imaginative conceptions 
that afford more autonomy to the subject.  Academic papers have begun featuring authors 
living with dementia, lamenting the often depersonalising quality of current participation in 
research, where subjects and their habits, experiences and preferences are reduced to neatly 
discrete but meaning-bereft packets of data (Beard, Knauss, and Moyer, 2009; Knauss & 
Moyer, 2006; Tanner, 2012).  In addition, I will argue, works of thoroughly researched and 
sensitively rendered fiction can also contribute to productive reconceptualising of neurological 
difference.   
Examining this specific genre of the ‘neuronovel’ – discussed in more detail in the introductory 
chapter of this thesis – Sarah Birge (2012: 93) suggests that ‘neurofiction’s ability to create and 
explore selfhood, rather than merely “brainhood”, positions the genre to fulfil an important 
role in studies of consciousness’.  Birge (2012: 93) further notes: 
‘Neurofiction, which frequently features central characters with cognitive disabilities, 
provides complex portrayals of the intersection between brains and culture, serving to 
elucidate ways in which the interactions of biological structures and processes, 
physical environments, and social interactions (including institutions such as the legal 
and health-care systems) operate to construct individual and social understandings of 
cognitive disability.  Neurofiction articulates and influences the webs of meaning that 
contribute to the cultural creation and experience of cognition and consciousness.’ 
 
In this way such works may contribute to a better understanding of how we may labour to 
maintain narratives capable of re-aligning the volitions of those living with dementia with their 
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capacities.  Insofar as we are custodians of each other’s selfhood in almost any context of life, 
this is especially the case for those living with dementia, who will likely be more dependent 
upon another in maintaining an accord between cognition, emotion, body, environment, and 
temporality (King, 2009: 297).  Within the current ‘therapeutic void’ (George and Whitehouse, 
2008: 590) of ineffective clinical and pharmaceutical interventions our interpersonal efforts to 
alleviate these commonly occurring discords of self and world become ever more important.  
In turn, this shift holds promise for a productive reconfiguring of selfhood, signalling a move 
away from the tyranny of the ‘hypercognitive’ island of self and its ‘productive’ capacities, to a 
subjectivity framed in more extensive and expressive ways: 
‘We may need to stop looking only to individuals as the bearers of “selfhood,” and 
start looking more at how “selfhood” is distributed among networks, sustained by 
supportive environments, emergent within practices of care.’  
Taylor, 2008: 326  
Through this reorientation we might also dismantle some prevailing narrow spectroscopes of 
‘wellbeing’ that insist on the intensive gaze into an unrealistically unified, rational subject.  
Therefore, in addition to rethinking the subjectivity of those living with dementia, it is possible 
that we might breathe new vitality into our approach to the neurological subject more 
generally.  As Kitwood (1989: 13) suggests: 
‘… one of the crucial factors is the extent to which the 'experiential self has or has not 
been well-developed: that is, an integrated centre, grounded in feeling and emotion.  
For this can remain when the 'adapted self’ (derived from role-performance and 
meeting others expectations) declines – as is very often the case for people in later 
life.’ 
Thus the pathology of neurofibrillary plaques and tangles and performance on a battery of 
cognitive assessments should not be wholly determinative of our conceptions of the 
neurodegenerating subject.  Such narrow conceptions and the coolly objective clinical gaze 
that determines them may only result in a needless denuding of the self, whereby otherwise 
good-faith attempts at understanding the manifestation of a condition inadvertently deprive 
other ways of maintaining and affirming being.  As Vittoria (1998: 104-5) notes, the 
preservation of the self undergoing cognitive decline requires ‘communicative care’, an 
emotional labour not ‘done to’ the person, but ‘done with’.  Arlie Russel Hochschild’s (2012) 
highly influential work on the various forms of emotional labour that sustain selfhood and 
social life in diverse contexts remains pertinent here, and the social sciences can still learn 
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much from the necessity and nuance of emotional labour in the case of dementia.  One carer 
of those affected with dementia pithily described this labour as the willingness to ‘go in their 
world with them’ (Vittoria, 1998: 108), and the degree of adaptation required for the journey 
says much about the existence – and indeed the fragile contingency – of typical frames of 
selfhood.  To pursue such a labour of mutual world-building is a demanding undertaking for 
the committed carer, for within the mind of the person with dementia temporalities can 
dramatically flatten and tangle: 
‘They’re back forty or fifty years in their mind.  Because everybody’s mother and father 
is living.  Everybody’s always going to see Mom and Dad.  I know they go back to their 
hometown.  They go back to the farm and on and on and on.’  
Anonymous Certified Nurse in interview with Vittoria, 1998: 108 
Narratives and volitions thus take on a fluidity of space and temporality to which carers – 
when time and other resources allow – attempt to accord themselves.  This is not to ‘indulge’ 
or ‘humour’ the person with dementia, but rather to enter into a performative display that 
affirms the subject’s narrative worldview to whatever extent is practically possible.  A common 
example of this is evident in the persistence of habits of an occupational, vocational, or similar 
role-based nature.  Residents may slip into the personas of their former day-to-day public 
selves, for example once managerial types may find comforting rhythms in professionally 
courteous exchanges or studious bookkeeping, while those formerly in caring professions 
(homemakers, nurses) will in turn dedicate themselves to upkeep, cleanliness, and concern for 
the welfare of others (Vittoria, 1998: 112-13).  These performative exchanges can prove to be 
effective strategies in retaining a sense of self-worth and vocation through labour for others, 
while also likely being comforting in their familiarity, injecting a knowing rhythm into 
exchanges that may otherwise be overwhelming and bewildering.  
Fictional explorations of dementia are one means by which we may get closer to the interiority 
and temporality of the quotidian rhythms of living with dementia, but may also serve as a way 
of imaginatively ‘anticipating’ a highly uncertain future:  
‘But when I consider my own future in a family predisposed to Alzheimer’s, I’m left 
with urgent questions that only fiction can answer: What do those late stages feel like? 
What is it like to lose oneself and still live?  Could there be some essential kernel of 
selfhood that survives until the end?  Mid- to late-stage sufferers, lost in their aphasia, 
can’t explain it to us.’ 
Block, 2014 (my emphasis)  
153 
 
King (2009: 297) similarly observes that ‘only imaginative reconstruction can hope to explore 
the experience of memory loss beyond the point when the very attempt to write fails’.  
Admittedly, there is inevitably a degree of speculative thought that comes with such works, 
but I would suggest that cautious, thoughtful speculations that seek to be productively open to 
contestation and debate are of greater use to us than the hasty assumptions and affixing of 
the ideal neurological subject that I have critiqued throughout this thesis.  
The fictional characters living with dementia that I discuss below are presented as precariously 
teetering in a ‘liminal state’, neither as capable as they once were, nor past a point where 
forced reductions in autonomy will not harm self-esteem (Lock, 2014: 91).  The elusive 
subjectivities of those living with dementia are the central focus of these novels, explored with 
a depth and sensitivity that allows for empathy, rather than just sympathy.  In this way such 
narratives can be both consoling and gently instructive.  Such works have the potential to open 
up alternative ways of seeing the ‘demented’, and offer ways of getting out of commonly 
invoked but often unproductive frames of dementia as a forthcoming ‘tsunami’, a ‘collective 
terror’, and ‘nothing more than a fatal prognosis’ (Van Gorp and Vercruysse, 2012: 1278).  At 
its best, such fiction may also tell us much about the ‘hard’ emerging norms of subjectivity in 
the era of the neurosciences, and the increasing labours that must be done to uphold such 
often Sisyphean tasks of averting neurodegeneration; with such toiling in vain rendered 
strikingly visible at the bifurcations in the narrative of selfhood that dementia brings so 
dramatically to the fore.  
 
 
Tropes of dementia in fictional works 
 
Accounts of the day-to-day realities of dementia have come largely from carers and 
occasionally from neurologists, with several biographical works achieving widespread interest.  
Though welcome developments, these works ‘inevitably put the subjectivity of the carer at the 
centre, rather than that of the person experiencing dementia’ (King, 2009: 297).  Curiously, 
some of the first examples striving to correct this imbalance were actually by those caring for 
loved ones with dementia, who would look to ‘translate’ into poetry or prose what 
communicative urges they believed resided within but were bodily trapped in those for whom 
they cared (Gubrium 1988; Herskovits, 1995).  Other fictional works have sought to gently 
instruct and console family members of those affected by dementia, particularly children, who 
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frequently serve as primary or secondary carers (Manthorpe, 2005).   A recent example of this 
fictional literature developed for children is The Dementia Diaries (Snyman, 2013), a work 
which was the outcome of a pioneering project by the Social Innovation Lab of Kent (SILK).  
Through their collaborative ‘human-centred methodology’ SILK worked with children who had 
close family members living with dementia to produce a lively, appealing, but also 
appropriately frank account of common experiences of living with a dementia sufferer.  These 
forms of thoughtful, participatory collaboration can prove very effective in undoing stigmas 
and fostering communities better equipped to cope with neurological difference. 
Sadly though, not all creative works presenting neurodegenerative disease adhere to such a 
mandate of sensitivity and authenticity.  Popular films can be especially susceptible to 
exploiting dementia as a banal trope or convenient plot device (Segers, 2007).  Block (2014) 
also observes a similar trend in the incorporation of dementia in some works of literary fiction: 
‘Nearly every novel I’ve read that attempts to depict the internal experience of 
Alzheimer’s also attempts to fit the disease’s retrogenic symptoms to one sort of 
sentimental trope: a reckoning with a repressed or unacknowledged truth that must 
come before acceptance is possible.’  
Such practices introduce an unnecessarily moralised quality to depictions of terminal illness, 
where suffering is visited upon a person as an impetus for them to correct the mistakes of the 
past before they shuffle off this mortal coil.  These overly convenient tropes and inane 
sentimentalising of dementia may prove counter-productive in improving wider understanding 
of neurodegenerative disease. 
Some fictional works, however, feature characters living with dementia in ways that are 
plausibly woven into wider contexts.  Zeilig (2014: 262-3) cites High Hopes (1988) and A 
Separation (2011) as two fictional films that highlight the interweaving of the materiality of 
body/brain experience with social context, through an array of neurodiverse characters and 
plotting attuned to the trials of neuropathological ascriptions and experiences.  High Hopes is 
set during the Thatcher years, with the treatment of a woman with dementia paralleling the 
cold brutishness of social and economic policy at the time.  Please note, however, that 
dementia is not being cheaply troped in High Hopes as a metaphorical means of representing 
wider societal issues.  Rather, the film describes the dialectical and mutually reinforcing 
circumstances in depicting the micro and macro effects of fostering a culture of coldly 
disinterested sentiment.  Put another way, there are broad but often unintended 
consequences to rationalisation processes in which we are called to realise specific value-
bearing capacities as individuals.  Though such ideological frameworks are intended to raise 
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overall wellbeing they may also inadvertently cultivate dispositions within subjects that can 
prove detrimental to the quality of life for those who do not conform to the ideal types of such 
frameworks of citizenship.  A Separation is similarly instructive in realistically portraying the 
familial tension, anguish, and difficult compromises that can arise for families who care for 
loved ones with dementia.  Yet while popular representations of dementia are generally 
improving, Cohen-Shalev and Marcus (2012) argue that there is still a dearth of films which 
delve into the subjective experience of characters undergoing cognitive decline.  This is 
somewhat understandable, given that a dilemma arises in considering how to depict the 
experience of dementia on film – a medium where the depiction of internal states can be 
difficult to do well – without embracing experimental methods that may attract the ire of 
viewers seeking generally ‘realistic’ portrayals. 
Novels, however, can more easily access and present interiority, and may capture subjective 
states and intentionality with a depth and complexity that other media cannot readily equal 
(Zunshine, 2006).  Moreover, the slow, nuanced unravelling of a novel allows for a form of 
slow-burn advocacy, for readers can bear witness to protagonists at their most vivacious 
selves, pre-dementia, and then travel with these characters as they are steadily ontologically 
reconfigured.  Given that we generally enter into a novel by making what Paul Ricoeur 
described as a ‘wager’ (1967: 355) – ie. we actively seek to enter into a form of alterity and 
stretching of empathic capacities – then fictional works hold great potential in opening up new 
avenues for how we might approach neurological difference.  
 
Point-of-view and the figuration of difference 
 
Part of this chapter’s contribution to efforts of neurodiversity – and the accompanying 
rejection of the ‘hypercognitive’ subject – is through outlining the importance of point-of-view 
as a means by which to explore the subjectivity of dementia.  The novels to be discussed below 
all adopt different approaches to point-of-view, with each approach making a worthwhile 
contribution to reframing common perceptions of the ‘demented’ subject.  For the reader’s 
ease of engaging with the following discussion, a brief synopsis is provided of each the novels 




Still Alice – Lisa Genova (2009) 
Alice is a 50 year-old professor of linguistics at Harvard, married to a fellow academic, and 
mother of three children.  Alice is suffering from recurrent failings of memory, and after 
diagnostic testing is confirmed to have a rare form of early onset Alzheimer’s.  Alice informs 
her family of her condition but attempts to conceal her symptoms from her Harvard 
colleagues.  Soon, however, damning student evaluations directly related to her cognitive 
decline compel Alice to ‘confess’ and relinquish her professional identity.  Not wishing to be 
reduced to an existence she considers intolerable, Alice develops a self-administered exam – 
the ‘Butterfly’ test – to be taken daily, which serves for her as a measure of whether life is still 
worth living.  In the event that Alice should fail the test, she has left clear, simple instructions 
in a computer file to enable her future, less capable, self to commit suicide.  As the disease 
advances, Alice tries to squeeze the most from life that she can, but must also contend with 
her husband’s unyielding career ambitions and her children’s differing opinions of what is best 
for her.  In these exchanges the novel demonstrates in various ways how Alice risks becoming 
a subject/person slowly and irrevocably rendered object/patient.  Still Alice is the most 
straightforward of the fictional works featured here, primarily striving to be a vehicle of gentle 
but unsparingly pragmatic instruction and advocacy on the difficulties of living with dementia, 
along with dismantling common misconceptions.  The author, Lisa Genova, is a Harvard-
trained neuroscientist. 
 
Elizabeth is Missing – Emma Healey (2014) 
Maud is an elderly yet still sprightly woman living with dementia, cared for by her weary but 
patient daughter, Helen, and tactless part-time carer, Carla.  For the most part though Maud is 
left alone to while away the hours, watching daytime television with sardonic puzzlement and 
following (and equal parts resisting) instructions left around the house in the form of 
handwritten notes.  But something is troubling Maud: her friend Elizabeth seems to be 
missing, and Maud’s own handwritten notes remind her of this repeatedly.  However, her 
concerns are dismissed by others, so Maud sets out to investigate, gamely attempting to 
compensate for her lapses of memory through diligent note-taking.  As Maud searches for 
clues, the narrative is intercut with her memories surrounding the unsolved disappearance of 
her older sister Sukey, who went missing in suspicious circumstances when they were young.  
These haunting reveries are often triggered by sensory stimuli in the present, bubbling up 
announced with such vividness that Maud often finds herself caught unawares by her 
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accompanying behaviour.  As the novel progresses these two mysteries become further 
entwined, generating an urgency and escalating tension heightened further by Maud’s steadily 
declining capacities.      
 
We Are Not Ourselves – Matthew Thomas (2014) 
This novel is told mainly through the perspective of Eileen, an Irish-American woman seeking 
the ‘American Dream’ after a troubled childhood characterised by alcoholism and familial 
conflict.  During the cultural turbulence of the 1960s Eileen meets Ed, a young scientist 
specialising in psychopharmacology, and they soon wed.  Reserved, but tender in his own 
absent-minded professor-type way, Ed represents for Eileen the promise of life soon to be 
fulfilled.  After some time though Ed begins to develop strange habits, accompanied by an 
inwardness that seems to border on selfish obtuseness towards Eileen, who at one point fears 
that she has ‘interrupted him in a reflection on something monstrous’ (Thomas, 2014: 122).  It 
appears that Ed can sense a cruel augur of what is to come.  Eileen, however, is clouded by her 
fervent desire to realise their upward class mobility and status potential, and so neglects to 
recognise that Ed is suffering from early-onset Alzheimer’s disease.  Eventually Ed is diagnosed 
and Eileen must contend with his cognitive decline as they struggle to manage their affairs.  
The point of view in this novel also shifts for brief periods to Eileen and Ed’s only child, Connell, 
a young man going through his formative years just as his father is steadily rendered formless. 
 
The Night Guest – Fiona McFarlane (2013) 
Ruth is a 75 year-old woman living by herself in a secluded coastal setting.  Having grown up in 
Fiji and spending most of her adult life in Sydney, Ruth and her husband decide to retire to a 
more peaceful locale.  However, soon after this move Ruth’s husband dies of a heart attack, 
and Ruth finds herself very much alone as dementia begins to take hold.  By her own 
assessment, life for Ruth has just seemed to stop (McFarlane: 2013, 107).  One evening Ruth’s 
‘blurry brain’ (McFarlane: 2013: 1) senses the presence of a tiger in her home.  Ruth does not 
see the tiger, and well knows that the tiger cannot possibly be ‘real’, yet the veracity of the 
tiger is in all other ways undeniable for Ruth, embodying something of ‘extravagant 
consequence’ she finds enlivening (4).  The very next morning a woman, Frida, arrives at the 
house, announcing herself as Ruth’s new carer, assigned by the government.  Ruth soon finds 
herself equally distrustful and dependent upon Frida, whose own presence is very much like a 
tiger’s: playful, but also powerful, unpredictable, and sometimes fearsome.  The two 
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unannounced arrivals trigger a stalking sense of foreboding, instilling a deeply felt urgency 
within Ruth to realise unfulfilled but hazily defined desires before her remaining autonomy is 
entirely foreclosed.  As Ruth’s dementia worsens her ability to assert herself over the 
domineering Frida wanes.  Consequently, Ruth finds herself in a claustrophobic, threatening 
setting, seeking some form of reconciliation with the world before her volitional unity of being 
is eclipsed.  
 
The point of view chosen in these novels is notable, for in each instance they reflect a shift 
towards according a greater voice to those living with dementia.  Emma Healey is particularly 
ambitious in adopting a first-person perspective of a character with dementia throughout the 
entirety of Elizabeth is Missing.  Lisa Genova and Fiona McFarlane adopt a slightly less 
restrictive third-person limited view, with interiority granted only to the protagonists living 
with dementia, Alice and Ruth respectively.  Matthew Thomas’ We Are Not Ourselves is an 
exception here, for this novel is told solely through the perspectives of Eileen and Connell, who 
bear intimate witness to Ed’s decline.  Ed’s interior life therefore remains somewhat of a 
mystery, but is delicately revealed through evident changes in disposition as his condition 
worsens.   
This recent turn towards greater recognition of the subjective experience of dementia – both 
in fiction and non-fiction – raises productive questions around the aspiration to mimetic 
representation, and of how we might faithfully express living with conditions that are so often 
characterised by their inexpressibility.  It is here we might briefly consider the work of Paul 
Ricoeur, the philosopher and literary theorist known particularly for his fruitful combination of 
phenomenology and hermeneutics (see Ricoeur, 1967, 1981, 1984, 1992, 2005).  Ricoeur’s 
philosophy is, at its core, relational, concerning itself with how the capabilities, vulnerabilities, 
and perceptions of self are shaped through our extensions and interpretations into and of the 
world.  The Ricoeurian ideal of literature is to extend the interpretative circle, and to build 
hermeneutic bridges between subjects through narratives informed by an ethic of reciprocity 
and recognition.  This, for Ricoeur (1967: 350), is a ‘restorative’ criticism, capable of 
resurrecting texts by unfixing them from their set contexts, opening them up to 
reincorporation into new settings, and thereby potentially ‘restoring’ subjects otherwise 
dismissed or maligned (see also Sedgwick, 2003, 123-52 on ‘reparative’ reading).   
Ricoeur is also invested in the relations between narrative, time, and the realisation of ethical 
potentials within these dialectical entanglements.  Ricouer (1992) affirms the sociological 
truism that our identity is a function of our engagements with others, with the implication 
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that, while we can doggedly attempt to craft our being, ultimately others are the ‘custodians’ 
of our selfhood, and we of theirs (especially in the case of dementia, see Hepworth, 2000; 
King, 2009; Taylor, 2008).  The crucial measure of ethical being may therefore not be those 
virtues gained by way of personal asceticism or other arbitrary measures, but rather the willed 
extensions of a self seeking communion with others, of reconfiguring oneself in service of 
another.  This ethical labour takes on greater urgency where dementia is concerned, for we 
must seek to join and maintain the narrative of another in ways that require both creativity 
and a measure of vulnerability in order to ‘get into the world’ of those for whom language and 
high-cognitive functioning are no longer primary (Vittoria, 1998).   
It is here that I should note what may appear to be a contradiction in these fictional 
explorations of dementia, captured by a reviewer of Elizabeth is Missing.  This reviewer was 
particularly incredulous when it came to the point-of-view chosen, suggesting that the 
interiority presented becomes steadily more implausible as the cognitive capacities of the 
protagonist declines, yet we, the reader, are presumed to consider them somehow ‘secretly 
articulate’ (Gillies, 2014).  There is some bite to this critique, for the character of Maud 
maintains a richly articulate interiority despite her waning capacities, as do Alice and Ruth in 
their respective works.  But to state that this representation is implausible would appear to 
needlessly reduce point-of-view in fiction to a superficial function of depicting only the 
semantic and clearly denotive ‘internal monologue’ of characters, which in itself is an 
implausible construction of our interiority.  Part of the very purpose of various techniques of 
narrative voice is to make communicable that which may initially seem inaccessible and 
inexpressible, for one of the functions of language is clearly as a hermeneutical bridge 
between different substantiations of being.  Entering into any narrative requires this willing 
suspension, one where ‘we must understand in order to believe, but we must believe in order 
to understand’ (Ricoeur, 1967: 351), engaging in a dialectic of ‘exposing ourselves to the text 
and receiving from it an enlarged self’ (1991: 88, cited in Simms, 2003: 131).  This, for Ricoeur, 
is a ‘wager’ we are asked to make, that we must in good faith give the gift of our credulity, 
willing ourselves into a space where hermeneutic bridges may work upon us, and so labouring 
together to liberate what might first seem opaque and impenetrable.  Admittedly some 
aspects of qualia will always remain hidden, and the novels featured are necessarily 
speculative in their attempts at a reparative hermeneutics of life with dementia.  Nevertheless, 
Ricoeur construes mimesis not simply as an attempt at reproducing the world-as-is, but rather 
in looking to elevate and illuminate the meaning behind action higher up in the hermeneutic 
circle, rendering a particular phenomenological state accessible in some form to a greater 
number of others (Simms, 2003: 61-85). 
160 
 
Ricoeur (1984: 54-76) proposed a threefold model of how mimesis may be realised, aspects of 
which take on curious nuances when applied to novels of dementia.  Firstly, we the reader 
must be suitably prefigured by being presented with some form of wilful agent.  This agent 
need not necessarily be ‘high functioning’, but we must be sufficiently clued into their 
capabilities so that we may adapt our practical understanding of narrative drive to the agent 
with whom we are asked to share some degree of interiority.  Thus we are introduced to 
intellectually driven, fiercely independent protagonists such as the academics Alice and Ed, 
before being asked to continually readjust our figurations of them as we bear ongoing witness 
to their decline.  For Elizabeth is Missing and The Night Guest we are also expected to 
recognise their respective twists on genre – broadly that of mystery and psychological thriller 
respectively – and align them with the lived experience of Maud and Ruth’s cognitive 
disorders.  So while the reader will soon be aware that ‘Elizabeth’ is not actually ‘missing’ this 
in no way diminishes the narrative as some abuse of the mystery genre, for we recognise that 
the actual primary aim of using this template is to explore a form of subjectivity in new ways.  
Similarly, while The Night Guest, with its fugue-state fantastical qualities, may set itself up as 
yet another entry into the psychological and claustrophobic thriller canon, we quickly 
understand that such titillation is certainly not McFarlane’s main objective.  Ruth knows the 
tiger is not real, as do we, but that does not preclude the phenomenological reality that Ruth is 
witnessing the tiger as some virtualisation of portent that is otherwise inexpressible.  We are 
asked only to accept that the internal state of someone with dementia could plausibly 
manifest such a spectral being.27 
We must next contemplate Ricoeurian configurations: the drive, the urgency, and the means 
by which the protagonist is compelled towards action.  What lines of possibility are open to 
them?  For Alice, this configuration is especially noteworthy, for we are acutely aware of her 
preferences from the time she develops the ‘butterfly’ test.  It is Alice who will determine the 
terms of her forthcoming metamorphosis.  As her condition worsens, though, the reader 
becomes the sole holder of Alice’s ultimate intentions, the gravity of which gradually slips from 
Alice herself, even while she diligently completes her test every morning.  Alice steadily 
becomes ontologically reconfigured, resulting in a doubling of her drives: the end-of-life 
wishes of the highly capable, proud ‘Alice’, against those of the later ‘Alice’, who functions in 
ever-smaller pockets of temporal coherence, but still seeks to persist and be affirmed through 
connection with her family.  Similarly, for Maud and Ruth, the configuration to action requires 
the reader accepting the urgency of the mysteries they feel compelled to solve, respectively 
                                                          
27
 Hallucinations of this kind are a fairly common experience of those with living with neurodegenerative 
diseases that have progressed to a moderate or severe stage (Holroyd and Sheldon-Keller, 1995; 
Sanchez-Ramos, Ortoll and Paulson, 1996).    
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‘Where is Elizabeth?’ and ‘What does the tiger want from me?’, along with more elusive drives 
for reconciliation with the world.   
Lastly, Ricoeur suggests that realising mimesis requires acts of refiguration.  We, the reader, 
must find a way to accommodate what the text might afford us in our own lives and the lives 
of others, thus expanding the text’s hermeneutic reach.  Our labour of suspension must persist 
in considering how the text may extend beyond itself, to instruct, inform, advocate, and 
stretch our empathetic capacities.  If we cannot generate such refigurations, the utility of the 
fictional narrative is diminished, trapped within its bindings, and the means to effect change 
through it is lost.  The following sections will explore the ways in which these novels of 
dementia achieve forms of mimesis through the delicate, variegated constructions of 
persistence, urgency, temporality, embodiment, and emotional overflows and residuals. 




A common theme in many fictional works exploring dementia is a somewhat problematic skew 
towards depicting the neurodegeneration of persons who are highly intelligent, and who 
themselves labour and hold great interest in language and the cognitive sciences (see, for 
example, Franzen, 2001; Genova, 2009; LaPlante, 2011; McFarlane, 2013; Thomas, 2014).  The 
not especially subtle implication here is that they have ‘more to lose’, and are thus more 
worthy of our empathy.  Similarly, Segers (2007: 56) has suggested that in depictions of 
dementia in film the persons affected are very often members of the social and cultural elite. 
Certainly, Still Alice risks amplifying this skew, for its protagonist is a professor of linguistics at 
Harvard, and so is the very exemplar of the ‘hypercognitive’ subject, one whose economic and 
cultural value correlates to her intellectual capacities, which in turn are entwined with her 
sense of status and self-worth (O’Neill, 1997, Post, 2000).  In the Still Alice film adaptation 
(2014), for example, Alice lists as one of her most proud achievements the publication of her 
textbook, along with her loving marriage and high-achieving children.  Alice also bravely 
attempts to disguise her symptoms in order to continue working as an academic, but is 
ultimately undone when student evaluations of her teaching reflect her creeping debility.  
Hence these evaluations amount to simply another efficient, rationalised, and hypercognition-
based metric of Alice’s unravelling.  Admittedly, at times this deployment of cruel ironies can 
lack nuance, for example Alice’s first inkling of disquiet is in forgetting the word ‘lexicon’ 
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during a lecture (Genova, 2009: 10-1).  Despite this somewhat heavy-handed approach, Still 
Alice’s focus on neurodegeneration as it pertains to an intellectual career does helpfully 
demonstrate an important aspect to consider regarding dementia (especially of early onset 
forms), for failures of competence will almost invariably be displayed publicly at some stage, 
with all the damages to reputation and legacy that may ensue.   
Likewise, Ed of We Are Not Ourselves is a lecturer in neuroanatomy and psychopharmacology, 
and – in another instance of cruel irony – is ruined by those same interior structures he tries to 
elucidate for his students.  Like Alice, Ed’s most public embarrassment occurs when – despite 
his almighty resolve and quiet determination – he can no longer conceal his clearly worsening 
symptoms while delivering a lecture, catastrophically failing in this performative arena in ways 
that can never be rectified (Thomas, 2014: 155-60).  This devastating scene marks the end of 
Ed’s vocation and status as an intellectual.  Ed had once been headhunted by Big Pharma to 
work towards treatments for neurodegenerative disease, but opted for the far less lucrative 
vocation of teaching disadvantaged students, and so, in order to access drugs that may briefly 
slow his decline, Ed finds himself asking for support from those he previously spurned.  Alice 
too must contend with finding herself subjected to the same diagnostic tests she once 
participated in as cognitively ‘normal’ control subject, coolly traced through examinations she 
knows the names and purposes of but now cannot successfully complete (Genova, 2009: 68, 
126-142).  Alice is thus in some sense ironically measured against her former ‘control’ self, 
undergoing measures of precise tracing but negligible (or worse) therapeutic benefit. Alice’s 
proactive response is to take control of these disciplinary processes of confession by assessing 
herself against the qualities she deems makes life worth living, a rationale achieved through 
the ‘butterfly’ test she self-administers. 
A common trope in narratives of dementia is at least one diagnostic testing scene, whereupon 
the clinical gaze provides a finality that is inescapable.  Incapacities are starkly revealed in the 
presence of the methodical clinician, who surveys with a grim matter-of-factness to confirm 
what may be already known, but secretly dreaded.  The exchange often confirms a suspicion of 
internal discord that has likely been felt for a lengthy period.  This sense of internal betrayal is 
particularly evident when Ed receives his diagnosis, with the socially inept physician informing 
Ed that he is superficially in good health, but that this matters little given the ‘bad news’.  The 
tactless neurologist informs Ed and Eileen: 
‘… the good news is, physically you’re as healthy as a horse.  A great specimen… If he 
didn’t have Alzheimer’s, he’d probably live to ninety-five.  Heart, lungs, kidney, 
circulation – all tip-top.  But he’s got it.’  
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Thomas, 2014: 323 
In the doctor’s shifting attention from Ed to Eileen, we can discern that, already, Ed is being 
gently edged across the threshold from person to patient.  The diagnostic scenes in these 
fictional works are all remarkably similar, providing little vignettes of set processes conducted 
by more-or-less friendly and professional physicians.  Yet an aloofness abounds in these 
interactions, if only because there is little consolation to be found aside from what comes with 
the authoritative confirmation of one’s ailment.  An array of standardised tests are run, 
performance is duly recorded, and Maud’s doctor ‘writes and writes’ but to what end she does 
not know (Healey, 2014: 156).  Yet one consequence of initial diagnostic tests for dementia, 
which are then often followed by regular data collection processes, is that – given that there is 
little clinicians can do to alleviate symptoms – patients are often stuck in a regime where they 
are tracked for purposes that are of no personal benefit to them, but instead are repeated 
both blunt and precise reminders of their ongoing decline (Lock, 2014: 85-93, 200-201; 
Vittoria, 1998: 117-8; Bender and Cheston, 1997: 513).    
These processes that come into effect once the subject has crossed the threshold into negative 
difference can have severe knock-on effects in diminishing their sense of self.  For Ed, once 
proud and independent to a fault, stoicism and inwardness become steadily transformed into 
alternating indifference, apathy, and outbursts of frustration directed at Eileen.  But even Ed’s 
seeming obtuseness and callousness dissipates after some time into a resigned meekness and, 
following his diagnosis, Eileen is left with a stark realisation that ‘he would have to become 
something like a child to her’ (Thomas, 2014: 337).  This process of bequeathed autonomy is 
often marked with the inescapably cold formality of bureaucratic due process: 
‘She signed with a certain stoicism a form consenting to participate on his behalf, but it 
was the “Record of Choice of a Surrogate Decision Maker” form that nearly made her 
lose her composure, because it was the only one Ed had to sign himself, and he started 
his signature an inch above where he should have and angled it down and through a 
line in a way that made it look as if he was falling down as he did it.’  
Thomas, 2014: 327 
Alice, a once esteemed lecturer and author of a feted textbook, must also suffer the indignity 




“Okay.  In the future, you’re going to have to bring a family member or someone else 
who sees you regularly in with you.  You’re complaining about a problem with your 
memory; you may not be the most reliable source of what’s been going on.’  
Genova, 2009: 55 
Diagnostic forms also instruct Alice that “This should be filled out by an informant, NOT the 
patient” (Genova, 2009: 72).  This marks the irrevocable crossing of a threshold.  Designated 
others, informants who surveil Alice, will now record her comings and goings, her apparent 
motives and behaviours, and report back to clinical authorities.  This new regime will 
henceforth determine what is best for her.  This tendency towards cruel ironies, though 
perhaps somewhat trite, is instructive given that the authors seek to emphasise the radical 
transformations of being that may take place through dementia, and this is arguably easier to 
demonstrate with protagonists who are initially characterised by their ‘hypercognitive’ status.  
But what might somebody who is living with dementia do in order to reclaim their autonomy 
against surveilling ‘informants’? 
 
  
Asserting selfhood  
 
Those diagnosed with dementia will often find themselves working between two contrasting 
frames and tropes of representation.  The first is that of being undone by an ‘invader’, while 
the second is the varying capacity to retain a ‘unity’ of self (Van Gorp and Vercruysse, 2012: 
1276).  The project of unity through narrative propulsion will be discussed later, but for now I 
will consider how the person with dementia finds themselves precariously wedged in 
attempting to assert their selfhood against the ‘invader’ that threatens to ruin them.  This 
trope figures prominently in novels of dementia.  Lisa Genova (2009: 1) – recall herself once a 
lab-based neuroscientist – opens Still Alice with this epigraph: 
‘Even then, more than a year earlier, there were neurons in her head, not far from her 
ears, that were being strangled to death, too quietly for her to hear them.  Some 
would argue that things were going so insidiously wrong that the neurons themselves 
initiated events that would lead to their own destruction.  Whether it was molecular 
murder or cellular suicide, they were unable to warn her of what was happening 
before they died.’ 
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Prominent neuroscientist Zaven Khachaturian (1997: 21) uses similarly evocative language in 
anthropomorphising Alzheimer’s as a condition that ‘quietly loots the brain, nerve cell by 
nerve cell, a burglar returning to the same house each night’.  Such characterisations of 
insidious, internal betrayal are also commonly found in accounts of cancer and other grave 
illnesses (Murphy, 1987; Styron, 1990; Frank, 1995).  As highlighted earlier, accounts of life 
with dementia often invoke metaphors of a thief, demon, or monster, a spectral presence 
upending a once peaceful existence.  Related to this is the problem of visibility and stigma, 
where the sufferer is not just resisting cognitive decline but also assessments of permissible 
autonomy imposed by others. 
Persons in early to moderate stages of dementia often find themselves stigmatised, socially 
isolated, and made ‘other’.  This can occur for a number of reasons.  Early to moderate-stage 
sufferers may find that they can no longer meet the individualised and precisely quantified 
performance expectations of their occupations, or that once enlivening interests and hobbies 
may become unsafe or impractical to continue, or that friends may keep their distance out of 
fear, impatience, or plain ignorance.  This stigmatisation was a significant source of motivation 
for Lisa Genova in writing Still Alice: 
‘I think the most common struggle I see people face, though, is the alienation and 
loneliness.  Because this disease takes people out of their formerly fast-paced, 
personally fulfilling careers; because everyone else stays busy in their busy lives and 
people with this disease have to slow down; and because of the enormous stigma 
placed on having Alzheimer’s, people with early-stage Alzheimer’s find themselves 
extremely alone.’  
Postscript interview in Genova, 2009: n.p. 
Fittingly, then, Genova’s Alice expresses increasing frustration regarding the widespread 
perceptions of those with Alzheimer’s, knowing all too well how persons like her may be 
viewed: 
‘She wished she had cancer instead.  She’d trade Alzheimer’s for cancer in a 
heartbeat… while a bald head and a looped ribbon were seen as badges of courage 
and hope, her reluctant vocabulary and vanishing memories advertised mental 
instability and impending insanity.  Those with cancer could expect to be supported by 
their community.  Alice expected to be outcast.  Even the well-intentioned and 
educated tended to keep a fearful distance from the mentally ill.  She didn’t want to 
become someone people avoided and feared.’  
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Genova, 2009: 117 
Recent advocacy efforts directed towards reducing stigma echo this sentiment, although 
certainly not in these stark terms.  This provocative directness is one of the chief benefits of 
fiction as an exercise in empathy.  Of course neither I nor Lisa Genova wish to make judgments 
as to what forms of terminal illness result in greater suffering, for such comparisons would be 
grotesque and unproductive.  Rather, Alice’s lament speaks to those dehumanising aspects of 
living with an illness that could so easily be alleviated if we simply shifted our collective 
perceptions and dispositions.  In this way Still Alice seeks to be a form of earnest advocacy, a 
means of partially rectifying the therapeutic void by dispelling misconceptions that needlessly 
hasten isolation and impose stigma (Wade, 2015).  Indeed, the film adaptation of Still Alice 
(2014) goes even further in this impassioned advocacy, with the film's call-to-arms found in a 
speech given by Alice in which she rails against common perceptions of persons with dementia 
being ‘incapable, ridiculous, comic’.  Still Alice is also liberally sprinkled with practical advice, 
citing actions that can be done proactively by both patient and carer to ensure safety: 
‘… you should probably register with the Alzheimer’s Association’s Safe Return 
program.  I think it’s something like forty dollars, and you wear an ID bracelet with a 
personal code on it.’  
Genova, 2009: 132 
Alice also finds solace through small dementia support groups – sometimes referred to as 
‘memory cafes’ – where those living with dementia (and their carers) can share experiences 
and advice, but perhaps even more importantly simply be recognised as social and desiring 
beings, knowing that they will not be reduced to their afflictions in this space (Mather, 2006).  
Genova’s novel also emphasises the potential for selfhood to be maintained by way of 
enabling affirming labours, regardless of however intolerably diminished sufferers may appear 
relative to their former abilities.  For some of those living with dementia such labours can take 
on a sense of urgent vocation, for as diagnostic processes have improved in recent years more 
persons have been identified with dementia at earlier stages of progression, thus enabling 
greater opportunities for them to assert control of how the transformation in their ontology 
will be managed over time (Beard, 2004a).  
While Lisa Genova is certainly the most direct, Emma Healey and Fiona McFarlane also look to 
shift popular conceptions of dementia in their respective works.  Like Still Alice, point of view 
in their narratives is restricted entirely to the character living with dementia, with Healey’s 
Elizabeth is Missing especially notable in wholly adopting a first-person perspective.  This is an 
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admirably ambitious undertaking given the difficulty of presenting a mimetically salient 
internal depiction of neurodegeneration, while also imbuing that same single voice with 
enough expository heft to convey a complex narrative to the reader.  Through these fixed 
perspectives the authors demonstrate that, although some capacities may be diminishing, 
their protagonists’ inner lives remain rich and vital, and their emotional acuity still finely tuned.  
The desires of these characters are perhaps less precise and tangible, but they are no less 
fervent, and at times these persons appear to display a greater sensitivity to their surroundings 
and embodiment than they may have previously. 
These unusual narrative voices know when they are being patronised, socially excluded, and 
prohibited from doing once mundane but still life affirming activities.  Also registering are 
tones, demeanours, or related behaviours of others which signal a change in the dynamic of 
their relationship, precipitating and enacting yet another demotion of selfhood.  This 
recognition of being excluded can ironically even occur in the midst of other failures of 
perception: 
‘They talked about her as if she weren’t sitting in the wing chair, a few feet away.  They 
talked about her, in front of her, as if she were deaf.  They talked about her, in front of 
her, without including her, as if she had Alzheimer’s disease.’  
Genova, 2009: 225 
Alice observes the social exclusion that makes it seem to her as though she were suffering 
from Alzheimer’s disease, yet the very manifestation of this condition obscures from Alice that 
she is indeed undergoing rapid neurodegeneration.  Alice does not understand why she has 
been made ‘other’, and this in itself is precisely why she has been excluded from discussions 
regarding her own wellbeing.  Alice, Ruth, and Maud are also often aware of when they 
committed some kind of faux pas, even if they do not know exactly what misstep they took.  
This constant impression management is shown to be a complex and draining affair, and this is 
a common experience for those with dementia (Beard, 2004b).  Ruth can sense the ‘serene 
weariness’ (McFarlane, 2013: 3), ‘tolerant chuckle’ (10) and ‘youthful authority’ (13) her 
children employ in an attempt to placate her fear of the tiger.  Consequently Ruth finds herself 
wedged into a lonely, existential terror, for the knowledge that the tiger is not real – or at least 
not real enough to generate genuine concern from her loved ones – does not negate the felt 
reality of its presence for her.  Still, Ruth remains resilient, acutely aware of her presence in 
this ‘liminal state’ of living with dementia (Lock, 2013: 91).   
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This retaining of desires while losing the capacities to realise them, combined with the 
recognition of the damning and disparaging assessments of others, can generate lonely, 
melancholic longings.  Ruth, for example, is desperately starved of company, and knows the 
exact timing pattern of a typical conversation on the phone with her family, and when to best 
end a call to avoid seeming helpless and needy (McFarlane, 2013:12-3, 71).  Maud of Elizabeth 
is Missing is similarly longing for company but sensitive to pleading such hopes, and so deploys 
tidbits of gossip in order to coax loved ones to linger a little while longer: 
‘I could tell Carla.  News of that kind is valuable.  Helen has been known to stay an 
extra thirty seconds for it in the past.’ 
Healey, 2014: 24 
Despite desiring a form of communion through shared and co-creative narratives, Ruth and 
Maud usually find themselves alone with ‘the gentle, bewildering expanse of the day, the 
filling of all those more-or-less hours’ (McFarlane, 2013: 21).  Both characters exhibit a dry 
humour regarding this purgatorial state in which they reside, aware of their increasing failings 
but sardonically resigned to them: 
‘A bang, somewhere in the house, makes my eyes skitter across the sitting room, 
there’s an animal, an animal for wearing outside, lying over the arm of the settee.  It’s 
Carla’s.  She never hangs it up, worried she’ll forget it, I expect.  I can’t help staring at 
it, sure it will move, scurry away to a corner, or eat me up and take my place.  And Katy 
will have to remark on its big eyes, its big teeth.’   
Healey, 2014: 4 
Such common minor failings are often met with this kind of weary, self-deprecating humour.  
Other missteps, however, can be immensely distressing, disheartening, and even terrifying.  
Indeed, when they can no longer be achieved the most seemingly banal and quotidian tasks 
can be the most frightening augurs of all, for they inescapably render apparent one’s cognitive 
decline.  Maud, for example, feels an acute pang and searing embarrassment upon realising 
she no longer knows how to set the cutlery on a table (Healey, 2014: 60-1).  Alice gets lost in 
her own holiday home searching for the bathroom, and in her growing panic loses her 
continence (Genova, 2009: 149-51).  When Ed’s son Connell tells him ‘your breath stinks’ the 
usually fastidious Ed is flushed with an embarrassment that results in an hour of compulsive 
brushing (Thomas, 2014: 296-7).  Inversely related to these disheartening performative 
failures, however, is that successfully carrying out even routine and mundane tasks can be 
marvellously enlivening, serving as small but nonetheless positive affirmations of a purposeful 
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self.  A common observation of those living with dementia is a desire to ‘stay busy’ as a way of 
affirming one’s presence in the world (Beard, Knauss and Moyer, 2009; Holst and Hallberg, 
2003).  Often this will be through activities that are ‘smooth-flowing and unreflective’, which 
tend to draw more on embodied habits, rather than the difficult demands of higher cognition 
(Phinney, Chaudhury, and O’Connor, 2007: 391).  Actions are infused with both this revitalising 
force and the subsequent melancholic recognition of what this novelty forebodes: 
‘Once a week, under Jeffrey’s orders, she [Ruth] went out to sit in the car and run the 
engine; doing so, she experienced a busy, practical sense of renewal followed by the 
disquieting feeling she was about to drive herself to her own funeral.’  
McFarlane, 2013: 41 
Precariously positioned between their declining capacities and the damning assessments of 
others, the protagonists of these novels adopt various strategies to assert their selfhood 
against the prospect of becoming irrevocably ‘othered’.  Persons living with dementia will 
usually have to contend with three overlapping strategies of asserting selfhood (Beard, 2004b: 
422-5).  The first is that of ‘defining moments’, wherein sufferers may first begin to recognise 
something is amiss, or experience public failings, or, in later stages, will be compelled to 
relinquish the undertaking of activities tied to their independence and autonomy (eg. driving, 
using appliances, personal care etc.).  Such ‘defining moments’, then, are often dispiriting 
markers of decline and the acquiescence of personal responsibilities to others, with said 
markers and moments often tied to ethically-inflected assessments of the productive 
hypercognitive subject.  Secondly, following diagnosis, those with dementia must then 
consider whether ‘to tell or not to tell’ others of their condition (Beard, 2004b: 422-4).  Some 
subjects prefer to conceal their condition from others and so attempt to ‘pass’ as cognitively 
‘normal’ for as long as possible.  Others may prefer to be open and frank about their condition, 
perhaps because concealment can be an incredibly taxing task.  Lastly, and closely related to 
the previous two strategies, subjects may adopt ‘preservation’ strategies, avoiding activities 
that threaten to be disorienting or harmful to their pride, while also embracing habits they 
believe will best realise and protect their affirming abilities and affective desires (Beard, 
2004b: 424-5).   
Alice and Ed are by far the most systematic in crafting these strategies in the novels discussed 
here.  This is perhaps unsurprising given their academic backgrounds, which may better equip 
them for cool, unflinching appraisal of forthcoming circumstances.  Using these intellectual 
resources Ed and Alice manage to pass as cognitively sound in their professional capacities for 
an extended period, displaying inventive means by which to compensate for deficiencies.  With 
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regard to their concealment strategies, Ed seems aware of his condition from an early stage in 
We Are Not Ourselves, but opts to conceal it from everybody, including his wife Eileen.  Alice 
alternatively elects to tell her family, but tries to preserve her master status of intellectual at 
Harvard for as long as possible before her decline makes teaching untenable.  Ultimately both 
are ‘unmasked’ in tragically public fashion, Ed especially so (Thomas, 2014: 155-60). 
Still, Ed and Alice, and Ruth and Maud to a lesser degree, remain unerringly pragmatic and 
conscientiously hopeful.  Alice assiduously tests her memory retention, while Ed rigourously 
adheres to minutely devised routines that enable him to continue teaching.  Maud’s 
handwritten notes around the house often remind her of good habits of neurological care of 
the self – for example that ‘Coffee helps memory’ (Healey, 2014: 11) – while Ruth works 
diligently on the upkeep of her secluded home.  As touched upon earlier though, Alice is by far 
the most methodical, secretly devising a self-administered examination, conducted daily, in 
order to assess her cognitive decline.  This measure of Alice’s own devising will determine for 
her when suicide becomes the most appropriate course of action.  This agency directed 
towards committing suicide, though initially crafted by Alice, is thus given over to the objective 
measures and scripts of the test.  Alice’s ‘Butterfly’ test is a simple set of questions, housed on 
her Blackberry phone, which she is prompted to answer daily: 
‘Alice, answer the following questions: 
1. What month is it? 
2. Where do you live? 
3. Where is your office? 
4. When is Anna’s birthday? 
5. How many children do you have? 
If you have trouble answering any of these, go to the file named “Butterfly” on your 
computer and follow the instructions there immediately.’  
Genova, 2009: 119 
These instructions are intended to lead Alice to a hidden cache of sleeping pills procured in 
advance, amounting to a potentially lethal dose.  Of note here is that Alice’s ‘Butterfly test’ is 
essentially an adapted form of the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE), a short test 
commonly used to assess cognitive function in those with suspected neurological disorder.  
The main difference in this case is that – as opposed to the standardised questions of the 
MMSE – Alice’s test is modified to explicitly measure what she believes makes life worth living.  
In this way Alice has cleverly found a way of incorporating her narrative drives into a medical 
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model, and preserves her autonomy by distributing her intentional self into objects that can 
later compensate for her declining faculties (eg. her Blackberry phone prompts Alice to take 
the test every morning at 8am, so that she herself does not have to remember).  The use of 
notes, routines, prompts, and the like are found throughout these novels of dementia, and are 
common strategies amongst those in early stages of disease progression as a means of 
retaining some independence and autonomy (Steeman et al. 2006). 
Maud, believing her friend Elizabeth is missing but not being able to rouse the concern of 
others, is also fiercely motivated to retain her faculties to the very last, including by – like Alice 
– extending her intentional self into artefacts that can retain her agency: 
‘The thing is be systematic, try to write everything down… I’ve written that down too.’  
Healey, 2014: 22  
This, in passing, is a knowing and mildly melancholic humour, one not intended to mock 
Maud’s condition but rather to highlight her resolve despite such hindrances, along with 
emphasising the nagging residual panic that propels her labours.  Hence Maud attempts to 
compensate for her failing memory by distributing her narrative drives into written notes, and 
often finds verbally repeating words – re-attaching signifier to signified – comforting and 
orienting (Healey, 2014: 113).  Alice too will chant things she wishes to remember, extending 
mind into sound (Genova, 2009, 217-9), while Ed will compose himself in monk like fashion 
before a social occasion, seeming to summon up hidden cognitive reserves through meditation 
in order to successfully ‘pass’ in the company of others (Thomas, 2014: 303-4).  Ruth also 
displays a fervent determination to retain her highest autonomy until she can discern the true 
motives of the tiger and Frida.  It is this determination to retain a narrative drive as a way of 
maintaining a sense of self that I will now address. 
 
 
Coherency of self through motion and embodiment 
 
Paul Ricoeur (Simms, 2003: 102-3; Keuss, 2013: 145) suggests that identity is retained through 
the ability to place oneself in a propulsive mechanism of narrative, where identity denotes not 
simply idem or ‘sameness’ over time, but ipse, a form of constancy through change.  This is to 
say that identity is affirmed through the motion of a ‘plot’ that allows for constant but 
coherent refiguring.  One could metaphorically liken this to a gyroscope, where its agency is 
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only realised in the balance of interpenetrating centrifugal forces that still and centripetal 
forces that throw.  Once this agency is enacted, though, a spinning gyroscope can balance itself 
on something as insubstantial as a taut piece of string.  Similarly, those with dementia often 
only require only a thread of narrative in order to stay affirmed in the world.  It is this 
constancy-through-movement and force-feedback that affirms our relation to the world, 
rather than ideals of the immutable unity of self-ness.  However, both idem and ipse are 
threatened by the onset of dementia.  The ‘sameness’ of idem is clearly undone by 
neurodegeneration itself, for physiological changes are taking place that undermine those 
capacities which allow for ‘fixed’ aspects of our identity.  These processes will steadily erode 
short term memory, language capabilities, problem solving capacities, regulation of mood and 
emotion, and eventually long-term memories and basic motor functions.  Under this new 
regime, some ‘sameness’ is simply impossible, for its requisite mechanisms are no longer 
present or fully functioning.  However, the more narratively relevant ipse – of the figure that 
ontologically shifts over time in ways found to be self-actualising – remains tenable for those 
with dementia.  This, however, requires the dedicated labours of those around the subject, 
guiding thought which may be fragmented and elusive towards narrative drives that can be 
practically sated. 
Again, this is not a question of avoiding hard realities, for inevitably those with dementia will 
reach a stage where it appears they can no longer be reached by our most dedicated efforts of 
care.  Catherine Malabou (2012: 14-5) describes such unfortunates as ‘figures of the void’, with 
whom we can no longer find communion by our usual therapeutic endeavours, and thus they 
steadily, irrevocably, slip into abysmal alterity, one marked by the absence of self: 
‘The worst dissensions of the subject with the self, the most serious conflicts, do not 
even look tragic.  Paradoxically, they are signaled by indifference and coldness.’  
In dementia the synaptic self is slowly being suffocated, with neuronal networks steadily being 
unwound, and with it the range of cognitive capacities the sufferer might still access and 
perform.  This degeneration may occur without any outward change, except for the gradual 
loss of dispositional displays, which will eventually lead to a seeming ‘indifference and 
coldness’.  Malabou (2012: 15) cites Maurice Blanchot’s discussion of Kafka’s Metamorphosis 
to illuminate this purgatorial state, wherein a subject is ‘unable to quit existence’, stuck in a 
‘mode of degeneration’ as they move ‘closer still to absurdity and the impossibility of living’.  
Our ingenuity has solved the maladies of old, never before have we been more resilient to the 
decomposition of our bodies, and so now we must contemplate the disintegration of 
subjectivity itself.  How can we find our way to these ‘ontological refugee[s]’, who themselves 
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are only partial witnesses to their ongoing dissonance and dissension of self (Malabou, 2012: 
24)?  Here one sufferer attempts to communicate this elusive, melancholic state: 
‘I am being split open from inside. It is a process I cannot stop because I myself am that 
process. You think "I," "my body," "my mind," but these are only words. They used to 
protect me. Before I was like this. But now there is a greater force holding sway in me, 
which is not to be gainsaid. I don't want to think about it any more.’  
Bernlef 1989:94, cited in Herskovits, 1995: 146 
We can note the sense of betrayal, and of ‘mind’ and ‘body’ as occluding constructs of 
language, once protective and dependable concepts, and now shown to be mere facades.  An 
enlivening force still holds sway, something persists, but something also desists.  A former 
unity is lost, one to which Malabou (2012: 32) invokes Spinoza (2000: 256-7), who remarks 
that:  
‘I understand the body to have died when its parts are so disposed that they maintain 
a different ratio of motion and rest to one another … For I am not so bold as to deny 
that the human body, whilst retaining the circulation of the blood and other features 
on account of which a body is thought to live, can nevertheless be changed into 
another nature which is very different from its own.  For no reason compels me to 
assert that the body does not die unless it is turned into a corpse; indeed, experience 
seems to speak in favor of something else.  For it happens sometimes that a man 
suffers such changes that it is not easy for me to say that he is the same.  For example, 
I have heard of a certain Spanish poet who was stricken with disease, and although he 
recovered from it, he was so forgetful of his past life that he did not believe that the 
dramatic poems and tragedies that he had written were his own, and could have 
indeed been taken for a grown-up infant if he had not also forgotten his native 
language.’ 
Biological mechanisms can continue to operate for extended periods after a trauma is inflicted, 
but they may do so without ever again coalescing to form a concert of volition, for the 
subject’s sense of narrative propulsion is lost.  Hence through neurodegeneration we witness a 
cleaving and distortion of life’s ratio and motion that begins with a series of small betrayals: A 
name is forgotten; we find ourselves lost in a familiar place; temporalities take on strange 
qualities; or we feel trapped within a body rendered alien by odd motor functions.  Ricoeur has 
his own version of Spinoza’s characterisation of life as a ratio of motion, positing a disjuncture 
or disproportion that can occur between what is willed or conceivable in the universal (logos), 
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and what is possible of a physical being bounded in the spatiotemporal (bios) (Dauenhauer and 
Pellauer, 2014).  This, for Ricoeur, is a ‘ratio of fallibility’ measured by the varying accord or 
discord between one’s imagination, character, and feeling (Simms, 2003: 16).  Of course these 
measures can never entirely align and reconcile with each other, for this would suggest an 
inert homeostasis.  Rather, it is the constant churn of imbalances and corrections that propels 
this Spinozan motion; a self constantly at work between what seems willed by the indexical ‘I’ 
and what volitions appear to simply arrive from the ether to tug us here and there.  The 
difficulty, as will be shown below, is when ‘imagination’, ‘character’, and ‘feeling’ can no longer 
be reconciled to each other at any point in time.   
All of the fictional protagonists discussed in this chapter are imbued by their authors with a felt 
sense of urgency.  Some end must be realised before they no longer have the requisite 
wherewithal.  These reckonings are not clearly demarcated tasks, nor do they represent the 
over-moralised making-amends-for-past-mistakes tropes that Block (2014) rightly criticises.  
Instead these ‘conatic hopes’ (Hage, 2003) are more elusive, felt longings, something 
inexpressible that seeks to be freed from the confines of slipping minds.  For Ruth this is 
signified by the tiger, ‘her consequential visitor’ (McFarlane, 2013: 23).  Ruth is both fearful 
and joyous of this new presence: 
‘A tiger!  Ruth, thrilled by this possibility, forgot to be frightened and had to counsel 
herself back into fear.’  
McFarlane, 2013: 2 
The tiger is not intended to symbolise any one thing – McFarlane (2014) herself has admitted 
as much – but is rather used to give visceral form to the heady confluence of memory, longing, 
fear, and sheer possibility that Ruth feels as her ontological makeup shifts into a state of 
alterity.  The tiger is a nonchalant, untameable predator, coming and going and doing as he 
pleases.  Ruth is invigorated by this presence, one she desires to inhabit and emulate, adopting 
the tiger’s demeanour and comportment so as to counter the dominating presence of Frida 
(who herself is partially reflected in the avatar of the tiger through her large but graceful and 
skulking presence, and brightly coloured hair).  Ruth knows the tiger is some portent of 
change, and finds this to be incredibly enlivening after previously lingering in a state of numb 
isolation since the sudden death of her husband.  The arrival of both the tiger and the 
domineering Frida instils a fevered urgency within Ruth, a desire to regain control of her 
narrative and to project herself into the future as an intentional, hopeful being.  This 
projection of the self includes pondering desired states, such as mulling over a potential visit 
from an old flame: 
175 
 
‘Ruth sat still with the idea of Richard.  She was surprised by how much she wanted to 
see him, and also by the pleasure of wanting.  He would be an arrival – one that she 
had asked for, that she had planned.’  
McFarlane, 2013: 64 
The ‘pleasure of wanting’ is to willingly throw oneself across space and time through one’s 
own future-oriented narrative; it is to retain idem while expanding ipse.  This willed desire of 
holding indexical unity towards a futurity runs counter to Frida’s attempts to quell and dull 
Ruth in routine habits.  Consequently the novel’s unfolding follows a tense descent of 
increasingly claustrophobic and delirious encounters, as each woman looks to impose their will 
upon a subjectivity steadily becoming untethered from reality. 
In Healey’s Elizabeth is Missing, Maud’s coherency of self and emotional urgency is affixed to 
the world through her search for her friend Elizabeth, whom Maud believes is missing.  The 
reader will soon grasp that Elizabeth is not actually missing at all, but will also come to 
understand that Maud simply cannot retain this fact.  Instead ‘Elizabeth’ is felt as a constant 
lack, a gnawing absence within Maud.  When Maud cannot attach the fitting signifier to this 
gap her notes often serve as a reminder that Elizabeth is ‘missing’, and so reconcile Maud with 
a clear narrative and imperative to action.  Family and carers patiently try to reassure Maud 
that Elizabeth is not missing and, in a good faith attempt, Maud tries to yield to their pleas by 
writing herself a note as a way to convince her distrustful mind of the ‘truth’ (Healey, 2014: 
81).  However, this does not reconcile the felt lack, for soon thereafter an affective gap opens: 
‘Not that again,’ Carla says. ‘I thought you’d given it up?’ [claiming Elizabeth is missing] 
…. 
‘Oh yes,’ I say, laying down my pen.  I feel disappointed, as if I’ve lost something 
valuable.’  
Healey, 2014: 83 
What is ‘valuable’ here is the unity of self that comes through narrative propulsion, the 
intentionality that extends Maud into the world through a desire to effect some affirming 
action: 
‘I have a nagging feeling that there’s somewhere I’m supposed to be.  I put on my coat 
and walk out.  I can’t think where I’m going, but that doesn’t matter, I’m sure I’m 
supposed to be somewhere and I must come to it eventually.’  
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Healey, 2014: 89 
‘The next street is just as strange and my heart gives a thud in my chest.  I’m running 
out of time.  I’ve got to get somewhere, or to someone.  It’s urgent.’  
Healey, 2014: 140 
Maud is beholden to a residual of feeling (see below), her narrative of self cannot be 
maintained without some definite task that compels her to action.  Hence Maud’s sense and 
affirming motion of selfhood is only realised in the labour of the ‘urgent’ task of looking for her 
friend, Elizabeth.  This is generative of a consoling single-mindedness that – though strictly 
speaking based upon a falsehood – is Maud’s best means of persisting in the world.  The 
Guardian review of Elizabeth is Missing (Gillies, 2014) unfortunately missed the importance of 
this central conundrum of a distress that can actually be enlivening and affirming, sceptically 
noting that: 
‘It's tempting to wonder why a woman constantly writing herself notes – and still able 
to read them – hasn't also written down the solution to the Elizabeth mystery, which, 
it transpires, Helen [Maud’s daughter] has explained to her over and over again.’    
But the mere ‘solution’ to the ‘mystery’ cannot, in itself, resolve a lack Maud registers within 
herself, for Elizabeth’s ongoing status as ‘missing’ instils a momentum that keeps Maud 
reconciled with the world.  Indeed perhaps it is the only thing maintaining her narrative unity, 
and thus Maud seems compelled to retain this propulsion to action.  In every instance where 
others attempt to convince Maud of the truth she immediately slips into a void, bereft of 
meaning, only to be brought back by the eventual act of forgetting this truth.  In a telling scene 
Maud is undertaking a diagnostic assessment, failing every measure of cognitive functioning, 
except for one: when asked to write a complete sentence Maud neatly jots ‘My friend 
Elizabeth is missing’ (Healey, 2014: 156).  It is this desire to effect positive action upon the 
world that enables Maud to retain such capacities in the face of radical ontological 
transformation and loss.  
Unlike Ruth and Maud’s projects of selfhood, which delve into elusive and abstract longings to 
be reconciled with the world in some form, and Alice’s narrative drive, captured in her 
rationale for developing the ‘butterfly’ test, Ed’s narrative unity is instead maintained through 
a palpable urgency to instil within his son Connell an openness to the world, one that will 
sustain him through a life soon to be without his father.  Also evident is a less reticent display 
of Ed’s marital affections for his wife Eileen.  As Ed becomes further ensnared by Alzheimer’s 
he slips between demonic fits of rage and angelic outpourings of affection.  Thrown between 
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good spells and bad spells Ed finds himself unable to regulate his emotional state, so that at 
times he appears to be ‘taken’ by a spectral presence and rendered unrecognisable.  What this 
neurological atrophy somewhat ironically provides, though, is an expansion of Ed’s emotional 
capacities (for both better and worse).  The filters of his aloof stoicism are removed and 
replaced with an equally determined will to leave affective imprints upon others through the 
co-creation of good encounters. 
Our narrative persistence is always bound to our relationality, and so it is significant that even 
in the very latter stages of debility Ed conveys a desperation to retain the fidelity of his wife, 
barking a series of panicked ‘No!’s, ‘my’s, and ‘mine’s of possessiveness towards Eileen after a 
male carer moves into the home (Thomas, 2014: 487-8).  This is one of Ed’s very last acts of 
discernible autonomy, and so it is noteworthy that it be reserved for protecting a relational 
bond.  Ed also develops a predilection for taking photos, perhaps in the hope that memories 
and their accompanying emotions could be carried over into such representations (Thomas, 
2014: 286).  Ed stridently resists Eileen’s request to move into a nicer neighbourhood, implying 
an acute awareness that removal from familiar surrounds and routines will hasten his 
unbecoming (Thomas, 2014: 336).  The importance of routine and familiar locales has long 
been observed to aid stalling cognitive decline in studies of dementia, particularly in enhancing 
feelings of security and comfort, which in turn better enables those living with dementia to 
remain socially engaged (Proctor, Silverman and Murphy, 1987).   
Prior to diagnosis Ed is shown to be reserved and distant, perhaps selfishly so in the context of 
a new marriage.  In part this may be due to the onset of neurodegeneration; there are early 
flashes of Ed seeming to not recognise Eileen, of flinching at her touch, and other behaviours 
not fitting with his otherwise rigidly sensible character.  Following his diagnosis, however, Ed is 
imbued with a radical new vigour, albeit one that only manifests itself in small bursts of reverie 
and epiphany.  This gives his interactions with Connell a palpable, yearning energy: 
‘”I’ve noticed something in you that worries me,” his father said.  “Maybe because it 
reminds me of me at your age.  I made life harder for myself than it needed be.  I see 
you hardening yourself.  That isn’t you.  I see you closing your mind.  You are open and 
beautiful.”  
Thomas, 2014: 298 
Here Ed is briefly able to strip himself of all pretences of stoic, patriarchal reserve, so that he 
may communicate what he feels most urgently: that the subduing of emotional volitions risks 
accumulating residuals of feeling that could so easily console, delight, and affirm others.  This 
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willing vulnerability is a labour of figuration, of bringing others into existence through the 
transmission of affect (Brennan, 2004).  Such displays in fictional works can so often slip into 
trite, sentimental tropes, wherein the terminally ill or neurologically different seem put upon 
this earth only to teach us neurologically high-functioning folk important life lessons, but 
Thomas’ take here is less sociologically naïve. His sensitive yet unflinching approach is 
especially apparent in a scene where Connell tries to uphold Ed’s instruction, faithfully trying 
to espy and maintain the flow of feeling between them as his father’s capacities diminish: 
‘After his father was in the chair, Connell watched his knee for some vestige of the 
gesture that had bound them over the years…  Early on in the illness, whenever 
Connell hugged him, his father squeezed back and said simply, “Good boy.”  When his 
father began to lose his strength, the squeezes turned to pats; when he lost his 
coordination, the pats became pounding slaps.  “Just rub,” Connell said once, as they 
clutched.  “Rub.  Now just keep your hands still for a second, like this.”  Then his father 
started to slur his words, so that all he could say clearly was “Good, good, good,” and 
then eventually that “good” gave way to an inarticulate sound – but Connell knew 
what it meant, even if no one else could have interpreted it.  Then Connell would lean 
down to initiate a hug, and his father would reach up from the couch, until eventually 
his father didn’t reach up anymore but just patted his own knee.  The final stage came 
when Connell noticed that his father patted his knee whenever Connell was even in 
the room.  Now, though, in the wheelchair, he didn’t move at all.’  
Thomas, 2014: 534  
This, for Connell, essentially signals the irrevocable loss and admission that ‘His father was 
gone, gone’ (Thomas, 2014: 542). Such dispositions and expressions of, in this case, familial 
love, are both embodied and contextual, each folds into and affirms the other in a virtuous 
hermeneutic circle.  But when one falters both are diminished in spiralling fashion, so as Ed’s 
condition declines Connell must help translate feelings that are bodily trapped into 
contextually appropriate and communicable forms.  Squeezes become pats, pats teeter on 
becoming hard slaps but are gently transformed into rubs.  ‘Good boy’ becomes just ‘good’, 
and yet this ‘good’ signifies much, for its underlying impulse is known only to Connell, and is 
directed to him alone.  Connell sets the context of an embrace, maintaining and modifying the 
hermeneutic bridge for as long as possible, so that eventually Ed patting his own knee 
becomes the only means of transmitting feeling.  The emotional labour required to maintain 
these transmissions tells us much about the performative burdens of relational being, 
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captured poignantly by one carer who laments that ‘you just know in your heart of hearts that 
he’s in there and if you let go, that’s it’ (Gubrium, 1986: 41).   
Explorations of embodiment play a key role in novels exploring dementia, sometimes as felt 
absences, other times as expansions of self.  Often it is an uncanny combination of both, such 
as when The Night Guest’s Ruth contemplates her changing embodiment and sense of 
temporality:  
‘When she woke early the next morning, Ruth couldn’t remember falling asleep.  More 
than this, she couldn’t remember her own body; it seemed to be missing.  
Nevertheless, she was able to move… Ruth was standing, without quite knowing how 
she came to be on her feet.  She felt nothing.  This might be the true weight of age, she 
thought, without feeling her thought; it was weightless, everything was, but not in a 
light way.  That might be pleasant.  This weightlessness was all absence…  Then there 
was a noise in the room, which finally she recognised as her own voice – she wasn’t 
sure what her voice was saying, but the existence of it, and its definite sound, returned 
sensation to her back and legs.’  
McFarlane, 2013: 152 
Again, it is the liminal state of dementia that brings into focus the complex entanglement of 
our embodiment and our accompanying sense of ontological being.  Yet it seems the body has 
been strangely absent from analyses of dementia, reduced only to a set of motor functions in 
decline, or a set of parts to be arranged in the provision of personal care (Oberg, 1996).  But 
we are not brains in a vat, and our body is inextricably woven through our psyches, especially 
through our endocrine system (Wilson, 2004, 2015).  So, while hard transhumanists may 
propose enhancing our unique capacities for rational thought, we should not neglect to note 
that ‘the most basic form of consciousness, is not symbolic or linguistic.  It is bodily, a sense of 
at-homeness in the body … the sense of one’s body as one’s own’ (Berger, 2014: 132).  This, 
we can recall, speaks to the strangeness of measuring our ‘morality’ through MRI scans where 
participants must lie perfectly still for the data to be ‘reliable’, for our response to such 
dilemmas is often powerfully visceral prior to the arrival of higher cognition.  To exclude the 
body from such encounters is therefore to reduce ethics to a hopelessly narrow ledger of our 
being.  The ways in which our volitions are held and distributed by the body must be 
considered, and it seems significant here that Ruth does not begin to emulate the tiger – and 




In this creeping porosity of both body and temporality not all experiences will be pleasant.  To 
be thrown back and forth through memory and accompanying shifts in self-conceptions, along 
with being similarly ejected from one’s body can be immensely distressing and disorienting for 
the already narratively fragile subject.  Simple motor functions – such as Ed attempting to 
place money in a toll booth receptacle – become complex processes requiring taxing 
deliberation and focus (Thomas, 2014: 209).  Everyday preferences that serve to make up our 
affirming idiosyncrasies are lost, such as Alice not recalling her strong dislike of coffee (Genova, 
2009: 93).  Cycles of ‘natural’ processes, such as sleeping patterns and meal times, are lost, 
with ‘sundowning’ and odd eating habits quite common (Volicer et al., 2001; Ikeda et al., 
2002).   Protagonists forget to eat (Thomas, 2014: 378), eat too much (Healey, 2014: 5,121), or, 
in the case of Alice, fail to link ingestion with appropriate activity, who vomits while running 
after forgetting – both in the cognitive and bodily sense – that she had only recently eaten a 
heavy meal (Genova, 2009: 97).  Further forms of body dissociation can occur, sometimes felt 
as uncannily pleasant reckonings: 
‘Ruth hadn’t thought about her feet in some time.  She was mildly surprised to find 
them intact at the end of her legs…’  
McFarlane, 2013: 81 
But at other times this combination of body dissociation with collapses of temporalities can 
render self-perception a terrifying ordeal.  Alice is horrified by her image in a mirror, it appears 
aged, alien, and grotesque, and so she proceeds to paint over all the ‘defective’ mirrors 
(Genova, 2009: 282-3).  Ruth similarly begins to no longer recognise her reflection, with her 
shifting ontological makeup here marking a falling action for the novel (McFarlane, 2013: 211).  
From here on Ruth becomes susceptible to temporalities collapsing with greater speed and 
force, along with other actors taking on increasingly fantastical qualities, altogether ramping 
up the tension towards The Night Guest’s denouement. 
What can often alleviate such discords is simply the physical touch of another.  This can be a 
powerful means of (re-)affirming the subjectivity of persons living with dementia (Kim and 
Buschmann, 1999; Gleeson and Timmins, 2004).  Sadly, however, this is often lacking in 
rationalised regimes of care, as noted by the daughter of a man living with dementia:  
‘He’s going now through a touching stage.  He wants to be holding my hand all the 
time, because what touching does he get during the day?  He gets cleaning, and 
moving, and some kind of nursing care.  He doesn’t get the loving touches, he doesn’t 
get held by his wife or by his daughter.  So these are things that we forget, we run 
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away from the disease, we say ‘Well I can’t stand seeing him like that’ so then he 
misses out on all the things that he needs.’  
Vision TV, 2011 
The ‘loving touches’ is the contact that affirms another as a subject worthy of recognition, 
rather than a patient to be efficiently managed towards death.  These are tender acts of 
figuration through the recognition that ‘existing is being caressed and touched’ (Ernaux, 1997: 
88, cited in Van Gorp and Vercruysse, 2012: 1276).  As noted earlier Ruth often loses sense of 
her limbs in space, even to the extent of being ‘mildly surprised’ to find her feet still attached 
to her legs.  Yet to simply be held by another reaffirms oneself as a desiring and embodied 
entity, a confirmation Ruth begins to yearn for following the tiger’s arrival: 
‘Ruth went back to the lounge room and listened for some time.  Every noise she 
heard was ordinary, and the cool room was stiff and airless.  She lay on the sofa, 
turned her back from the lace of the windows, and waited.  It seemed important that 
something might touch her, and crucial that she not open her eyes to look for 
whatever that thing might be.’  
McFarlane, 2013: 52 
Affirmation through embodiment is also shown to occur in other ways, with satiation often 
derived from obsessively undertaking single, simple tasks, particularly physically taxing ones – 
in Ed’s case – or through the tearing and breaking of small objects, of which Maud, Ruth and 
Alice all engage in frequently.  These are small but sustaining acts of physically proving and 
imprinting one’s presence upon the world as a form of therapeutic haptics.  Even the most 
minor and seemingly banal of movements can be immensely satisfying when they assert an 
accord of body and mind: 
‘Ruth nodded again.  It felt good to nod, so she continued to do so; yes, she said with 
her pendulous head, and yes and yes again; she was a clock, she thought; she was 
generous and wise.’  
McFarlane, 2013: 208 
Physiological displays of interior dispositions can still manifest themselves, and indeed may 
become all the more crucial for those surrounding the sufferer to recognise and encourage as 
higher capacities wane.  Ed, for example, struggles to follow the intricate stories of television 
programs, yet there remains a recognition of the affective undercurrents of these narratives:    
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‘What caught fire in his mind were the rudiments of narrative: a ringing retort, anguish 
on a face, a happy reunion.  He could still feel.  He could still cry.  He did cry, without 
knowing he was doing so.  He felt the tears drying on his face afterward, and it was 
though he had awoken from an unhappy dream.’  
Thomas, 2014: 571 
Intensities of feeling may pass, register, and leave traces in ways unbeknown to the higher 
cognition of the subject (Hochschild, 2012: 24-34).  Recognising and embracing the volitions of 
another is felt to be empowering.  Ruth, for example, in adopting the traits of the tiger by 
prowling around her house with an air of nonchalant impunity, experiences a radical 
transformation in herself, so that what was once ‘only the silly clamour of her beating blood’ 
(McFarlane, 2013: 2) later becomes ‘the distant roar of her own blood’ (169).  That this 
refiguring is a symptom of her escalating neurodegeneration seems almost beside the point; 
her cognitive materiality will inevitably change, but what matters is the vitalising impulses that 
remain.   
However, compounding the difficulty of retaining realisable volitions is the frequent blurring 
and collapse of temporalities.  Part of sustaining a unity of motion and form is the ability to be 
multiply present in different temporalities; to stretch one’s present self into the past in a way 
that construes a coherent narrative, but also to extend oneself into the future and thus affirm 
the will of an intentional being.  For our protagonists living with dementia this is incredibly 
difficult, for they are repeatedly thrown into reveries of the past, while also lacking the 
cognitive means to project themselves into the future, even in the very near term.  The result 
is that temporal existence either shrinks to a pinprick of the present or is stuck in a fugue state 
of the past, dredging up residuals of feelings from events that cannot be altered.  For example, 
Alice repeatedly mistakes her daughter for her deceased sister, while Maud is constantly 
dropped into a well of memories around the unsolved disappearance of her sister when they 
were young.  Ruth regularly forgets that her husband, Harry, has died, resulting in a repeated 
resurfacing of anguish as the loss is felt again and again; a looping, unending bereavement: 
‘Frida sank into the catless end of the couch. ‘Ruthie,’ she said, with unexpected 
softness, ‘Harry’s dead.’ 
‘I know that,’ snapped Ruth, and she did know it; she had even known it a moment ago 
when she suggested they consult him.  And she was disgusted with him, because 
nobody could be really, truly dead; nobody could stand it.  It was one thing, maybe, to 
die – and Ruth held his head as Harry died, she remembered that now, she saw the 
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sand on the pavement at the bus stop and Harry’s shaking dying head – but it was 
quite another to go on being dead.  That was obstinate; it was unkind.’  
McFarlane, 2013: 211 
These characters suffer a constant churn of affect-laced memories butting up against blunt 
realities, and when the two become entangled this can also cloud their present willed 
intentions.  The result is a dizzying confluence of emotional overflows and residuals, which 
requires the labour of those surrounding the subject to continually help render their shifting 
interiority towards a new figuration and accord with the world. 
 
 
Overflows and residuals of feeling  
 
During an interview Emma Healey, author of Elizabeth is Missing, stated that one of her 
primary motivations in writing the novel was in rectifying common misconceptions of 
interpersonal encounters and their lingering effects: 
‘The misconceptions about the illness upset me more than anything, the idea that you 
can be less than pleasant to somebody with dementia ‘because they won’t remember’ 
whereas in fact the feelings evoked are residual.  They know something is wrong, that 
something bad has happened and they don’t always forget that.’ 
Emma Healey, in interview with Miller, 2014 
Certainly, recollection encompasses much more than simply the descriptive content or ‘plot’ of 
an encounter.  We also re-collect the emotional imprints left by others through interactions, 
gathering together a reverie of embodied dispositions and their accompanying narrative 
thrust.  Indeed, contrary to the harmfully ignorant understandings highlighted by Healey, 
wounds inflicted on the psyche can be even more harmful when their narrative aetiology is 
unknown, for the inability to connect injury to cause may leave one in a state of crippling 
dissonance.  While the recent affective turn in social theory distinguishes clearly between 
‘emotion’ and ‘affect’ so as to open up an ontology irreducible to personal identity (Massumi 
2002; Hynes, 2013; Hynes and Sharpe, 2015), the work of Teresa Brennan (2004) provides a 
description of the flow of emotion that I am associating with the emotional labour of dementia 
care.  Brennan (2004: 3) describes the ‘transmission of affect’ as ‘a process that is social in 
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origin but biological and physical in effect’ with ‘enhancing or depressing energies’ that result 
as they move from one subject to another.   
As Maud’s cognitive faculties deteriorate she will repeatedly lose the narrative thread of this 
circuit of emotion, her volitions are untethered from affirming ends, resulting in a trapped 
residual energy that swells a reservoir of distress.  Healey is quick to establish to the reader the 
significant impact these residual emotions have on Maud.  The opening chapter begins with 
Carla – Maud’s carer – breathlessly recounting a news report of a mugging of an elderly 
woman who had been found ‘“with half her face smashed in”’ (Healey, 2014: 3).  Maud 
laments to herself ‘I wish Carla wouldn’t tell me these things; they leave me with an uneasy 
feeling long after I’ve forgotten the stories themselves’ (Healey, 2014: 3).  These induced 
feelings linger within Maud, expanding and looping upon themselves once they are cleaved 
from their previous referents in the act of forgetting.  Healey’s Maud and McFarlane’s Ruth are 
especially prone to such residuals.  What is induced by another is retained, but soon thereafter 
found to be inexpressible, sometimes distressingly so, but also occasionally in pleasant ways.  
The elusive quality of the transmission generates a potentiality that seeks affixing in a 
coherent narrative.  For instance, when Ruth countenances the new presence of the tiger she 
cannot help but revel in the possibilities it engenders: 
‘… and pictured, as she did so, the headlines: ‘Australian Woman Eaten by Tiger in Own 
House’.  Or, more likely, ‘Tiger Puts Pensioner on the Menu’.  This delighted her; and 
there was another sensation, a new one, to which she attended with greater care: a 
sense of extravagant consequence.  Something important, Ruth felt, was happening to 
her, and she couldn’t be sure what it was: the tiger, or the feeling of importance … She 
felt something coming to meet her – something large, and not a real thing, of course, 
she wasn’t that far gone – but a shape, or anyway a temperature.  It produced a funny 
bubble in her chest.’  
McFarlane, 2013: 4 
A life that had once descended into whiling away the hours now takes on an expansive urgency 
of ‘extravagant consequence’.  With the powerful dual presence of Frida and the tiger, Ruth’s 
days become ‘thick’ and ‘crowded’ with a ‘strange hothouse heat’ (McFarlane, 2013: 40).  Ruth 
knows know not the why or wherefore of this atmospheric change, but its sensate veracity 
promises some form of reckoning and reconciliation with the world. 
Maud’s residual of emotion, on the other hand, is laced with more panic and disquiet, given 
that it is tethered to her ‘missing’ friend Elizabeth.  This is not a disinhibiting residual, rather it 
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propels Maud into action, but often her anxiety holds a charge that knows not where to 
dissipate.  Maud repeatedly finds herself with unrealised affects stuck in a narrative 
disjuncture, seeking to be affixed somewhere, with volitions coursing through the body whose 
referents cannot be found:   
 ‘… but I can’t sit down, I must keep on.  I must do the thing I came to do.  For a 
moment I can’t think what it is.  My mind is blank.  My arm starts to shake and my 
heart beats in my stomach.’ 
Healey, 2014: 75 
These are feelings fizzing with potentiality, physiologically manifesting themselves as 
something akin to a fight-or-flight response, except that Maud does not know the source of 
her unease.  But when these discords of volition and narrative are reconciled, Maud’s comfort 
is palpable: 
‘I fold a stalk over itself until it snaps.  ‘Tell me.  Tell me who it is.  Who’s missing, 
Helen?  Who am I looking for?’ 
She says Elizabeth’s name, and hearing it is like falling into a soft bed.  Bits, bits fall 
from the stem of a hydrangea as I run my hand down it.’  
Healey, 2014: 166  
This desire for narrative accord creates powerful somatic markers, the pangs of a selfhood 
struggling to persist.  This is especially evident through a deathly panic Alice feels when she 
cannot find a desired object, knowing not what the object is but that she will be certain of its 
vital purpose when it is found: 
‘“I don’t know, I told you, I’ll know it when I find it.  I have to find it, or I’ll die.”’  
Genova, 2009: 237  
This feeling of the object holding literally life-or-death importance prompts Alice to think it 
may be her medication, however when she finds the medication ‘the urge, the life-and-death 
need, didn’t dissipate.’ (Genova, 2009: 237).  Sadly, Alice never finds this object.  Later it is 
discovered to have been her treasured Blackberry phone, which Alice had placed in the 
freezer.28  Though Alice cannot quite join the narrative dots her intensely felt suspicions are 
essentially correct, for while she does not ‘die’ from the loss of the Blackberry it does signify 
                                                          
28
 This is a common form of object-use error committed by persons with dementia (Cappa et al., 1998).   
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the end of her self-administered butterfly test, and therefore her autonomy in controlling the 
circumstances of her eventual death.  Consequently Alice feels ‘an inconsolable grief over the 
death of the Blackberry’, a displacement of the sorrow she ultimately feels for herself (Genova, 
2009: 239-40).  
Frequently, throughout these novels we are given the impression that feelings have become 
trapped, and need to be ejected from the body by any means necessary.  What may emerge, 
then, are overflows of inexpressibility, manifesting themselves through: cursing and other 
minor performative transgressions; the habitual breaking of small objects; and occasionally fits 
of impotent rage born of sheer frustration.29  The authors are all careful in establishing that 
these behaviours are clearly out of character for their respective protagonists, but neither are 
they purely physiological symptoms of atrophying neuronal networks.  Rather, the overflows 
are entangled phenomena, for cognitive decline collides and loops with status ascriptions and 
resistance thereof, and thus flashes of feelings such as anger are caught between: attribution 
to the disease modifying personality; or a reaction to personal frustration; or a rational 
response to a perceived personal injustice.  This results in a wedged state that Alice herself 
recognises as one of perpetual contingency (Genova, 2009: 198).  Similarly, the normally prim 
and proper Ruth becomes increasingly frustrated with being corralled, dominated, and 
patronised by her children and Frida, such that swearing provides a cathartic release: 
‘… she swore again, with greater pleasure this time, as if the word fuck could increase 
in beauty the more care she took to say it.’  
McFarlane, 2013: 165 
In another vein of contingent existence Ed – prior to his diagnosis – is placed in a bind of being 
unable to articulate to Eileen exactly why he adamantly refuses to move to another 
neighbourhood (for, as Ed knows – but cannot articulate – the loss of routine and familiar 
surrounds will rapidly undo him).  This frustration of inexpressibility culminates in Ed calling his 
wife a ‘bitch’, an utterance which he had never before committed ‘in all their years together’ 
(Thomas, 2014: 195).  Other residuals of feeling work their way out in a more mutually 
affirming manner, so that what was once repressed under a cool stoicism now becomes: raised 
fists in the air after accomplishing once mundane tasks; a suddenly more ‘purposeful’ 
lovemaking with Eileen; compulsively revising his students’ grades upwards, as if wanting to 
                                                          
29
 Verbal and physical aggression is relatively common among nursing home residents living with 
dementia.  The difficulty of managing affective states combined with the loss of autonomy that comes 
with life in a total institution can understandably manifest in outbursts of frustration (Schreiner, 2001)  
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vicariously access their future feelings of pride and accomplishment (Thomas, 2014: 249-52); 
and, lastly, the previously discussed openness towards his son. 
The once intellectually unassailable Alice also struggles to articulate her wishes to her 
husband, who in turn dismisses her pleas under the new regime of person made patient.  
Maud is likewise constantly thwarted by others in her attempts to look for Elizabeth, 
generating waves of anxiety that are only partially sated in tearing up tissues, leaves, flowers, 
pencils and the like (Healey, 2014: 71, 166, 217, 254, 260).  Alice also derives some cathartic 
release from small but significant acts of physical force: 
‘She hated those fucking eggs.  She held one in her hand and threw it as hard as she 
could into the sink.  One by one, she destroyed them all.  It was marginally satisfying, 
but not enough.  She needed to break something else, something that required more 
muscle, something that would exhaust her.’  
Genova, 2009: 66    
Exhaustion, it seems, may sometimes be the only means by which a brief reconciliation with 
the world can be realised, sought in order to both quell wayward thoughts and feel oneself to 
be a productive subject.  Ed feverishly works himself into a soothing fatigue with monotonous, 
labour-intensive tasks, such as cleaning floor tiles with a toothbrush.  At other times, Ed’s 
behaviour is neurotically haptic, compulsively turning things off, breaking pencils, squashing 
peaches underfoot, and stamping his feet in childish petulance (Thomas, 2014, 272-3).  Seen 
from the point of view of the flows of emotion and feeling that are so important to sociality, 
these seemingly odd behaviours are no longer the strange habits of the ‘demented’, but rather 
perfectly understandable acts towards catharsis and self-actualisation.   
The protagonists’ overflows of feeling are usually triggered by some event that disorients or 
inhibits, but at other times residuals of feeling arrive unannounced, repeating on themselves 
but shorn of any discernible context.  As noted earlier, this can be equally empowering or 
disabling depending on the residual and context, and sometimes can be simultaneously both.  
Ed, for instance, is brought to ecstasy and then retching tears by a piece of music, compelling 
Connell to shift him from one medium to another: music to television (Thomas, 2014: 558-9).  
The former stirs and rouses, while the latter soothes and pacifies.  Practically speaking, this 
homeostasis of stimulation is quite a common strategy in care practices, if only because 
heightened emotions require greater levels of supervision, which can stretch resources beyond 
capacity (Schreiner, Yamamoto and Shiotani, 2005).  The typical outcome in such institutions is 
that emotions become rationalised and contained within safe middling zones, or persons with 
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Identity through narrative  
 
Those living with dementia must contend with multiple insults to their sense of self (Bender 
and Cheston, 1997: 518).  Facets of themselves once considered central to their identity must 
be relinquished because they can simply no longer be performed to standards determined by 
others.  Status ascriptions may shift, and perhaps some framings may be resisted, but others 
are acquiesced to, however reluctantly.  A steady disempowerment may occur, a ‘de-skilling 
process’ whereby the sufferer is piece-by-piece relieved of all those undertakings which once 
amounted to their usual sense of agency and identity (Kitwood, 1990: 181-4).  Those living 
with dementia are therefore burdened with the extra task of having to constantly assert and 
display their autonomy against the ongoing assessments of others, who discern what freedoms 
they may retain by measuring the surveilled subject against the ‘hypercognitive’ ideal.  
However, there are some means by which this project of self can be aided through the efforts 
of others, so that those living with dementia may be affirmed in their shifting state of being.   
As carers know all too well this requires a labour of mutually constructing and performing 
narratives that are mimetically resonant for those living with dementia.  Highlighted earlier, 
Arlie Russel Hochschild’s (2012) The Managed Heart provides a fine overview of the demands 
of this emotional labour.  Often such a labour involves an act of ‘transmutation’, realised by 
making the emotional state of another commensurate and complementary with your own 
(2012: 19).  This requires summoning and inducing the compatible feeling within oneself 
through various entraining strategies that serve to erase any sense of dissonance in oneself.  
That is, we adopt the techniques of ‘deep acting’ in order to cultivate the required feeling that 
renders our performances as sincere engagements with others, rather than merely managed 
veneers of displayed affect (Hochschild, 2012: 33-54).  Hochschild’s ethnographic research 
across many spheres of emotional labour demonstrates that when a required act of emotional 
labour demands a great deal of the person who labours for another, a common method of 
erasing potential dissonance is to reframe the narrative of the subject for whom they labour.  
In this way the rude customer is reconfigured as someone who is perhaps under great stress, 
or that the disruptive child has a tumultuous home life, or that the senile, demented person 
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was once (and should still be recognised as) a figure of great stature, the central protagonist of 
a rich life narrative.   
This custodial quality, the tending to another’s sense of narrative and feeling, is of great 
significance.  Vittoria (1998), in an ethnographic study of a care facility, provides compelling 
evidence of this labour that goes well beyond the ‘bed and body’ (105) work we may 
erroneously think captures the totality of care for those with dementia.  One example Vittoria 
gives is that of a former banker, now a resident in the care facility after the onset of dementia.  
This resident still adopts the habits and airs of his former vocation, and the staff duly play 
along in an ensemble of roles that would accord with this occupation (Vittoria, 1998: 112-3, 
120-1).  Such performative exchanges can provide the affirming co-creation of narrative 
through ‘identity work’ (Vittoria, 1998).  This role playing – a quotidian form of ‘deep acting’ – 
by persons with dementia is quite common and variously encouraged due to its therapeutic 
benefits.  Former administrators will be given forms to fill out, while those who were once 
homemakers may help with the upkeep of the facility (Cohen-Mansfield, Golander and 
Arnheim, 2000).  One former store owner would even compliment her ‘workers’, the nursing 
staff (Vittoria, 1998: 110-1). 
Given that emotional residuals within dementia can expand, loop, and then repeat upon 
themselves it can take only seemingly minor acts to shift dispositions dramatically.30  
Demonstrative of the importance of fostering positive encounters is a scene in Elizabeth is 
Missing where Maud wishes to report her friend Elizabeth as ‘missing’ to the police.  The 
officer initially seems kind and obliging and indeed somehow already aware of Maud’s 
concern.  Maud begins to feel ‘tears of relief’ knowing that her fears are being heard with 
seeming sincerity, but is soon dreadfully undone when it is revealed that the officer is cruelly 
mocking her: 
“‘This’ll be the … let me see …’ he clicks at the computer a few times ‘… fourth time 
you’ve been in.’ 
Fourth time.  ‘So,’ I say.  ‘Is someone looking for Elizabeth already, then?’  I know as 
soon as the words are out of my mouth that it’s hopeless. 
                                                          
30 Schreiner, Yamamoto, and Shiotani (2005), for example, note the importance of structured 
recreational activity in care facilities as a producer of positive affect, whereas affectless or ‘null’ displays 
were 2.5 times more likely to be present at any given moment when residents were simply left to their 
own devices (see also Teri 1991).     
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He laughs.  ‘Oh yeah.  I’ve got every man on the force out.  Sniffer dogs, forensics, 
flying squad.  They’re all out there’ – he pauses to skim a hand through the air – 
‘looking for your friend Elizabeth.’ 
I got hot at his words.  My armpits prickle.  I can see what he thinks of me now, and I 
feel sick.  The tears spill over, finally, and I turn away so he won’t see them.”  
Healey, 2014: 77 
After this encounter the hurt lingers within Maud, despite the ‘plot’ of the event being 
forgotten within moments.  The bad feelings continue to dog Maud, damning her into a 
depressive state.  That this is callous treatment by the police officer is obvious enough.  More 
precisely though, the instructive lesson here regards how feelings may be retained as 
incapacitating residuals.  The cheap gratification of the policeman comes through a kind of 
emotional ‘dumping’ onto Maud (Brennan, 2004: 30).  Yet in return for this mild spark to his 
perhaps otherwise dull day Maud must now contend with the depletion of her own sense of 
agency and volition that has occurred through an act of belittlement and mockery.  There is a 
gross disequilibrium of feeling created here, for the pleasures enjoyed by the officer are surely 
not inversely equivalent to the distress felt by Maud, hence the resulting creation of an inert, 
residual feeling. 
But note also that an emotional labour of care and recognition does not require ‘humouring’ 
or infantilising those with dementia, rather it simply requires the willing labour of constructing 
mutually according narratives (Lyman, 1988).  Healey makes this clear in juxtaposing Maud’s 
depleting encounter with the police officer with a later scene, wherein Maud attempts to place 
a classifieds advertisement to aid her search for Elizabeth.  In this scene the receptionist 
assisting Maud is well-meaning and patient, but mistakenly assumes ‘Elizabeth’ is a cat, 
resulting in a comical extended miscommunication.  This is a carefully directed humour, 
grounded not in the disparaging of another but in two equal persons acting in good faith and 
mutuality, with results going harmlessly awry in ways that can be easily mended (Wade, 2015).   
From the mutual translation of Ed and Connell’s hugs and knee pats, Ruth’s urge to prowl 
around her home and to be touched by another to confirm her corporeal presence, and 
Maud’s expressed desire for someone to recognise her concern for her missing friend, these 
novels demand of us that we open ourselves to the emotional labour that dementia requires, 
and to reconsider what such labour can tell us about neurological difference and wellbeing.  
We are called to recognise that maintaining the communicative flows essential to selfhood 
requires understanding that we are each the means and source of one another’s enlargement 
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of self, and far less the author of our own, regardless of how ‘hypercognitive’ we believe 
ourselves to be.   
 
 
Conclusion – Rethinking recognition  
 
In the preceding chapters, I have interrogated the assumption that our potential to be ethical 
citizens is dependent upon ‘enhancing’ our higher cognitive capacities through interventions 
targeted at the neuronal level.  This gaze both individualises and disaggregates the subject, 
handing over to them the responsibility to intensively optimise these substrates of the ideal 
citizen.  Yet it would appear that a comparably imperative ethical challenge we are facing 
today is how we may ensure the best possible quality of life for the growing number of those 
who embody the seeming antithesis of the ‘hypercognitive’ society.  This chapter, through 
highlighting the sensitive but evocative instruction provided by literary depictions, has 
suggested means by which the ongoing personhood of those with dementia may be better 
realised, while also supplanting unhelpfully fearful and abysmal conceptions of 
neurodegeneration.  In part, these novels instruct us to focus less on a diminishing 
‘hypercognitive’ status, and instead seek to cultivate and satiate the experiential self that 
remains.  In turn, we might also reconsider the high value we place upon the hypercognitive 
subject as the measure of our ethical being.   
Let us again recall here Pontius’ (1973) original interpretation of ‘neuroethics’, where walking 
devices used to aid newborn children may ironically result in long term consequences for 
developing the required neurological capacities for that very same motor function.  
Pharmakon-like, what was once a supportive crutch unwittingly resolves itself into a 
developmental hindrance.  As noted at the start of this chapter, the array of causal factors that 
can result in symptoms of dementia are unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future.  Yet, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, many of our efforts to avert cognitive decline and better 
realise our hypercogntive capacities can be defined by their perfectly antithetical qualities to 
constructions of the ‘demented’ subject, despite the efficacy of such ‘brain training’ remaining 
largely unproven. Perhaps, then, we might consider the Pontius possibility that we are relying 
on devices and scripts that loop into effect practices of care for the self that do not reduce our 
propensity to neurodegenerative disease.  Instead, such an ethic may counter-productively 
heighten the dread associated with cognitive decline, and so render us all the more vulnerable 
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and ill-prepared to actually consider alternate possibilities of what dementia can instruct us 
with regard to the embodied and affective qualities of ethical wellbeing, and what efforts are 
required to induce such wellbeing for those in our care.  As Sabat and Harré (1992: 460) as 
mournfully observe, this unproductive dread  
‘… is founded on story lines that paint the sufferer as inadequate, confused, helpless, 
etc., then that person will be so positioned and will have his or her behaviour 
interpreted by others in such a way as to confirm the initial story line and positioning. 
The ultimate result of such a situation is the fencing off of the sufferer so that no 
adequate self can be constructed. Perhaps it is not stretching the point too far to refer 
to such a situation as a species of self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, if there is a loss of the 
capacity to present an appropriate self, in many cases the fundamental cause is to be 
found not in the neurofibrillary tangles and senile plaques in the brains of the 
sufferers, but in the character of the social interactions and their interpretation that 
follow in the wake of the symptoms.’ 
Of course, there is always scope to remain hopeful.  Perhaps the prevalence of the various 
symptoms and knock-on effects of dementia will plateau or even decrease over time as 
preventative measures and stalling interventions become more efficacious.  Yet it still remains 
likely that in the highly developed world the mechanisms of our final undoing will increasingly 
be entwined with our neurology, whether it be through already prevalent neurodegenerative 
causes, or through endocrine and pituitary dysfunction, lymphatic disorders, or a host of other 
neuropathic conditions.  The interplay of neurology with environment in the varying 
manifestation of these conditions is stupendously complex, and so requires a model of 
neuroethics sensitive to difference, and less enamoured with ideal models.  This would be an 
ethic of neurodiversity less concerned with ‘enhancing’ our species-unique capacities of 
rationality and higher cognition, but instead seeking a ‘common currency’ in what can be 
faithfully transmitted between subjects, of what can be mutually affecting across different 
modes of being.  This aspiration will be further explored in the final chapter. 
A brief anecdote to finish here: In a paper discussing the experience of caring for her 
dementia-suffering mother, the anthropologist Janelle Taylor (2008: 314-5) lamented how 
strange and misguided it seemed that when asked about her ailing mother the question was 
always a variant of ‘does she recognise you?’.  Implicit within this question, notes Taylor, is 
also an assessment of whether her mother is in turn worthy of ‘recognition’ as an affect-
desiring subject.  Instead, Taylor argues, we should focus less on ‘recognition’ as a property of 
the high cognition capacities of the bounded individual subject, and instead embrace a model 
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of mutuality and reciprocity across greater neurological terrain.  This seems a fitting way to 
conclude this chapter, for surely any kind of ethics worth having and defending will not be 
realised in the intensive labour of working upon one’s brain, but rather in extensive acts of 
transmission, in labours of reciprocity and mutual affirmation of being.  What unites us all is 
not some lofty conception of our species-unique capacity of rational morality, but rather the 
desire for a narrative accord with the world, one that can only be realised through the co-




















Conclusion – Epistemological Humility in Service of an Expansive 
Ethics 
 
‘Modern science’s relentless search for the base underneath mere appearances has 
given new force to the old argument.  It has indeed forced the ground of appearances 
into the open so that man, a creature fitted for and dependent on appearances, can 
catch hold of it.  But the results have been rather perplexing.  No man, it has turned 
out, can live among “causes” or give full account in normal human language of a Being 
whose truth can be scientifically demonstrated in the laboratory and tested practically 
in the real world through technology.  It does look as though Being, once made 
manifest, overrules appearances – except that nobody so far has succeeded in living in 
a world that does not manifest itself of its own accord.’ 
Arendt, 1981: 25-6 
Introduction – Two visions 
 
This thesis has sought to contribute to a burgeoning critical discourse that – while certainly not 
hostile to the cognitive neurosciences – looks to hold neuro-practitioners to account as their 
endeavours explore increasingly expansive properties of subjectivity and wellbeing at ever 
more intensive levels.  My primary concerns centre around the observation that some efforts 
in empirical neuroethics result in flawed ‘moral spectroscopes’ that presume to have 
mimetically translated ethical conduct into the ‘brain terrain’, but in actuality merely harden 
highly socio-historically contingent idealisations of the ethical subject.  My further concern 
regarding these developments is that we may lose a ‘conatic hope’ (Hage, 2003) found in not 
having the bounds of our ethical capabilities and other measures of wellbeing rigidly affixed in 
our molecular assemblies.  We should remain wary of any ‘hyphen-ethic’ (Žižek (2012: 110-1) 
that provides too-neat substantiality to that which has typically been ontologically elusive and 
socially negotiated.   
Much of this critical analysis within this thesis also aims to offer new frameworks and 
conceptual tools by which the neurosciences might orient their inquiry, offered in the hope of 
avoiding the common pitfalls that emerge when attempting to translate lines of inquiry across 
multiple expanses of ontological and epistemological terrain.  In this way myself and a growing 
number of these critical interlocutors from within the social sciences and humanities seek to 
195 
 
become productively ‘entangled’ with the neurosciences, attempting to grapple with the 
dizzying complexities and possibilities that arise as we attempt to illuminate the wondrous 
intricacies of our cognition, however it may be distributed through brain, body, and the 
external world.  
In the introductory chapter, The Promise of the Brain, I began with Latour’s anecdote of Paul 
Churchland’s unusual token of marital love: a passport-photo sized brain scan of his wife, the 
fellow well-known eliminative materialist, Patricia Churchland.  Though eliminative 
materialism is less commonly invoked today, it is certainly not insignificant that Patricia 
Churchland was one of the key figures in the discipline-shaping ‘Neuroethics: Mapping the 
Field’ conference in 2002, and that a great deal of neuroethical inquiry is powered by the 
eliminativist belief ‘that the ontologically most fundamental level of explanation is by default 
the most appropriate one’ (Slaby and Choudhury, 2012: 30).  This engenders equally 
fascinating and unnerving dilemmas if ‘morality’ is be to so reduced to its most ‘fundamental’ 
properties.  Hence I raised concern with hard discourses informed by hypothetic-deductive 
models that purport to identify what qualities are ‘essential’ to our species-being and 
‘imperative’ to maintain or even enhance, all so that we may become more and better 
‘human’.  In this way emerging claims from neuroethics regarding the ideal subject may fold 
back onto us as ethical injunctions, where technologies and techniques of caring for the self 
may now include cultivating a prescribed neurological disposition towards the world.  I thereby 
suggest that we should look to trace these ‘recurrent histories’ (Canguilhem, 1988) and lines of 
‘historical ontology’ (Foucault, 1984; Hacking, 2002: 1-26) with a watchful eye, noting how 
knowledge claims are variously produced and then folded through assessments of our 
conduct.  By adopting this critical stance we may craft means by which to think against the 
present (Rose, 1996: 18), and so illuminate how the frames, gazes, and rhetoric of scientific 
inquiry contribute to the ‘making up’ of subjects (Hacking, 1985).  Additionally, I posited that 
we should look to interpose a sociological perspective that strives not only to expose 
epistemological overreach, but also to contribute to ways in which the neurosciences may be 
productively integrated with neighbouring disciplines similarly concerned with the self, 
subjectivity, and wellbeing.  To this end I provided a literature review of the recent work of 
those scholars looking to become ‘entangled’ with neurosciences, including from those within 
the new field of Critical Neuroscience, to social scientists and humanists willing to work in 
interdisciplinary territory, and philosophers and critical theorists who seriously consider what 
cognitive neuroscience may offer to their own endeavours.   
In Moral Spectroscopes and Synaptic Ledgers I endeavoured to trace the emergence of 
neuroethics as a sub-discipline, providing a discourse analysis beginning with the 2002 
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‘Neuroethics: Mapping the Field’ conference up to more recent manifestos espousing how the 
field may inform assessments of ethical conduct.  This chapter was especially interested in a 
small but ambitious cadre of neuroethicists who proclaim – in both academic and lay contexts 
– that their field may lead the way to a ‘second Enlightenment’ by revealing our ethical 
constitutions at the neurological level.  By reducing the complexity of ethical thought and 
behaviour to the ontological ‘common currency’ of their differing activation in the brain, these 
advocates posit that a rigourously-defined ‘universal ethics’ might be revealed through an 
epistemic privilege to which they lay claim.  Yet, given the looping effects of assessments of 
our ‘essential’ human qualities, such endeavours threaten to have greater effects in their 
propounding to wider society rather than through the actual validity of their findings.  
Moreover, I argued that some neuroethical experimental constructs are laden with false 
categorical neatness unbefitting the import and complexity of the properties they seek to 
measure, thereby risking hardening and reifying what is merely the ‘popular prejudice’ of 
today.  This Nieztschean-inspired critique concludes the chapter, warning against mistaking the 
contingent tributary for the universal property by attempting to force ‘consequentialism’ and 
‘deontology’ down the translational chain into our neurology, thereby further corrupting that 
which is already in need of repair. 
Not Fit for Purpose? followed neuroethics out of the lab, observing how neuroscience-based 
claims – particularly through ‘hard’ transhumanists who propose that we consider 
neurologically ‘enhancing’ ourselves in this age of global manufactured risk – have sought to 
translate the knotty and elusive debates around our sense of meaning and wellbeing into 
precise, technical, and rigidly demarcated measures of the ‘ideal’ citizen-subject.  However, 
even when packaged in the pleasurably virtuous play and low-intensity interaction of ‘brain 
training’, I have argued that such creeping personal ‘responsibilization’ combined with the 
‘marketization’ of life (Rose, 2007: 4) may prove to be burdensome, for these appeals come 
laden with ethical injunctions regarding how the ideal subject stands in relation to their value-
bearing cognitive capacities.  In response I conclude, with reference to posthumanist thought 
of similar inclination, that some humility and rapprochement is needed given our still meagre 
understandings of neurological being, notwithstanding the accompanying risk of what lines of 
inquiry may be lost if we too hastily and rigidly set down narrow epistemological paths.  This 
caution is especially necessary in weighing up calls for ‘neuro-enhancement’, against which I 
have argued that we may unwittingly diminish potentialities for new modes of ethical being if 
we are unsparingly subjected to a ‘hard’ transhumanist regime of neuro-enhancement that 
comes a priori packaged with presuppositions of the ‘good citizen’.  Alternatively, I have 
suggested that rather than insisting on current notions of enhancement, we should open lines 
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of inquiry towards the enchancement of subjectivity, humbly acknowledging that we are still 
so very far from truly understanding the interplay of cognition and ethical wellbeing, but 
daring to explore entanglements beyond current classically humanist conceptions. 
Finally, the preceding chapter, Dementia in a Hypercognitive World, aims to make a 
contribution to this productive entanglement by noting the instructive ways in which novels 
that explore the lived experience of dementia can serve as both helpful advocacy efforts and 
experimental aids in realising new models of ethical interaction sensitive to neurodiversity.  
Concurrently, these texts might also lead us to reconsider the perhaps damning burdens and 
looping stigmas we place upon ourselves and others in acquiescing to creeping prescriptions of 
care for the neurological self, prescriptions that result in Sisyphean labours ill-fitting to both 
more humane and pragmatic considerations of cognitive decline and overall wellbeing.  Such 
considerations of a more expansive neuroethics may entail a shift away from morality-in-a-vat 
experimental models and applications, and instead towards co-constitutive and distributed 
understandings of wellbeing. 
Rather than further recapitulate the entire thesis as it has progressed, however, I would like to 
continue this brief summing up by outlining two visions of the brain, each presented in public 
settings by prominent figures of neuroscience.  These two visions helpfully capture some of 
the current ambitions and conceptual ambiguities this thesis has addressed, particularly as 
they relate to the promise of better realising our collective wellbeing through our neurology, 
and how such hopes are enjoined upon lay subjects.  However, in response to these intensive 
gazes oriented to expansive visions – which I have critiqued throughout this thesis, particularly 
those that fold into ethical injunctions levied upon the individual subject – I would like to 
briefly offer four means by which we can resist slipping into these rationales.  These four 
trajectories are offered in the hope that we may open up a conceptual space in which, rather 
than configuring the subject by attempting to trace external phenomena as they are so 
determined to pass through the brain, we instead further explore the possibility that the brain 
is merely one site through which the constitutive qualities of the self, agency, and volition pass 
and leave measurable traces.  I am not the first to expound this kind of view, but I at least 
hope that this thesis has contributed to helpfully questioning the growing tendency towards 
pinioning our hopes on the brain as the formative site of our wellbeing.  This affixing risks 
creating a looping effect of hyper-reflexivity, wherein our labours upon this terrain 
disaggregates the self into essentialised functions that obscures their socio-historical 




Here, for example, is one vision of an intensive gaze directed to expansive ends, framed in a 
way that invites hasty over-determination and ontological atrophy.  Notable neurophysiologist 
and public intellectual Baroness Susan Greenfield has often invoked a reading of the brain that 
is extremely localised with regard to otherwise expansive and elusive concepts of subjectivity, 
agency, and wellbeing.  Here is a customary example of this view from Greenfield (2013), 
framed around her experiences of studying neuroanatomy at Oxford, and sourced from a 
public lecture given at the University of Melbourne: 
‘You put your hand in this bucket … then you hold a human brain in one hand.  And I 
remember thinking if I wasn’t wearing surgical gloves, and a bit, for some reason, just 
lodged under my fingernail, would that be the bit that somebody loved with?  Would it 
be a habit?  Would it be a memory?’ 
Here the brain is framed as a site of intensively localised fragility, a fragility not simply of 
delicate organic matter (vulnerable, in this case, to the hard organic matter of the careless, 
keratinous fingernail), but of highly abstracted qualities of selfhood vulnerable to minute acts 
of material destruction. 
Contrast this with a second vision, this time presented by neuroanatomist Jill Bolte Taylor 
(2008a) in which, during a TED conference – so often the venue for this kind of ‘third culture’ 
evangelism31 – Taylor spoke of an epiphany she experienced whilst undergoing the strange and 
rapid ontological refigurations that often occur during the onset of a brain haemorrhage.  
Following the initial stroke, Taylor found herself ‘inside of a silent mind … I could no longer 
identify the boundaries of my body, I felt enormous and expansive. I felt at one with all the 
energy that was, and it was beautiful there’.  Taylor described this brief period as one of 
‘euphoria’ and ‘Nirvana’, and in that moment contemplated whether she would ‘ever be able 
to squeeze the enormousness of myself back inside this tiny little body’. 
But it is curious to note that her subsequent call to better recognise the ‘life-force power of 
the universe’ – a force both constitutive and independent of us – was ultimately packaged 
within the brain and its (dys-)function.  The expansive vision was thereby drawn back to the 
intensive gaze.  It is not insignificant that during an early part of Taylor’s TED talk an actual 
brain with attached spinal cord was presented for her to hold (echoing Greenfield’s emphasis 
on the vulnerable physicality of our selfhood, of the brain as the delicate container of our 
being).  While holding the brain Taylor spoke briefly on the hemispheric lateralisation of brain 
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 Indeed design theorist Benjamin Bratton (2013) has described the TED format as ‘middlebrow 
megachurch infotainment’, with content that is both over-simplified and over-promissory in ways that 
may prove unproductive and even harmful. 
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function32, and invoked the common metaphor of the left hemisphere as a serial processor and 
right hemisphere as a parallel processor.  The brain is onstage for less than two minutes, and 
as an instructive prop is certainly not essential to the talk in any direct way, but nonetheless its 
unassuming physical presence (held in one hand) is given to be the fragile terrain upon which 
we may discern that which makes life worth living.  Specifically, the two hemispheres were 
framed by Taylor as contesting mechanisms of figuration: the left giving a sense of our 
boundedness and separateness from the world, while the right seeks communion and 
commensurability with the world.  For Taylor, her stroke briefly placed her left hemisphere 
into an ‘offline’ state, leaving her with a state of consciousness in which she felt herself as 
entirely permeable with the external environment (hence the comparison to a place of 
Nirvana).  According to Taylor, this state of being holds great promise, for ‘the more time we 
spend choosing to run the deep inner-peace circuitry of our right hemispheres, the more 
peace we will project into the world, and the more peaceful our planet will be’.  Taylor’s 
(2008b: 140-177) call to ‘step to the right of our left hemisphere’ is perhaps heartening given 
that it comes from a neuroanatomist seeming to reach across the two cultures divide, though 
the proposal is not theoretically detailed or otherwise insightful in how we might enact such 
an ethic.  Still, there is promise here in the attempt to unstick volition and wellbeing from its 
typical reference points. 
Ultimately, however, both of these visions are concerning, for they are narrowly intensive and 
naively expansive.  In these performative events of science communication the brain terrain 
has been stretched to house ideals of ‘love’ and ‘Nirvana’, and portrayed as wholly containing 
of these states, such that these elusive properties take on a hardness unbefitting their 
negotiated emergence.  While we may admire the willingness and enthusiasm of these 
communicators in presenting neuroscience-informed views that countenance such otherwise 
intangible properties of wellbeing, we should remain wary of looping into effect practices 
whereby we look with reverence to the brain as an iconographic designate to which we accord 
ourselves in search of the ‘good life’.  While Joshua Greene (2008: 38, see Chapter Two) may 
suggest that moral philosophers do not recognise that their long-debated stances are actually 
better explained as ‘psychological natural kinds’, we may in turn reply that perhaps 
neuroscientists are on epistemologically shaky ground in conflating ‘love’ with a substance that 
can fit under the fingernail, or of ‘Nirvana’ with an untethered right hemisphere.  These 
qualities of the interpersonal and the transcendental require an epistemological humility, lest 
we reconstitute them in corrupted forms through our translational haste.  It is against these 
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well-meaning but overreaching visions – along with the neuroethical ‘imperatives’ and 
‘hypercognitive’ ideals traced throughout this thesis – that I offer four ways we can 
productively resist and reorient approaches to our neurology.  
 
 
Resisting the brain as the silo of self, ethics, and wellbeing 
 
This thesis opened with the vignette of Paul Churchland’s unusual wallet token of affection, 
one which depicted his wife Patricia through a brain scan in lieu of the typical portrait.  Such a 
gesture speaks to a sweeping ontological claim, whereby all that we deem to constitute the 
self can ultimately be contained within the brain.  Such bald-faced eliminative materialist 
claims are seemingly not as prevalent as they were when the Churchland’s first propounded 
their model, but I have argued that broadly similar stances are now returning in new form 
through a particular vein of empirically-oriented neuroethics.  This form of neuroethics – which 
embraces experimental models in order to trace ‘morality’ as it is molecularly realised in the 
brain – positions itself as the authority by which we might epistemologically ground 
endeavours towards illuminating a ‘universal ethics’.  In this way neuroethics threatens to 
become part of that disciplinary ‘vortex’ Emily Martin (2000: 574) attributed to the cognitive 
neurosciences more broadly, sucking in all other lines of inquiry under their irresistible 
epistemic pull.  In this case, the vortex may come to claim the ongoing debate of millennia, 
pulling the assessments of wellbeing, right thinking, good action, and fellow feeling – and 
whatever else we might house under ‘ethics’ – into the brain terrain, where neuro-
practitioners will exercise an epistemic privilege, and where we in turn may come to look to 
our brains as the primary site upon which to better realise our capacities for virtue. 
I have argued that we should resist these attempts to produce morality in a vat, for the 
epistemological assumptions and subsequent experimental models that have resulted in wide-
ranging claims are highly questionable, visualising our morality within contexts of such 
‘irreality’ (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013: 78) that it threatens less to arrive at objective and 
definitive understandings of the moral subject than to rather produce this subject through the 
implications of their constructs and the effects of propounding their results.  Moreover, the 
very idea of the individual subject (and now his/her brain) as the most meaningful reference 
point of assessing ethics is wrapped up in recent socio-historical developments in 
governmentality.  To not recognise the contingency of these developments in neuroethical 
research would be to stubbornly affix ‘ethics’ to constructs unlikely to hold still, thus inviting 
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the prospect that current neuroethical transhumanists may find themselves defending an 
idealised subject as equally nostalgic and unrealistic as that for which many classical humanists 
currently find themselves disparaged.  
In response, throughout this thesis I have gestured to those theorists – who I would suggest 
share a broadly ‘anti-humanist’ stance – who propose that a subject ‘worthy of our present’ 
(Braidotti, 2013: 52) must be recognised as the entanglement of multiple ontologies, valences, 
and volitions through which ‘ethics’ circulates in exchange with surrounding contexts.  Finally, 
in addressing the vitalising labour of co-creating narratives for those living with dementia, I 
have outlined an ethical practice less focused on cultivating certain desired interior 
dispositions, and instead points to the recognition of mutual world-making.  Our interactions 
author each other into (or out of) an affirming state of selfhood, and thus our sense of 
wellbeing is far less dependent on (a largely Sisyphean) ethos of neuroasceticism than others 
may like us to believe.  This critique thus leads into the second recommendation I offer, 
arguing against the translational imperative to become ‘hypercognitive’. 
 
 
Resisting translational imperatives and the injunction to become ‘hypercognitive’ 
 
Throughout this thesis I have provided examples of a general distrust felt amongst ‘hard’ 
neuroethicists and transhumanists of affective and emotional volitions, and their 
accompanying aspirations to enhance our ‘species unique’ quality of rationality.  These 
aspirations are motivated in part by claims that we are ‘unfit for the future’, ill-equipped as 
citizens to collectively face global problems of risk, and so in need of ‘moral enhancement’ at 
the neurological level (Persson and Savulescu, 2012).  We are construed as failed subjects, with 
dispositions wedged between the violent, narrow-minded capacities of our primitive ancestors 
and the inability to cogently reckon with the magnitude of our global interdependence, and 
therefore need to be actuarially managed through sociobiological rationales.  In turn, and 
parallel to critiques already noted above, I have explored the question-begging quality of such 
proposals in their presumption to know what would constitute ‘moral enhancement’, along 
with noting the irony by which such a proposed regime of moral enhancement threatens to 
undermine some of the very same liberal-democratic principles these proponents so ardently 
seek to defend. 
Translational imperatives also manifest themselves at a less intrusive (but no less ethically 
salient) level through various ‘soft’ discourses of neuroscience, where popular texts, public 
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intellectuals, institutions, and consumer products and services espouse the promise of 
neuroscience in almost evangelical tones, enjoining us to harness the possibilities housed in 
our ‘neuroplasticity’.  Although ‘training’ your brain may do little at the neurological level (at 
least, not in the way that it is claimed to be efficacious), the accompanying ethical appeals 
embedded in these forms of virtuous play certainly contribute to entraining a particular kind of 
subject, who thinks of themselves as hypercognitive, always improvable, and that this willing 
labour shapes one’s virtue and their propensity to extract the most from life. 
Finally, these translational imperatives of the neuro are also increasingly found in policy 
development, and while the rhetoric of these texts is generally more measured the 
expectations often remain simultaneously ambitious and blinkered.  Such output is 
characterised by the proposing of practical applications that perhaps run ahead of plausibility, 
and are frequently justified by mobilising both the empirically ‘hard’ and persuasively 
evocative qualities of neuroscience, particularly through the epistemic appeal of brain imaging 
(Broer and Pickersgill, 2015a).  Through this turn of social policy to the neurosciences the brain 
is framed as a site of optimisation, self-governance, and vulnerability (Broer and Pickersgill, 
2015b), but when such policies are applied naively through mechanisms of the state harmful 
outcomes can result (Edwards, Gillies and Horsley, 2015).  
Altogether, these imperatives entail the expectation that we must – as aspiring citizens who 
wish to accord ourselves to prevailing norms – wrestle control over our rebellious psyches, 
deferring to epistemic authorities in how we should conduct this neuroasceticism, and also 
when our various differences require the consoling solidity of those specialised techniques by 
which our neurological makeups are rendered ‘visible’.  We increasingly appear to desire an 
authority whereby our flaws and shortcomings are rendered at a level below the self – and so 
partially absolving – but are alleviated through the encouragement towards certain 
personalised practices of self-care (which in turn serves as a display of one’s virtue).  In this 
way our ethical conduct is relocated into the neurological terrain. 
This translational haste may foreclose as yet unseen ways of imagining our neurological being, 
a haste in part resulting from the ‘chasing’ of scientific solutions to contemporary social 
problems (Rapp, 2011).  We should resist becoming swept up in a totalising logic of the brain 
as a new site for an ‘accumulation strategy’ (Harvey, 2000).  Such strategies promise the 
realisation of greater personal freedom, autonomy, and the utility derived from pushing our 
brains in search of perpetual growth.  But to accord ourselves to the narrow parameters of 
where ‘value’ is conferred today would also be to align ourselves with a crudely functionalised 
‘Brain Profile’ – as evident in popular brain training programs – that is ultimately unbefitting of 
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our potential.  Instead, we must humbly admit that we do not know how best to be ‘plastic’, 
for to make such claims forecloses the possibility of enchancement, whereby in resisting 
contemporary contingencies we may open new spaces in which cognition may traverse.  
Perhaps it would be timely, then, to again recall the original coinage of neuroethics, when in 
1973 Anneliese Pontius raised concerns that devices used to aid babies in walking were 
actually inhibiting the development of the motor functions required to walk unaided.  This 
cruel irony – and the further irony that contemporary neuroethics has largely eschewed and 
then forgotten this initial framing of the field – should compel us to be sensitive to what 
artefacts and prescriptions we integrate into our functioning as ideally ethical subjects, for 
they may prove self-defeating in ways not intended. 
 
 
Embracing transdisciplinary entanglement and ‘play’ 
 
I have been sharply critical of some neuro-enthusiasts throughout this thesis, chiefly those 
who I claim are practicing a hasty and overdetermined reductionism that may take great effort 
to deconstruct once it is rigidly ‘looped’ into our self-construction.  That said, great promise 
lies in recent and future transdisciplinary efforts between the neurosciences, the social 
sciences, and the humanities.  Their continued success, I believe, will rely upon leaving open a 
space for collaborative efforts characterised by a sense of ‘play’ (Balmer, 2013).  By ‘play’ I do 
not mean that these undertakings should be shot through with a sense a fun and levity for – as 
Callard and Fitzgerald (2015) note in their very recently published Rethinking Interdisciplinarity 
text – these risky endeavours are often beset by asymmetries of power, discomfiting 
ambivalence and ambiguity, the wearying ‘housework’ required for setting the scene for 
collaboration, not to mention the emotional labour necessary to hold these fragile collectives 
together to fruition.   
Rather, ‘play’ is meant here in the sense that – in contrast to prevalent hypothetico-deductive 
models – we should not presume to pre-emptively know or otherwise narrowly delimit what 
we may ‘discover’.  This is the kind of cautious play that humbly recognises that our paucity of 
knowledge – notwithstanding the undeniably spectacular developments in the neurosciences 
in recent decades – entails that the most regrettable thing to do now would be to solidify 
exactly how elusive and contextually nuanced properties may be rendered ‘visible’ through the 
brain.  Admittedly, to uphold such a sense of ‘play’ in an experimental setting invites a paradox 
of sorts, for the very mobilisation of certain disciplinary actors and specialised technologies 
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sets in motion what ‘reality’ may be made apparent through given means of translation 
(Latour, 1999).  There is also no doubt that these efforts will frequently result in working 
tensions and experimental ‘failures’ that some may find galling, but these discomfiting 
entanglements and their resulting output may nevertheless prove instructive, and should not 
be dismissed for their lack of neatly packaged research outcomes (Fitzgerald et al., 2014; 
Littlefield et al., 2014).  By diligently gesturing towards ‘play’, then, we may stay alive to 
chancing upon new ways of drawing the neurological out of the confines of the cranium. 
With this aspiration in mind, here is perhaps the best place to address the limitations of this 
study overall.  Firstly, it must be acknowledged that my accounts and critiques of some 
neuroethical scholarship and related calls for neuro-enhancement are largely synthetic 
discourse analyses, and so are perpetually stuck in a position of ‘catching up’ with knowledge 
production as an attempt to shape future lines of inquiry, rather than being an agent operating 
directly at this epistemological coalface.  Also, space limitations do not permit a thorough 
socio-historical outlining of various scientific models of the ‘ideal citizen’ since modernity, of 
which Joshua Greene’s moral dilemma and fMRI-based claims constitute one of the latest 
iterations.  Similarly, while there is a great deal of posthumanist thought cited in support 
throughout this chapter, there is a lack of new materialist interventions in a space where they 
are arguably well suited.  Though I do not wish to absolve myself of the failure to incorporate 
this potential for a more radical contribution to the neuro-turn, I can only point to the 
difficulty of traversing from, for example, the unflinchingly ‘practical’ ethics of scholars like 
Julian Savulescu to the knotty demands of poststructuralist thought, whilst always maintaining 
a coherent throughline accessible to readers across a variety of disciplinary backgrounds.  
Along similar lines, though the thesis could have stood on its own without the addition of 
Dementia in a Hypercognitive World, I was reluctant to leave this study as a largely negative, 
reactionary response to work in and around neuroethics that I still hold a begrudging respect 
for, if at times only for its sheer audacity.  Instead, with the limited resources at my disposal, I 
wanted to offer an approach that would simultaneously: contrast sharply with the ‘ideal’ 
neurobically-inclined subject envisioned by others; remain loosely within the same 
methodological gamut of close textual analysis; link current theoretical debates around the 
constitution of ‘ethics’ with practical and urgent discussions of ‘advocacy’; and finally also 
contribute to interdisciplinary ‘play’ with ‘entangled’ phenomena.  I remain sensitive to the 
supposition that perhaps an alternate ‘entanglement’ could have been offered, one perhaps 
not reliant on the inescapably speculative quality of fictional accounts.  Nevertheless, due to 
restrictions of access and resources this delve into Oliver Sacks-inspired ‘romantic science’ (see 
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Wade, 2015) was deemed necessary as a means of offering a positive original contribution to 
complement the thorough disciplinary interrogation that preceded it. 
With these admissions in mind, my own contribution to this interdisciplinary ‘play’ has been 
through pointing to the ways in which creative works of fiction may elucidate new ways of 
exploring the subjectivity of dementia, and open up parallel paths to currently prevalent 
neuroscientific discourses regarding function and difference.  Fictional works, and novels 
especially, can explore aspects of interiority unavailable to other textual forms, and so when 
complemented by thorough insight and sensitive rendering can produce narratives that are 
gently but persuasively instructive, suffused with consolation and affirming empathy.  These 
fictional works stoke within us the willingness to make Ricoeur’s ‘wager’ (1967: 355) of 
entering into psyches of alterity, and finding therein a form of ‘restorative’ and ‘reparative’ 
criticism that contributes to the broader movement of neurodiversity, a diversity enacted not 
simply in the sense of improving the quality of care we provide to those who are neurologically 
atypical.   Rather, this neurodiversity recognises that sound ethical practice does not require 
intensively tilling and toiling over one’s arable brain terrain in the hope of improving the 
productive yield of the self, but instead is achieved in far less inward-looking and far more 
urgent task of seeking ways in which the expressive desires of others may be better realised, 
however far from ‘hypercognitive’ such expressions of mutuality may appear.    
 
 
Embracing the polyphenomenality of ethical being  
 
In the epigraph that opens this final chapter Hannah Arendt speaks of our ‘relentless search for 
the base underneath mere appearances’, yet we find ourselves nevertheless compelled to 
overlay certain orienting constructs to make this ‘base’ phenomena meaningfully manifest.  
Similarly, we look for those ‘human kinds’ to match the ‘natural kinds’ of the world, immutable 
laws of our being by which we can orient ourselves (Hacking, 1995).  But this affixing of the 
human subject is often a fraught task, for we are endlessly reflexive and porous beings, and 
thus we cannot make manifest ‘essential’ properties of our being in ways perfectly cleaved 
from the world without rendering them hollow, corrupted, and lacking in meaning.  Indeed, as 
I have shown, when we attempt to do so we risk propounding understandings of properties 
like ‘morality’ that loop into a diminished perspective of ourselves.  Flawed neuroethical 
‘spectroscopes’ that purport to hold objective rigour results in the misleading ledger of 
measuring morality in a vat, generating output ‘from which humanness is abstracted, yet 
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nevertheless claims to represent it’ (Cohn, 2004: 70-1).  This neat cleaving envisages the brain 
as an overdetermined space that flattens contingent and socio-historically negotiated qualities 
of being into inert material states.  Perhaps, given the focus of this thesis regarding the 
attempts to bound ethics in neurological terrain, we can instead envision a means by which 
the neurosciences – amongst other epistemic actors and spaces – can contribute to an effort 
towards rendering ‘ethics’ manifest in new forms, of considering ethics in ‘polyphenomenal’ 
terms (Rabinow, 1996), rather than simply the practice of the rational, hypercognitive modern 
subject.  In the 1999 (272) afterword to Governing the Soul Nikolas Rose posed: 
‘… at least as an experiment of thought, the question of what an ethic of existence 
might be that did not refer itself to that psy shaped space which has been installed at 
the heart of each modern individual.  Could one not imagine another kind of freedom, 
whose ethics were resolutely ‘superficial’?  An ethics whose vectors did not run from 
outer to inner, and did not question appearances in the name of their hidden truth, 
but which ran across the outsides, between, among persons, where subjectivities were 
distributed, collective and oriented to action?  An ethic, that is to say, that did not seek 
to problematize, to celebrate or to govern the soul?’   
For now, our ongoing intensive gaze into the modern subject – at least through neuroethics 
and related fields – seems to be moving away from this proposal to untether ‘ethics’ from the 
individualised citizen-subject.  Too often it seems, across both the hard transhumanist and 
more bioconservative stances, ethics is still framed within broadly humanist perspectives, 
dragging along with them conceptions of the ideal subject they seek to more securely buttress 
through essentialist appeals.  But, as noted by Foucault (1988: 15) earlier in this thesis, it is 
likely that there are ‘more secrets, more possible freedoms and more inventions in our future 
than we can imagine in humanism’.  To realise these secrets, freedoms, and inventions 
requires a humble willingness to not immediately look to the brain as a solution for 
contemporary problems.  Therefore, to channel a line of thought stretching back to Spinoza, 
we must humbly acknowledge that we do not know what a body can do, nor we do know what 
a brain can bring into its phenomenological purview.  Neither do we understand how various 
intentions and volitions are distributed through brain and body, along with the agents with 
whom we interact, and all those other actors, artefacts, and forces of the external world.  
Amidst these wondrous possibilities, we should hope that ‘ethics’ may amount to more than 
an intensively functionalised reading of our neurology, but rather is realised as an expansive, 
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